United States District Court, E.D. New York
ROBERT H. AJAMIAN, Plaintiff,
KINAN NIMEH, J.P. TURNER & COMPANY, ALI SABETYHADEN, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
M. AZRACK, District Judge:
March 9, 2017, pro se plaintiff Robert H. Ajamian
(“plaintiff”) has filed another in forma
pauperis complaint against Kinan Nimeh
(“Nimeh”), as well as J.P. Turner & Co.
(“Turner”) and Ali Sabetyhaden (“Ali”
and collectively, “defendants”) purporting to
allege claims of securities fraud based on events alleged to
have occurred during the period from April 2011 to October
2012. Upon review of plaintiff's request to
proceed in forma pauperis, the Court finds that
plaintiff is qualified by his financial status to commence
this action without prepayment of the filing fee.
Accordingly, plaintiff's application to proceed in
forma pauperis is granted. However, for the reasons that
follow, the complaint is sua sponte dismissed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (ii) and the Clerk
of the Court is directed to mark this case closed.
plaintiff's earlier complaints, plaintiff's brief,
handwritten complaint is difficult to understand. Although
the sparse allegations are difficult to discern, plaintiff
describes that conduct underlying his claims “took
place from 4/2011 - 10/2012.” (Compl. ¶ III.B.)
Plaintiff alleges that “Nimeh was told to invest in C
Citigroup when it was $2 a share and to buy $3000 worth of
this stock. By Jan. 2012 the stock went to $40 a
share.” (Id. ¶ III.C.) Nimeh is described
to have not purchased those shares and thus plaintiff claims
to have been damaged in the amount of “$57, 000 in lost
income.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that Nimeh was
“grossly negligent and deliberately ignored me”
and acted with “scienter” and “malice with
criminal fraudulent intent.” (Id.) Plaintiff
further claims that the shares he had asked Nimeh to purchase
“today would be worth $100, 000.” (Id.
¶ V.) As a result of the foregoing, plaintiff brings
claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(i) and Section 27 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)
for unspecified relief. (Id. ¶ II.B.)
Standard of Review
to the in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C.
§1915, a court must dismiss an action if it determines
that it “(i) is frivolous or malicious, (ii) fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (iii)
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court
must dismiss the action as soon as it makes such a
se submissions are afforded wide interpretational
latitude and should be held “to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per
curiam); see also Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d
857, 860 (2d Cir. 1997). In addition, the court is required
to read the plaintiff's pro se complaint
liberally and interpret it as raising the strongest arguments
it suggests. United States v. Akinrosotu, 637 F.3d
165, 167 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation
omitted); Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir.
Supreme Court has held that pro se complaints need
not even plead specific facts; rather the complainant
“need only give the defendant fair notice of what the .
. . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted); cf.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as
to do justice.”). However, a pro se plaintiff
must still plead “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted). The plausibility
standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678.
While “‘detailed factual allegations'”
are not required, “[a] pleading that offers
‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.'” Id. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Pleading Requirements of Rules 8 and 9 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure
Court has made clear to plaintiff in its prior orders in his
earlier cases, (see the April 19, 2016 Memorandum
and Order in 16-CV-00145 and 15-CV-7442), Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a pleading
contain, inter alia, “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8's pleading
requirements are intended to give the defendant “fair
notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.” Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S.
336, 346 (2005) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 47 (1957), overruled in part on other grounds by
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544). A “plaintiff's
obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to
relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
plaintiff's complaint involves allegations sounding in
fraud, the pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 9(b) must also be met. When a complaint
alleges fraud, “Rule 9(b) requires that allegations of
fraud be pleaded with particularity.” Harsco Corp.
v. Segui, 91 F.3d 337, 347 (2d Cir. 1996); see
also Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b) (“In alleging fraud or
mistake, a party must state with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent,
knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be
alleged generally.”). This means that a complaint
“must (1) detail the statements (or omissions) that the
plaintiff contends are fraudulent; (2) identify the speaker;
(3) state where and when the statements (or omissions) were
made; and (4) explain why the statements (or omissions) are
fraudulent.” Segui, 91 F.3d at 347; see
also Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 459 F.3d 273, 290 (2d
8's general pleading requirement and Rule 9(b)'s
particularity requirement must be read together. Ouaknine
v. MacFarlane, 897 F.2d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating
that “Rule 9(b) . . . must be read together with Rule
8(a) which requires only a ‘short and plain
statement' of the claims for relief”); Credit
& Fin. Corp. v. Warner & Swasey Co., 638 F.2d
563, 566 (2d Cir. 1981) (same). These two rules have been
read together to mean that a plaintiff need not plead
evidentiary details. See, e.g., In re
Scholastic Corp. Sec. Litig., 252 F.3d 63, 72 (2d. Cir.
2001). However, “[t]o pass muster under rule 9(b), the
complaint must allege the time, place, speaker, and sometimes
even the content of the alleged misrepresentation.”
Ouaknine, 897 F.2d at 79 (citing DiVittorio v.
Equidyne Extractive Indus., Inc., 822 F.2d 1242, 1247
(2d Cir. 1987) (additional citation omitted). Although
scienter need not be alleged with great specificity, Beck
v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d
Cir.1987), there must be some factual allegations in support
pleading standard applies even to pro se litigants.
While the special leniency afforded to pro se
litigants somewhat loosens the procedural rules governing the
form of pleadings, it does not completely relieve a pro
se plaintiff of the duty to satisfy the pleading
standards set forth in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and
9. See Vega v. Artus, 610 F.Supp.2d 185, 196 &
n. 8-9 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Second Circuit cases);
Wilson v. Dalene, 699 F.Supp.2d 534 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)