United States District Court, S.D. New York
Nath Blauvelt, NY Pro Se Plaintiff.
Anthony Jan-Huan Sun, Esq. U.S. Attorney's Office
S.D.N.Y. New York, NY Counsel for Defendant Internal Revenue
OPINION & ORDER
KENNETH M. KARAS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Prem Nath (“Plaintiff”) brought this pro se
Action against JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
(“JPMorgan”), Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.
(“SPS”), U.S. Bank, N.A., as indenture trustee
for C.S.F.B. Trust 2002-NP14 (“U.S. Bank, ” and
collectively with JPMorgan and SPS, the “Private
Defendants”), and the Internal Revenue Service (the
“IRS”), seeking to quiet title to certain real
property and to cancel or invalidate various assignments and
agreements related to a mortgage encumbering the property.
(See Compl. (Dkt. No. 1).) In an Opinion & Order
(“Opinion”) issued September 30, 2016, the Court
dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff's claims against the
Private Defendants and the IRS, with the exception of
Plaintiff's claim challenging the procedural validity of
the tax liens issued against the real property located at 12
John Calvin Street, Blauvelt, New York (the “Subject
Property”). (See Op. & Order
(“Opinion”) 31-32 (Dkt. No. 68).) With respect to
that claim, and that claim only, Plaintiff was granted leave
to file an Amended Complaint. (See id.)
the Court is the IRS's Motion To Dismiss the Amended
Complaint (the “Motion”). (See Dkt. No.
76.) For the following reasons, the Motion is granted.
Factual Background & Procedural History
Court assumes the Parties' familiarity with the facts,
and as the Court is fully familiar with them and has had the
opportunity to recount them in multiple opinions in the
numerous actions Plaintiff has filed, the Court declines to
repeat them here. A comprehensive account of the factual and
procedural history of this case can be found in the
Court's prior opinions. See In re Nath, Nos.
15-CV-3694, 16-CV-2032, 2017 WL 1194735 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31,
2017); Nath v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., No.
15-CV-8183, 2017 WL 782914 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2017); Nath
v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 15-CV-3937, 2016 WL
5791193 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2016).
filed the instant Action on May 21, 2015, “to [q]uiet
[t]itle on the [Subject] [P]roperty, to expunge any title
claimed by Defendants with respect to said property, to
remove the cloud on the title held by Plaintiff, and to
nullify a loan modification agreement secured by the
property.” (See Compl. 1-2.) Private
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on September 16, 2015,
(see Dkt. Nos. 20-22), which Plaintiff opposed on
September 25, 2015, (see Dkt. No. 23; see
also Dkt. No. 53). Private Defendants replied on October
2, 2015. (See Dkt. Nos. 25-26.) The IRS filed a
motion to dismiss on December 18, 2015, (see Dkt.
Nos. 43-46), which Plaintiff opposed on January 29, 2016,
(see Dkt. No. 52). The IRS filed its reply brief on
February 26, 2016. (See Dkt. No. 54.)
September 2016 Opinion, the Court dismissed with prejudice
Plaintiff's claims against the Private Defendants and the
IRS, but granted Plaintiff leave to amend a single claim
challenging the procedural validity of the tax liens issued
against the Subject Property. (See Opinion 31-32.)
On October 28, 2016, Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint.
(See Am. Compl. (Dkt. No. 71).) Despite the
Court's previous instruction, Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint named the Private Defendants in the caption of the
case and repeated numerous allegations as to those
Defendants. (See generally id.) In an Order issued
November 3, 2016, the Court again dismissed with prejudice
the claims against the Private Defendants. (See Dkt.
December 19, 2016, the IRS filed the instant Motion To
Dismiss and accompanying papers. (See Dkt. Nos.
76-78.) Plaintiff filed his opposition on January 23, 2017,
(see Dkt. No. 79), and the IRS filed its reply on
February 13, 2017, (see Dkt. Nos. 80-81).
Standard of Review
Supreme Court has held that although a complaint “does
not need detailed factual allegations” to survive a
motion to dismiss, “a plaintiff's obligation to
provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed,
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “demands
more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
naked assertions devoid of further factual
enhancement.” Id. (alteration and internal
quotation marks omitted). Rather, a complaint's
“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Although “once a
claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by
showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in
the complaint, ” id. at 563, and a plaintiff
must allege “only enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face, ” id. at
570, if a plaintiff has not “nudged [his] claims across
the line from conceivable to plausible, the complaint must
be dismissed, ” id.; see also Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 679 (“Determining whether a complaint
states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the
pleader is entitled to relief.'” (second alteration
in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2))); id. at 678-79 (“Rule 8 marks a
notable and generous departure from the hypertechnical,
code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock
the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing
more than conclusions.”).
ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge must
accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in
the complaint, ” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 94 (2007), and “draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the plaintiff, ” Daniel v. T & M Prot.
Res., Inc., 992 F.Supp.2d 302, 304 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(citing Koch v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 699
F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 2012)). Additionally, “[i]n
adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court must
confine its consideration to facts stated on the face of the
complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or
incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of
which judicial notice may be ...