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Nath v. Internal Revenue Service

United States District Court, S.D. New York

June 6, 2017

PREM NATH, Plaintiff,
v.
THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Defendant.

          Prem Nath Blauvelt, NY Pro Se Plaintiff.

          Anthony Jan-Huan Sun, Esq. U.S. Attorney's Office S.D.N.Y. New York, NY Counsel for Defendant Internal Revenue Service.

          OPINION & ORDER

          KENNETH M. KARAS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

         Plaintiff Prem Nath (“Plaintiff”) brought this pro se Action against JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“JPMorgan”), Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (“SPS”), U.S. Bank, N.A., as indenture trustee for C.S.F.B. Trust 2002-NP14 (“U.S. Bank, ” and collectively with JPMorgan and SPS, the “Private Defendants”), and the Internal Revenue Service (the “IRS”), seeking to quiet title to certain real property and to cancel or invalidate various assignments and agreements related to a mortgage encumbering the property. (See Compl. (Dkt. No. 1).) In an Opinion & Order (“Opinion”) issued September 30, 2016, the Court dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff's claims against the Private Defendants and the IRS, with the exception of Plaintiff's claim challenging the procedural validity of the tax liens issued against the real property located at 12 John Calvin Street, Blauvelt, New York (the “Subject Property”). (See Op. & Order (“Opinion”) 31-32 (Dkt. No. 68).) With respect to that claim, and that claim only, Plaintiff was granted leave to file an Amended Complaint. (See id.)

         Before the Court is the IRS's Motion To Dismiss the Amended Complaint (the “Motion”). (See Dkt. No. 76.) For the following reasons, the Motion is granted.

         I. Factual Background & Procedural History

         The Court assumes the Parties' familiarity with the facts, and as the Court is fully familiar with them and has had the opportunity to recount them in multiple opinions in the numerous actions Plaintiff has filed, the Court declines to repeat them here. A comprehensive account of the factual and procedural history of this case can be found in the Court's prior opinions. See In re Nath, Nos. 15-CV-3694, 16-CV-2032, 2017 WL 1194735 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017); Nath v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., No. 15-CV-8183, 2017 WL 782914 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2017); Nath v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 15-CV-3937, 2016 WL 5791193 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2016).

         Plaintiff filed the instant Action on May 21, 2015, “to [q]uiet [t]itle on the [Subject] [P]roperty, to expunge any title claimed by Defendants with respect to said property, to remove the cloud on the title held by Plaintiff, and to nullify a loan modification agreement secured by the property.” (See Compl. 1-2.) Private Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on September 16, 2015, (see Dkt. Nos. 20-22), which Plaintiff opposed on September 25, 2015, (see Dkt. No. 23; see also Dkt. No. 53). Private Defendants replied on October 2, 2015. (See Dkt. Nos. 25-26.) The IRS filed a motion to dismiss on December 18, 2015, (see Dkt. Nos. 43-46), which Plaintiff opposed on January 29, 2016, (see Dkt. No. 52). The IRS filed its reply brief on February 26, 2016. (See Dkt. No. 54.)

         In its September 2016 Opinion, the Court dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff's claims against the Private Defendants and the IRS, but granted Plaintiff leave to amend a single claim challenging the procedural validity of the tax liens issued against the Subject Property. (See Opinion 31-32.) On October 28, 2016, Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint. (See Am. Compl. (Dkt. No. 71).) Despite the Court's previous instruction, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint named the Private Defendants in the caption of the case and repeated numerous allegations as to those Defendants. (See generally id.) In an Order issued November 3, 2016, the Court again dismissed with prejudice the claims against the Private Defendants. (See Dkt. No. 72.)

         On December 19, 2016, the IRS filed the instant Motion To Dismiss and accompanying papers. (See Dkt. Nos. 76-78.) Plaintiff filed his opposition on January 23, 2017, (see Dkt. No. 79), and the IRS filed its reply on February 13, 2017, (see Dkt. Nos. 80-81).

         II. Discussion

         A. Standard of Review

         The Supreme Court has held that although a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss, “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, a complaint's “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Although “once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint, ” id. at 563, and a plaintiff must allege “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face, ” id. at 570, if a plaintiff has not “nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, the[] complaint must be dismissed, ” id.; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2))); id. at 678-79 (“Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hypertechnical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.”).

         “[W]hen ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint, ” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), and “draw[] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, ” Daniel v. T & M Prot. Res., Inc., 992 F.Supp.2d 302, 304 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Koch v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 699 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 2012)). Additionally, “[i]n adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court must confine its consideration to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice may be ...


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