United States District Court, W.D. New York
IN Re PRINCE divine MESSIAH MUHAMMAD, also known as Richard McCary, Respondent.
CHARLES J. SIRAGUSA United States District Judge.
examination of the Court's Docket, it appears that
Respondent, Prince divine Messiah Muhammad (who has sued
under a number of variants of that name or the name
Richard McCary, which appears to be Mr. Muhammad's legal
name) has engaged in a pattern of abuse of the judicial
process and thus should be enjoined from filing any future
cases in this District, of any type, without first obtaining
permission from the Court. Before Mr. Muhammad can be so
enjoined, however, the Court must provide him with an
opportunity to show cause, in writing, why this sanction
should not be entered and imposed upon him. See Moates v.
Barkley, 147 F.3d 207, 208 (2d Cir. 1998).
Muhammad is currently detained at the Rochester Psychiatric
Center ("RPC") as an "acquitee" who had
been found Not Responsible by Reason of a Mental Disease or
Defect in Kings County, New York in 1994, see N.Y.
Crim. Proc. Law § 330.20; Muhammad v. New York
State, 6:16-CV-06005-CJS, Docket No. 4, Order at 3, n.4
(W.D.N.Y. April 21, 2016).
review of the Docket shows that between December 2015 and
November 2016, Mr. Muhammad has filed at least ten civil
rights actions or habeas corpus proceedings in this Court,
and has sought permission to proceed in forma
pauperis in each case. Each of the civil actions and
petitions filed was illogical, confusing and, for the most
part, delusional. The central theme of each of them was that
Mr. Muhammad was forced to take a plea under N.Y. Crim. Proc.
L. §330.20 by his "devil lawyers" who told him
that if he agreed to the plea, he would be released from the
hospital within six months to a year and would then be
allowed to go home. As a result of the plea, he alleges that
he has been involuntarily committed in a number of
"Hospitals, " including the Kirby Forensic
Psychiatric Center, Kings County Hospital, Mid-Hudson
Hospital, Rikers Island and RPC, and has been "doped
up" to the point that he has developed diabetes and
other ailments and diseases. One complaint blames former
President Barack Obama and "his devils" for his
confinement and trying to kill him. See Muhammad v. New
York State, 6:16-CV-06005-CJS, Docket No. 4, Order at
2-3, April 21, 2016; Muhammad v. New York State,
6:16-CV-06030-CJS, Docket No. 5, Order at 3-4, April 21,
2016; Muhammad v. Sullivan, 6:16-CV-06127-CJS,
Docket 4, Order at 5, April 21, 2016. Each of the ten actions
filed has been dismissed as frivolous, repetitious and/or
delusional. One of the petitions was dismissed because
Plaintiff failed to address, as directed by former Chief
Judge Loretta Preska of the United States District Court,
Southern District on New York,  (1) what commitment order Mr.
Muhammad was challenging, (2) what steps he had taken to
exhaust his state judicial remedies, and (3) what the grounds
for relief were. Muhammad v. Griffin,
6:15-CV-06750-CJS, Docket No. 2, Order; 16-CV-06124 CJS,
Docket No. 16, Order. Mr. Muhammad's Amended Petition was
nothing more than the same oft-pled diatribe about the
circumstances of his § 330.20 plea and how he had been
doped up and treated at the various "Hospitals."
The petition was dismissed. Id.
Court cannot continue to allow Mr. Muhammad to file multiple
frivolous and repetitive cases in this Court wasting valuable
Court resources, which is not only intolerable, but also
harmful to the constitutionally mandated functions of the
Court. The Court therefore finds that it must enjoin Mr.
Muhammad from pursuing claims in this Court by a more severe
sanction than just dismissing his actions with prejudice and
with warnings that the continued filing of case after case in
this Court may lead to the imposition of sanctions against
him, including the very filing injunction addressed herein.
Mr. Muhammad, even after the entry of some of the dismissal
orders, addressed above, warned him that the repeated filing
of cases in this Court could lead to the imposition of severe
sanctions, including a filing injunction, has continued to
file cases that are repetitive and frivolous. E.g.,
Muhammad v. New York State, 6:16-CV-06005-CJS, Docket
No. 4, Order at 9-10, April 21, 2016; Muhammad v. New
York State, 6:16-CV-06030-CJS, Docket No. 5, Order at
9-10, April 21, 2016; Muhammad v. Sullivan,
16-CV-06127-CJS, Docket No. 4, Order at 9-10, April 21, 2016;
6:16-CV-06306, Docket No. 3, Order at 4, July 20, 2016).
Muhammad was also expressly warned that if he continued to
use foul language or expletives in any pleading or document
submitted to the Court, such as in a prior action,
Muhammad v. Mortiere, 6:16-CV-06661-CJS, Docket No.
4, Order at 2-3, Nov. 8, 2016, he would be sanctioned and
that the sanction might include, among other things, an
injunction against the filing of any actions or proceedings
in this Court without first obtaining permission from the
Court. In Mr. Muhammad's Amended Petition, he used
exactly the language he was advised against using and, in a
letter submitted with the Amended Petition,  admonished the
undersigned from questioning his use of such language.
Id., Order, Docket No. 6 at 3-4, June 20, 2017.
well settled that "[a] district court may, in its
discretion, impose sanctions against litigants who abuse the
judicial process." Shafti v. British Airways,
PLC, 83 F.3d 566, 571 (2d Cir. 1996). Mr. Muhammad's
status as a pro se litigant does not give him
"an 'impenetrable shield [from the application of
Fed.R.Civ.P. 11], for one acting pro se has no
license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery with
meritless litigation, and abuse already overloaded court
dockets." DePonceau v. Bush, No.
04-CV-6240CJS(FE), 2004 WL 1574621, at *3 (W.D.N.Y., June 04,
2004) (W.D.N.Y. June 4, 2004) (quoting Patterson v.
Aiken, 841 F.2d 386, 387 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting
Farguson v. Mbank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359
(5th Cir. 1986)). It is well-established that the federal
courts "have both the inherent power and the
constitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction from
conduct which impairs their ability to carry out Article III
functions." In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184
n. 8 (1989) (quoting In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d
1254, 1261 (2d Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 474 U.S.
1061 (1986)); see also Hong Mai Sa v. Doe, 406 F.3d
155, 158 (2d Cir. 2005) ("If a litigant has a history of
filing vexatious, harassing or duplicative lawsuits, courts
may impose sanctions, including restrictions on future access
to the judicial system.") (internal quotations and
citations omitted). The Supreme Court and our Court of
Appeals have made it clear that "a district court has
inherent authority to sanction parties appearing before it
for acting in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for
oppressive reasons." Sassower v. Field, 973
F.2d 75, 80-81 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing Chambers v. NASCO,
Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44-45, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 2133),
cert, denied, 507 U.S. 1043 (1993)).
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, sanctions
may be imposed upon a pro se litigant who continues to file
frivolous or baseless claims and petitions. Mendoza v.
Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1993);
DePonceau, 2004 WL 1574621, at *3; Young v.
Corbin, 889 F.Supp. 582 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). The Supreme
Court has stated that "the central purpose of Rule 11 is
to deter baseless filings in District Court and . . .
streamline the administration and procedure of the federal
courts." Cooler & Gell v. Hart-marx Corp.,
496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990) (citation omitted); see also
Williams v. Revlon Co., 156 F.R.D. 39, 43 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) (The purpose of Rule 11 is to check abuses which cause
"the waste of judicial resources and resulting
inefficiencies and delays that affect all actual and
potential litigants in the federal courts.") (citations
11(b) of the Federal Rules provides, in pertinent part, that
when an unrepresented party presents a pleading, motion, or
other paper to the court, that party:
certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after inquiry reasonable
under the circumstances:
(1) it is not being presented for an improper purpose, such
as to harass [or] cause unnecessary delay. ..
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for
extending, modifying, or reversing ...