United States District Court, W.D. New York
CASSANDRA D. RILEY-TULL, Plaintiff,
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,  ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
DECISION AND ORDER
FRANK P. GERACI, JR. Chief Judge.
D. Riley-Tull ("Riley-Tull" or "Plaintiff)
brings this action pursuant to the Social Security Act
("the Act") seeking review of the final decision of
the Acting Commissioner of Social Security ("the
Commissioner") that denied her applications for
disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and
Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Titles
II and XVI of the Act. ECF No. 1. The Court has jurisdiction
over this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),
parties have moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). ECF Nos. 11, 12. For
the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED,
the Commissioner's motion is DENIED, and this matter is
REMANDED to the Commissioner for further administrative
April 30, 2013, Riley-Tull protectively applied for DIB and
SSI with the Social Security Administration ("the
SSA"). Tr. 187-97. She alleged that she had been disabled
since March 12, 2011, due to irritable bowel syndrome
("IBS"), lower back pain, and asthma. Tr. 211. On
March 10, 2015, Riley-Tull and a vocational expert
("VE") testified at a hearing before Administrative
Law Judge Robert T. Harvey ("the ALJ"). Tr. 31-60.
On May 19, 2015, the ALJ issued a decision finding that
Riley-Tull was not disabled within the meaning of the Act.
Tr. 13-23. On January 27, 2016, the Appeals Council denied
Riley-lull's request for review. Tr. 1-6. Thereafter,
Riley-Tull commenced this action seeking review of the
Commissioner's final decision. ECF No. 1.
District Court Review
reviewing a final decision of the SSA, this Court is limited
to determining whether the SSA's conclusions were
supported by substantial evidence in the record and were
based on a correct legal standard." Talavera v.
Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotation
marks omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The Act holds that a decision by the Commissioner is
"conclusive" if it is supported by substantial
evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). "Substantial evidence
means more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion." Moran v. Astrue, 569
F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted). It is
not the Court's function to "determine de
novo whether [the claimant] is disabled."
Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1998)
(quotation marks omitted); see also Wagner v. Sec 'y
of Health & Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir.
1990) (holding that review of the Secretary's decision is
not de novo and that the Secretary's findings
are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence).
must follow a five-step sequential evaluation to determine
whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Act.
See Parker v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 470-71
(1986). At step one, the ALJ must determine whether the
claimant is engaged in substantial gainful work activity.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). If so, the
claimant is not disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step
two and determines whether the claimant has an impairment, or
combination of impairments, that is "severe" within
the meaning of the Act, meaning that it imposes significant
restrictions on the claimant's ability to perform basic
work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If the
claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of
impairments, the analysis concludes with a finding of
"not disabled." If the claimant does, the ALJ
continues to step three.
three, the ALJ examines whether a claimant's impairment
meets or medically equals the criteria of a listed impairment
in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of Regulation No. 4 (the
"Listings"). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). If the
impairment meets or medically equals the criteria of a
Listing and meets the durational requirement (20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1509), the claimant is disabled. If not, the ALJ
determines the claimant's residual functional capacity
("RFC"), which is the ability to perform physical
or mental work activities on a sustained basis,
notwithstanding limitations for the collective impairments.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e)-(f).
then proceeds to step four and determines whether the
claimant's RFC permits him or her to perform the
requirements of his or her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(f). If the claimant can perform such
requirements, then he or she is not disabled. If he or she
cannot, the analysis proceeds to the fifth and final step,
wherein the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that
the claimant is not disabled. To do so, the Commissioner must
present evidence to demonstrate that the claimant
"retains a residual functional capacity to perform
alternative substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy" in light of his or her age, education,
and work experience. See Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d
72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted); see
also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c).