Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Monk v. Racette

United States District Court, S.D. New York

July 12, 2017

TERRANCE MONK, Petitioner,



         On April 21, 2014, Terrance Monk ("Petitioner"), proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his August 17, 2005 judgment of conviction for attempted robbery in the first degree in New York state court and his sentence of a 10-year determinate term of imprisonment with five years of postrelease supervision. (Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Pet.") 1 (Dkt, No, 1).) On July 18, 2014, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Lisa Margaret Smith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). (See Order Referring Case to Magistrate Judge (Dkt. No. 5).) On March 24, 2017, Judge Smith issued a Report and Recommendation (the "R&R") recommending that the Petition be denied. (See Dkt. No. 18.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court adopts the R&R.

         I. Discussion

         'The factual and procedural background of this case is set forth, in part, in the R&R. (See R. & R. 2-4.) The Court will not repeat that background here.

         'The R&R was issued on March 24, 2017, (see Dkt. No. 18), and Petitioner's objections were therefore due by April 7, 2017, (see id.). On April 3, 2017, Petitioner requested an additional 30 days in which to submit his objections, (see Dkt. No. 19), and the Court granted the extension, (see Dkt. No. 20). On May 4, 2017, Petitioner timely filed his objections to the R&R. (See Dkt. No. 22.)

         A. Standard of Review

         1. Review of a Magistrate Judge's Report & Recommendation

          A district court reviewing a report and recommendation addressing a dispositive motion "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), a party may submit objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation. The objections must be "specific" and "written, " fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2), and must be made "| w]ithin 14 days after being served with a copy of the recommended disposition, " id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), plus an additional three days when service is made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b)(2)(C), (D), or (F), see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d), for a total of seventeen days, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1).

         "A district court evaluating a magistrate judge's report may adopt those portions of the report (and recommendation] to which no 'specific, written objection' is made, as long as the factual and legal bases supporting the findings and conclusions set forth in those sections are not clearly erroneous or contrary to law." Adams v. N.Y.Slate Dep't of Educ, 855 F.Supp.2d 205, 206 (S.D.N.Y.2012), aff'd sub nom. Hochstadt v. N.Y.State Educ. Dep't, 547 F.App'x 9 (2d Cir. 2013). However, where a party timely objects to a report and recommendation, as Petitioner has done here, the district court reviews de novo the parts of the report and recommendation to which the party objected. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3). "When a I petitioner] simply rehashes the same arguments set forth in [his] original petition, however, such objections do not suffice to invoke de novo review of the [r]eport." Aponie v. Cunningham, No. 08-CV-6748, 2011 WL 1432037, at * 1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2011) (italics omitted); see also Hall v. Herbert, Nos. 02-CV-2299, 02-CV-2300, 2004 WL 287115, at * 1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2004) ("[T]o the extent that a party simply reiterates his original arguments, the |c]ourt reviews the report and recommendation only for clear error, ").

         Finally, pleadings submitted by pro se litigants are held to a less strict standard than those drafted by attorneys. See Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 402 (2008) ("Even in the formal litigation context, pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties." (italics omitted)). Because Petitioner is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his pleadings to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest. See Triestmcm v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam).

         2. Habeas Corpus Review

         Petitions for a writ of habeas corpus are governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), which provides that “[t]he writ may not issue for any claim adjudicated on the merits by a state court unless the state court's decision was 'contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, ' or was 'based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.'" Epps v. Poole, 687 F.3d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(lH2)). In this context, "it is the habeas applicant's burden to show that the state court applied [federal law] to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner." Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002) (per curiam). "[A]n unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002); see also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007) ("The question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable-a substantially higher threshold.").

         Section 2254(d) "reflects the view that habeas corpus is a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." Harrington v. Richler, 562 U.S. 86, 102-03 (2011) (interna! quotation marks omitted). Consequently, a federal court must deny a habeas petition in some circumstances even if the court would have reached a conclusion different than the one reached by the state court, because "even a strong ease for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. at 102; see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 202-03 (2011) ("Even if the [federal] Court of Appeals might have reached a different conclusion as an initial matter, it was not an unreasonable application of our precedent for the j stale court] to conclude that [the petitioner] did not establish prejudice."); Hawthorne v. Schneiderman, 695 F.3d 192, 197 (2d Cir. 2012) ("Although we might not have decided the issue in the way that the [New York State] Appellate Division did..........and indeed we are troubled by the outcome we are constrained to reach--we .... must defer to the determination made by the state court. . . ." (citation omitted)).

         Under AEDPA, the factual findings of state courts are presumed to be correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Nelson v. Walker,121 F.3d 828, 833 (2d Cir. 1997). A petitioner can rebut this presumption only by "clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C, § 2254(e)(1); see also Cotto v. Herbert,331 F.3d 217, 233 (2d Cir. 2003) (same). Finally, only federal law claims are cognizable in habeas proceedings. "[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); see also 28 U.S.C. ยง 2254(a) ("The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.