United States District Court, W.D. New York
STEPHEN R. MACINTYRE, and SCOTT E. SULLIVAN, Plaintiffs,
JACK W. MOORE, Supervisor, Town of Henrietta, Defendant.
DECISION AND ORDER
ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, District Judge.
Stephen R. Maclntyre ("Maclntyre") and Scott E.
Sullivan ("Sullivan") (collectively,
"Plaintiffs") commenced this action on October 30,
2015, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. ("FLSA"),
and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001 et seq. ("ERISA"). (Dkt.
1). The complaint names only one Defendant: Jack W. Moore
("Moore" or "Defendant"), the Town
Supervisor of the Town of Henrietta, New York. (Id.
before the Court is Defendant's motion to dismiss the
complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), (Dkt. 4), and
Plaintiffs' cross-motion for leave to file an amended
complaint. (Dkt. 8). As discussed below, Plaintiffs have
failed to plausibly allege a claim under either the FLSA or
ERISA. However, because Plaintiffs may be able to
plausibly allege a claim under the FLSA, they are granted
leave to do so within thirty days of the date of this
Decision and Order.
former Engineering Inspectors for the Town of Henrietta, New
York, were terminated from their employment by Moore on
January 23, 2015. (Dkt. 1 at 3). Plaintiffs claim that they
were misclassified as independent contractors, rather than
town employees. (Id. at 3). Plaintiffs assert that
Defendant terminated them to avoid paying Plaintiffs "a
standard civil service wage and benefit entitlement and
denied [Plaintiffs] the opportunity to participate in the NYS
State [sic] Retirement Program." (Id. at 4).
Plaintiffs claim that they are owed lost wages, overtime
compensation, and unpaid benefits. (Id.).
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
considering a motion to dismiss, a court generally may only
consider "facts stated in the complaint or documents
attached to the complaint as exhibits or incorporated by
reference." Nechis v. Oxford Health Plans,
Inc., 421 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 2005). A court should
consider the motion "accepting all factual allegations
in the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiffs favor." Ruotolo v. City of N.Y., 514
F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). To withstand
dismissal, a plaintiff must set forth "enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."
Bell Ail. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). '"A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.'" Turkmen v.
Ashcroft, 589 F.3d 542, 546 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009));
see also Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir.
2014) ("The plausibility standard is not akin to a
probability requirement. A well-pleaded complaint may proceed
even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of the
facts alleged is improbable, and that a recovery is very
remote and unlikely." (citations and internal quotation
a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs
obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his
'entitlement to relief requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555 (alteration and citations omitted). Thus, "at a
bare minimum, the operative standard requires the
'plaintiff to provide the grounds upon which his claim
rests through factual allegations sufficient to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level."'
Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 2008)
(alteration and citations omitted).
addition, "[i]t is well settled that pro se litigants
generally are entitled to a liberal construction of their
pleadings, which should be read to raise the strongest
arguments that they suggest." Green v. United
States, 260 F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiffs' FLSA Claim Must Be
The Court Need Not Determine at this Time Whether a
Public Official Can Be Held Personally Liable Under the
first argues that he, as a public official, cannot be held