- September 13, 2016
Proskauer Rose LLP, New York, NY (Neil H. Abramson and Daniel
Altchek of counsel), for appellants Metropolitan
Transportation Authority and MTA-Long Island Bus.
Carnell T. Foskey, County Attorney, Mineola, NY (Robert F.
Van der Waag of counsel), for appellant Nassau County.
Beach PLLC, Pittsford, NY (Roy R. Galewski and Thomas J.
Garry of counsel), for appellant Veolia Transportation
M. Blasie, P.C., Garden City, NY, for respondents.
C. DILLON, J.P. ROBERT J. MILLER COLLEEN D. DUFFY HECTOR D.
DECISION & ORDER
proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to compel arbitration,
Metropolitan Transportation Authority and MTA-Long Island Bus
appeal, and Nassau County and Veolia Transportation Services,
Inc., each separately appeal, from an order of the Supreme
Court, Nassau County (Jaeger, J.), entered October 27, 2014,
which granted the petition and directed the parties to
proceed to arbitration.
that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs payable by
the appellants appearing separately and filing separate
in 1973, Nassau County provided bus service for the County
through an operating agreement with the MTA-Long Island Bus
(hereinafter the MTA-LIB), a subsidiary of the Metropolitan
Transportation Authority (hereinafter the MTA and, together
with the MTA-LIB, the MTA appellants). In connection with
that operating agreement, the County and the MTA appellants
received federal funds, the receipt of which required, as a
condition of the funding, that various protections be offered
to the employees of the public transportation service. These
protections were set forth in various agreements, known as
section 13(c) agreements, which included arbitration
2011, the MTA appellants terminated their bus service in the
County, and the County contracted with Veolia Transportation
Services, Inc. (hereinafter Veolia), to provide bus services.
Veolia agreed, inter alia, to be bound by the section 13(c)
agreements that had been entered into by the County, which
provided for arbitration of claims by the employees of the
bus service. Thereafter, the petitioners were terminated as
employees of the MTA-LIB and subsequently hired by Veolia.
The petitioners then commenced this proceeding against the
MTA, the MTA-LIB, the County, and Veolia to compel
arbitration, alleging that, as a result of moving their
employment to Veolia, they encountered negative employment
consequences that were compensable under the section 13(c)
agreements. The Supreme Court granted the petition and
directed the parties to proceed to arbitration. The MTA
appellants, the County, and Veolia separately appeal.
is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to
submit to arbitration any dispute which he [or she] has not
agreed so to submit'" (Matter of Monarch
Consulting, Inc. v National Union Fire Ins. Co. of
Pittsburgh, PA, 26 N.Y.3d 659, 674, quoting AT&T
Technologies, Inc. v Communications Workers, 475 U.S.
643, 648). A party may not be compelled to arbitrate a
dispute unless there is evidence affirmatively establishing
that the parties clearly, explicitly, and unequivocally
agreed to arbitrate (see God's Battalion of Prayer
Pentecostal Church, Inc. v Miele Assoc., LLP, 6 N.Y.3d
371, 374; Matter of Waldron [Goddess], 61 N.Y.2d
181, 186; Matter of Town of Mount Pleasant v JJC Const.
Corp., 35 A.D.3d 869, 870; Matter of Mendel
Zilberberg & Assoc. v Rosner, 292 A.D.2d 533, 534).
the Supreme Court correctly determined that the appellants
all clearly and expressly agreed to arbitrate the claims
alleged by the petitioners pursuant to the section 13(c)
agreements and that any conditions precedent to seeking
arbitration had been satisfied (see God's Battalion
of Prayer Pentecostal Church, Inc. v Miele Assoc., LLP,
6 N.Y.3d at 374; Matter of County of Rockland [Primiano
Constr. Co.], 51 N.Y.2d 1, 12; see also Matter of
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