United States District Court, W.D. New York
DECISION AND ORDER
ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Chanikka Davis Payne ("Plaintiff) filed this action on
August 15, 2009. (Dkt. 1). On October 16, 2012, United States
District Judge Michael A. Telesca granted Defendants'
motion to dismiss and dismissed the complaint, in its
entirety, with prejudice. (Dkt. 55). Judge Telesca's
decision was vacated by the Second Circuit to the extent that
it dismissed Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment claim arising from a
March 2007 arrest. (Dkt. 66 at 4). On remand, Plaintiff was
permitted to amend her complaint to allege facts in support
of that claim (id), and in support of that claim
only (Dkt. 72 at 3 ("[T]he only claim remaining for
consideration on remand is the alleged violation of
Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights based on the Niagara Falls
Police officers' warrantless entry into another
person's apartment to effectuate her arrest.")).
filed an amended complaint on October 29, 2014, alleging,
inter alia, a violation of her constitutional rights
during her March 2007 arrest. (Dkt. 67). She filed a
supplemental declaration on June 1, 2015, (Dkt. 73; see
also Dkt. 67-1), which Judge Telesca deemed a part of
the amended complaint (Dkt. 74).
before the Court are cross motions for summary judgment (Dkt.
84; Dkt. 87), and Plaintiffs motion for a decision in her
favor (Dkt. 90). For the reasons stated below,
Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted, and
Plaintiffs motions for summary judgment and for a decision in
her favor are denied.
facts here are as alleged in Defendants' Statement of
Undisputed Facts.(Dkt. 84-17). At the relevant times,
Defendants John Galie ("Galie"), Thomas Fournier,
Theodore Weed ("Weed"), John
Faso ("Faso"), and Joseph Gianquinto (collectively,
"Defendants") were officers with the Niagara Falls
Police Department. (Dkt. 84-17 at ¶ 1). On March 6,
2007, Plaintiff was arrested by Weed and Faso at 1310 18th
Street (Apt. 2), Niagara Falls, New York for an incident that
occurred on February 21, 2007, and charged with two felonies.
(Id. at ¶¶ 3-4, 6). To effectuate the
arrest, Weed and Faso knocked on Plaintiffs door, which
Plaintiff opened willingly. (Id. at ¶ 6).
Plaintiff was then informed she was under arrest.
(Id.). Plaintiff asked Weed and Faso if she could
"put on additional clothes and turn off the stove"
prior to being taken into custody. (Id. at ¶
7). Weed and Faso allowed her to do so, "provided she
remain[ed] within the view of the officers for safety
reasons." (Id.; see also Dkt. 67-1 at 1
(stating that Weed and Faso allowed Plaintiff to turn off her
stove and put on "regular clothes")).
Weed nor Faso searched the apartment or Plaintiff during the
arrest. (Dkt. 84-17 at ¶ 7). Plaintiff was only searched
after her booking. (Id. at ¶ 9).
Standard of Review
Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary judgment
should be granted if the moving party establishes "that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The court should grant summary judgment
if, after considering the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, the court finds that no
rational jury could find in favor of that party. See
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (citing
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)).
the moving party has met its burden, the opposing party
"must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . [T]he
nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial" Caldarola
v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting
Matsushita Elec, 475 U.S. at 586-87). "[T]he
mere existence of some alleged factual dispute
between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment. . . ."
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
Defendants Have Shown That There are No Issues of Material
only claim remaining in this case following remand from the
Second Circuit is Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment claim arising
from her March 2007 arrest. (Dkt. 66 at 4).
Plaintiff alleges in the amended complaint that she was
subjected to an unconstitutional warrantless arrest.
(See Dkt. 67 at ¶ 46). Her supplemental
statement- which constitutes part of the amended complaint
(see Dkt. 74 at 8)-claims "unlawful entry and
unlawful arrest. . . ." (Dkt. 67-1 at 1). Out of ...