United States District Court, S.D. New York
OPINION AND ORDER
PAUL OETKEN, DISTRICT JUDGE.
Jeremy Levin and Dr. Lucille Levin (“Plaintiffs”)
are judgment creditors of the Islamic Republic of Iran
(“Iran”). In 2009, they filed this suit seeking
turnover of Iranian assets within the United States in an
effort to enforce an unsatisfied judgment against Iran.
Plaintiffs now move for leave to file a supplemental
complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Proecudre Rule
15(d). For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted in
Court presumes familiarity with the factual and procedural
history of this case, as discussed in its two prior Opinions
and Orders issued on March 4, 2011, and September 23, 2013.
See Levin v. Bank of N.Y. (Levin I), No. 09
Civ 5900, 2011 WL 812032, at *1-4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2011)
(Patterson, J.); Levin v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon
(Levin II), No. 09 Civ 5900, 2013 WL 5312502, at
*1‒2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2013) (Patterson, J.).
hold an unsatisfied final judgment of $28, 807, 719 against
Judgment-Debtor Iran, arising out of the 1984 kidnapping of
Jeremy Levin in Beirut, Lebanaon. (Dkt. No. 1099-1
(“Supp. Compl.”) ¶ 1.) Levin's abductors
were terrorists who were trained, supported, aided, funded,
and directed by Iran. Id.
filed the original Complaint in this action in 2009 (the
“2009 Complaint”), seeking turnover of all assets
within the jurisdiction of the United States in which Iran
has a direct or indirect interest. (Dkt. No. 1099 at 2; Dkt.
No. 70.) The 2009 Complaint alleged that Defendant-Garnishee
J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“JPMCB”), along
with other New York banks, possessed “assets blocked by
the U.S. government due to the fact that Iran has an interest
in them either directly or indirectly (‘Iranian Blocked
Assets').” (Dkt. No. 70 ¶ 3).
Plaintiffs, along with other judgment creditors, have
obtained turnover of certain Iranian assets from
Defendant-Garnishee JPMCB (see, e.g., Dkt. No.
1089), Plaintiffs' judgment has not been fully satisfied.
(Dkt. No. 1100 ¶ 4). On November 29, 2016, Plaintiffs
served interrogatories on JPMCB. (Supp. Compl. ¶ 4.)
JPMCB's responses, which were served on January 12, 2017,
revealed the existence of two additional, previously
undisclosed Iranian Blocked Assets: (1) “a deposit
account” under the name of Lebanese businessman Kassim
Tajideen (“Tajideen Account”); and (2) an account
“hold[ing] the proceeds of a wire transfer, also known
as an electronic funds transfer (‘EFT'), that was
blocked by JPMCB under . . . 31 C.F.R. Parts 560, 561 and 594
[‘Iranian Sanctions']” (“Saderat
Account”). (Id.; Dkt. No. 1101 at 1).
move for leave to file a supplemental complaint seeking
turnover of the Tajideen Account and the Saderat Account for
collection and partial satisfaction of their judgment against
Iran pursuant to § 201(a) of the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act of 2002 (“TRIA”) and §§
1610(f)(1)(a) and (g)(1) of the Foreign Soverign Immunities
Act (“FSIA”).(Dkt. No. 1099 at 4; Supp. Compl.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d), a party may
“move to serve a supplemental pleading and the district
court may grant such a motion, in the exercise of its
discretion, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as may
be just.” Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 71
F.3d 58, 66 (2d Cir. 1995). “Absent undue delay, bad
faith, dilatory tactics, undue prejudice to the party to be
served with the proposed pleading, or futility, the motion
should be freely granted.” Id. (citing
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).
respect to the Tajideen Account, the Court concludes that
Plaintiffs should be permitted to supplement their original
complaint. Upon discovering the existence of the Tajideen
Account on June 12, 2017, Plaintiffs acted promptly by
delivering writs of execution for immediate service and levy
on Defendant JPMCB on June 13, 2017. (Dkt. No. 1100 ¶
7.) There is no evidence of “undue delay, bad faith,
[or] dilatory tactics.” Quaratino, 71 F.3d at
66. Nor is there any evidence of undue prejudice or futility.
See Id. Most important, JPMCB does not oppose
Plaintiffs' motion as it relates to the Tajideen Account.
(Dkt. No. 1101 at 2.)
respect to the Saderat Account, however, the Court concludes
that supplementation would be futile. In order to
“execute a judgment on the blocked assets of a
terrorist party, or its agency or instrumentality, to satisfy
a judgment against the terrorist party, ” a plaintiff
must establish that
(1) the plaintiff obtained a judgment against the terrorist
party; (2) the judgment is for a claim based on an act of
terrorism; (3) the assets are “blocked assets”
within the meaning of TRIA; and (4) execution is sought only
to the extent of the plaintiff's outstanding judgment for
Doe v. Ejercito De Liberacion Nacional, No. 15 Civ.
8652, 2017 WL 591193, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2017). Here,
JPMCB argues that supplementation would be futile because the
Saderat Account does not qualify as a “blocked
asset” under TRIA, as it is not ...