In the Matter of Luigi Izzo, an attorney and counselor-at-law. Grievance Committee for the Ninth Judicial District, petitioner; Luigi Izzo, respondent. Attorney Registration No. 4589131
D53779
C/hu
JOINT
MOTION pursuant to 22 NYCRR 1240.8(a)(5) by the Grievance
Committee for the Ninth Judicial District and the respondent,
Luigi Izzo, for discipline by consent. By decision and order
on motion of this Court dated September 30, 2016, the
Grievance Committee for the Ninth Judicial District was
authorized to institute and prosecute a disciplinary
proceeding against the respondent based upon a verified
petition dated March 4, 2016, and the issues raised were
referred to the Honorable Arthur J. Cooperman to hear and
report. The respondent was admitted to the Bar at a term of
the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Second
Judicial Department on June 18, 2008.
Gary
L. Casella, White Plains, NY (Forrest Strauss of counsel),
for petitioner.
Richard M. Maltz, New York, NY, for respondent.
RANDALL T. ENG, P.J. WILLIAM F. MASTRO REINALDO E. RIVERA
MARK C. DILLON JOSEPH J. MALTESE, JJ.
OPINION & ORDER
PER
CURIAM.
The
Grievance Committee for the Ninth Judicial District served
the respondent with a petition dated March 4, 2016,
containing seven charges of professional misconduct. The
respondent filed a verified answer dated November 4, 2016.
The petitioner and the respondent now move pursuant to 22
NYCRR 1240.8(a)(5) for discipline by consent, and request the
imposition of a public censure. As required by 22 NYCRR
1240.8(a)(5)(i), the parties have provided a conditional
stipulation dated June 6, 2017, which provides, inter alia,
as follows:
Stephen
Lyman Segall was disbarred by this Court on April 26, 2011,
upon his resignation (see Matter of Segall, 84
A.D.3d 159). From in or about March 2012 through on or after
January 29, 2013, the respondent represented Segall in
connection with a felony criminal matter in the County Court,
Westchester County. On July 24, 2012, Segall was convicted of
grand larceny in the third degree in violation of Penal Law
§ 155.35. Prior to sentencing, Segall secured a loan
from White Pine Holdings, LLC (hereinafter White Pine), in
part, to facilitate his payment of restitution in the
criminal proceeding, and executed a promissory note on or
about October 19, 2012, obligating himself to repay the sum
of $62, 272.25 plus interest thereon to White Pine. In
support of that loan, on or about October 22, 2012, the
respondent executed a lien letter in favor of White Pine,
wherein he pledged that his law firm would assign 25% of the
net legal fees received from certain personal injury cases
directly to White Pine until the Segall debt ($63, 272.25)
was paid in full. Annexed thereto was a schedule providing
information concerning more than 20 of the respondent's
personal injury clients, including the name of the client,
the date of injury, the insurance carrier, a description of
how the claim arose, a description of the client's
injuries and their current medical status, as well as the
respondent's assessment of the settlement and/or
post-verdict dollar value. The respondent neither advised the
clients that he would be releasing this information nor
sought their permission to do so. Approximately two months
later, on or about December 18, 2012, the respondent executed
a second lien letter in which he pledged that his law firm
would repay White Pine a revised principal amount of $68,
272.50. The respondent also granted White Pine a blanket lien
on all personal injury matters wherein "Izzo Law,
P.C." is the attorney of record.
Thereafter,
the respondent met with Jerry Bergson, a principal of White
Pine, to discuss issues relating to the debt owed by Segall,
the outstanding promissory note Segall had executed, and the
two lien letters the respondent had executed. The respondent
admits that he should have known or should have inquired
whether Bergson was represented by counsel. He also admits
that he failed to seek permission from Bergson's lawyer
to speak directly with Bergson.
Further,
the respondent admits that from in or about March 2008
through November 2015, he informed the Office of Court
Administration Attorney Registration Unit (hereinafter OCA)
that he had maintained various office addresses in White
Plains, Yorktown Heights, and the Bronx. However, the office
address listed on both lien letters is not an address
provided to OCA.
Based
upon the foregoing, the respondent also admits that he
violated the following Rules of Professional Conduct (22
NYCRR 1200.0): rule 1.8(e) by impermissibly advancing and/or
guaranteeing financial assistance to a client, other than
court costs and expenses of litigation, while representing
that client in contemplated or pending litigation; rule
1.6(a) by knowingly revealing confidential information to a
third party that was gained during the representation of one
or more clients, and that was protected by the
attorney-client privilege; rule 4.2(a) by engaging in
improper communications with a represented party; rule 8.4(d)
by failing to timely amend his attorney registration
information with OCA; and, by virtue of the foregoing
misconduct, rule 8.4(h).
The
parties advise that they have considered the respondent's
prior Letter of Caution as an aggravating factor. Further, in
mitigation, the respondent would have presented the following
factors had this matter progressed to a hearing: that at the
time that he sought to help his client by guaranteeing the
loan, he had been admitted to practice for approximately four
years; that he ultimately became responsible for the loan
when Segall failed to honor his obligation; that he has taken
steps to address his errors, and to prevent any repetition of
same; and that he would have presented character evidence
attesting to his honesty and integrity.
As
required, the respondent has submitted an affidavit in which
he conditionally admits the facts as stipulated, and consents
to the agreed discipline of a public censure, which consent
is given freely and voluntarily without coercion or duress.
Lastly, the respondent states that he is fully aware of the
consequences of consenting to such discipline.
Based
upon the foregoing, we find that the request for discipline
by consent pursuant to 22 NYCRR 1240.8(a)(5) should be
granted, and that a public censure is warranted ...