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Batalla Vidal v. Duke

United States District Court, E.D. New York

November 9, 2017

ELAINE C. DUKE, Acting Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, et al., Defendants. STATE OF NEW YORK et al., Plaintiffs,
DONALD TRUMP, President of the United States, et al., Defendants.



         Plaintiffs in the above-captioned cases challenge the rescission of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals ("DACA") program, as well as other actions that Defendants are alleged to have taken in connection with the rescission of that program. Defendants have moved to dismiss these cases for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. (See Defs. Mot. to Dismiss (Dkt. 95)[1]; Defs. Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss ("Defs. Mem.") (Dkt. 95-1).) For the reasons that follow, the court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and RESERVES RULING on Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.

         I. BACKGROUND

         The court begins by providing some background on the DACA program, the steps Defendants have taken to end it, and the increasingly complicated procedural history of these cases.

         A. Factual Background

         1. Deferred Action

         The DACA program originates in a mismatch between the number of individuals unlawfully present in the United States and DHS's ability to remove these individuals from the country. As of 2014, for example, approximately 11.3 million removable individuals were present in the United States.[2] (The Department of Homeland Security's Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others, 38 Op. O.L.C. at 1 (2014) ("OLC Op.") (Admin. R. ("AR") (Dkt. 77-1) at 4).) DHS has the resources to remove only a small percentage of these individuals-specifically, about 400, 000 per year, or less than four percent of the total, as of 2014. (Id. at 1; DHS, 2015 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics tbl. 39 (2016) (listing 333, 341 removals and 129, 122 "returns" for the year 2015).) Because of the "practical fact" that it cannot deport all these individuals, the Executive Branch has significant discretion to prioritize the removal of some and to deprioritize the removal of others. See Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

         "One form of discretion the Secretary of Homeland Security exercises is 'deferred action, ' which entails temporarily postponing the removal of individuals unlawfully present in the United States." Id. "Deferred action, " sometimes referred to as "nonpriority status, " is "in effect, an informal administrative stay of deportation, " Lennon v. INS, 527 F.2d 187, 191 n.7 (2d Cir. 1975), by which immigration authorities decide not to initiate, or decide to halt, removal proceedings "for humanitarian reasons or simply for... convenience, " Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 484 (1999) ("AAADC"). Immigration authorities have used deferred action and similar policies on numerous occasions since at least the early 1960s. Arpaio, 797 F.3d at 16 (citing OLC Op. at 7-8, 12-13). Although deferred action was initially "developed without express statutory authorization, " AAADC, 525 U.S. at 484 (quoting 6 C. Gordon et al., Immigration Law and Procedure § 72.03(2)(h) (1998)), it has since been referenced in the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") and in DHS regulations, see 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(D)(i)(II), (IV) (making certain individuals "eligible for deferred action and work authorization"); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.l2(c)(14) (authorizing certain recipients of deferred action to apply for work authorization).

         2. DACA and PAPA

         In 2012, the Obama Administration created the DACA program by issuing a memorandum stating that DHS would consider according deferred action to certain undocumented immigrants who entered the United States as children. (Mem. from Janet Napolitano, Sec'y of DHS, to David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm'r, CBP, et al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children (June 15, 2012) (the "2012 DACA Memo") (AR 1).) The 2012 DACA Memo directed CBP, USCIS, and ICE to consider exercising prosecutorial discretion with respect to individuals without lawful immigration status who (1) were under the age of sixteen when they entered the United States; (2) had been continuously present in the United States for at least the five years leading up to June 15, 2012; (3) were currently in school, had graduated from high school or obtained GEDs, or were honorably discharged veterans; (4) had not been convicted of felonies, significant misdemeanors, or multiple misdemeanors, and did not "otherwise pose[] a threat to national security or public safety"; and (5) were not above the age of thirty. (Id.) Individuals who met these criteria, passed a background check, and were granted relief "on a case by case basis" were shielded from removal and eligible to apply for work authorization, subject to renewal every two years. (Id. at 2-3.) The 2012 DACA Memo made clear, however, that it "confer[red] no substantive right, immigration status or pathway to citizenship, " but only "set forth policy for the exercise of discretion within the framework of the existing law." (Id. at 3.) Following the issuance of the 2012 DACA Memo, approximately 800, 000 individuals have been granted deferred action and work authorization under the program. (Second Am. Compl. ("SAC") (Dkt. 60) ¶ 73; USCIS, Number of Form I-821D, Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, by Fiscal Year, Quarter, Intake, Biometrics and Case Status, Fiscal Year 2012-2017 (June 30, 2017) (Am. Compl. ("State Pls. Am. Compl."), Ex. 1 (No. 17-CV-5228, Dkt. 55-1)).)

         In 2014, the Obama Administration announced a new deferred action program for the parents of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents, Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents ("DAPA"). (Mem. from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec'y of DHS, to Leon Rodriguez, Dir., USCIS., et al, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals Who Are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents (Nov. 20, 2014) (the "2014 DAPA Memo") (AR 37).) The 2014 DAPA Memo also expanded the DACA program by (1) permitting individuals born before June 15, 1981, to apply for deferred action; (2) extending the term of the benefits obtained under the DACA program from two to three years; and (3) adjusting the date-of-entry requirement so that individuals who entered the United States before January 1, 2010, could obtain deferred action and work authorization. (Id. at 3-4.) The court refers to these changes to the DACA program as the "DACA Expansion."

         Following the issuance of the 2014 DAPA Memo, twenty-six states, led by Texas, filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, claiming that the DAPA program violated the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 550 et seq., and the Take Care Clause of the U.S. Constitution, U.S. Const, art. II, § 3. See Texas v. United States, 86 F.Supp.3d 591, 598 (S.D. Tex. 2015). On February 16, 2015, the district court concluded that those states had standing to sue and were likely to succeed on the merits of their procedural APA claim that the 2014 DAPA Memo was invalid because it constituted a "substantive rule, " not a "general statement of policy, " and thus should have been promulgated through notice-and-comment rulemaking. Id. at 671-72. The court issued a nationwide injunction against the implementation of the DAPA program, Id. at 677-78, and the DACA Expansion, Id. at 678 n.111. The Fifth Circuit affirmed that decision, finding that the plaintiff states were likely to succeed both on their claim that the 2014 DAPA Memo should have been made through notice-and-comment procedures and on their claim that the memo was substantively contrary to the INA. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 178, 186 (5th Cir. 2015) (as revised). The Fifth Circuit declined to reach the plaintiff states' Take Care Clause claim. Id. at 146 n.3. The decision was affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court. See 136 S.Ct. 2271 (Mem.).

         3. PAPA Rescission

         The Executive Branch's immigration-enforcement priorities shifted with the election of President Donald Trump. Shortly after his Inauguration, President Trump issued an executive order that cast doubt on the exemption of "classes or categories of removable aliens from potential enforcement." Exec. Order 13, 768, Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017). The following month, then-Secretary of DHS John Kelly implemented that order by issuing a memorandum rescinding "all existing conflicting directives, memoranda, or field guidance regarding enforcement of our immigration laws and priorities for removal, " except for the DACA and DAPA programs, which he left in place. (Mem. from John Kelly, Sec'y, DHS, to Kevin McAleenan, Acting Comm'r, CBP, et al., Enforcement of the Immigration Laws to Serve the National Interest at 2 (Feb. 20, 2017) (AR 230).) Four months later, Secretary Kelly issued another memorandum, which rescinded the DAPA program and the DACA Expansion based on "the preliminary injunction in this matter, the ongoing litigation, the fact that DAPA never took effect, and our new immigration enforcement priorities." (Mem. from John F. Kelly, Sec'y, DHS, to Kevin K. McAleenan, Acting Comm'r, CBP, et al., Rescission of November 20, 2014, Memorandum Providing for Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents ("DAPA") at 3 (June 15, 2017) (AR 235).) That memorandum did not, however, rescind the original DACA program or revoke the three-year-long deferred action and work authorization issued between the announcement of the DACA Expansion and the Southern District of Texas's issuance of a preliminary injunction against that program. (Id. at 2 & n.3).

         4. DACA Rescission

         Following the rescission of the 2014 DAP A Memo, Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton wrote on behalf of eleven states to Attorney General Jeff Sessions to demand that the "Executive Branch" rescind the 2012 DACA Memo. (Ltr. from Ken Paxton, Att'y Gen. of Texas, to Hon. Jeff Sessions, Att'y Gen. of the U.S. (June 29, 2017) at 2 (AR 239).) Paxton warned that, if DHS did not act to end the DACA program, the plaintiff states would amend their complaint in Texas v. United States to challenge the DACA program and the remaining work permits issued under the DACA Expansion. (Id. at 2.)

         Thereafter, Attorney General Sessions wrote to Acting DHS Secretary Elaine Duke to "advise that [DHS] should rescind" the 2012 DACA Memo.[3] (Letter from Jefferson B. Sessions, III, Att'y Gen. of the U.S., to Elaine C. Duke, Acting Sec'y, DHS (the "Sessions Letter") (AR 251).) The Attorney General opined that DACA was unconstitutional and that the Texas plaintiffs would likely prevail in their anticipated challenge to the program:

DACA was effectuated by the previous administration through executive action, without proper statutory authority and with no established end-date, after Congress' repeated rejection of proposed legislation that would have accomplished a similar result. Such an open-ended circumvention of immigration laws was an unconstitutional exercise of authority by the Executive Branch. The related Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) policy was enjoined on a nationwide basis in a decision affirmed by the Fifth Circuit on the basis of multiple legal grounds and then by the Supreme Court by an equally divided vote. Then-Secretary of Homeland Security John Kelly rescinded the DAPA policy in June. Because the DACA policy has the same legal and constitutional defects that the courts recognized as to DAPA, it is likely that potentially imminent litigation would yield similar results with respect to DACA.

(Id. (citation omitted).)

         On September 5, 2017, Defendants rescinded the DACA program.[4] The Attorney General announced the decision at a press conference, and Acting Secretary Duke implemented the decision by issuing a memorandum (the "DACA Rescission Memo") to her subordinates. (DOJ, Press Release, Attorney General Sessions Delivers Remarks on DACA (Sept. 5, 2017),; Mem. from Elaine C. Duke, Acting Sec'y, DHS, to James W. McCament, Acting Dir., USCIS, et al., Rescission of the June 15, 2012 Memorandum Entitled "Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children" (Sept. 5, 2017) (AR 252).) Duke pointed to the rulings of the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court in the Texas litigation, as well as to the Attorney General's "legal determination" that DACA was "'an open-ended circumvention of immigration laws'" and "'an unconstitutional exercise of authority'":

Taking into consideration the Supreme Court's and the Fifth Circuit's rulings in the ongoing litigation, and the September 4, 2017 letter from the Attorney General, it is clear that the June 15, 2012[, ] DACA program should be terminated. In the exercise of my authority in establishing national immigration policies and priorities, except for the purposes explicitly identified below, I hereby rescind the June 15, 2012 memorandum.

(Id. at 3-4 (quoting Sessions Letter).)

         Rather than terminating the DACA program outright, the DACA Rescission Memo provided for a phased "wind down" of the program. First, DHS would consider initial applications for deferred action and work authorization that it had received as of September 5, 2017. (DACA Rescission Memo at 4.) Second, DHS would "adjudicate-on an individual, case by case basis" requests for renewal of deferred action and work authorization "from current beneficiaries whose benefits will expire between [September 5, 2017, ] and March 5, 2018 that have been accepted by [DHS] as of October 5, 2017." (Id.) DHS would not consider other applications for deferred action or work authorization under the DACA program. (Id.) Existing grants of deferred action and work authorization would remain in effect "for the remaining duration of their validity periods, " though DHS would retain the authority to terminate or deny deferred action when it deemed appropriate. (Id.) Under the DACA Rescission Memo, the benefits granted as part of the DACA program will therefore expire gradually over the next two years.

         B. Procedural Background

         1. Prior to the DACA Rescission

         The first of the above-captioned cases, Batalla Vidal v. Duke, No. 16-CV-4756 (E.D.N.Y.), predates the Trump Administration's decision to rescind the DACA program. In that case, Plaintiff Martin Batalla Vidal initially challenged DHS's compliance with the nationwide injunction issued by the Southern District of Texas in Texas v. United States. Batalla Vidal applied for deferred action and work authorization in November 2014 and, in February 2015, was notified that he had received deferred action and work authorization for the next three years under the terms of the DACA Expansion. (Compl. (Dkt. 1) ¶ 32.) On May 14, 2015, however, DHS revoked his three-year work authorization, citing the Texas injunction, and replaced it with a two-year permit. (Id. ¶¶ 34-36.) Batalla Vidal challenged that decision, contending that the Texas plaintiffs lacked standing to seek, and the Southern District of Texas lacked jurisdiction to issue, a nationwide injunction. (Id. ¶¶ 43-47.) Batalla Vidal subsequently amended his complaint to add the nonprofit organization MRNY as a plaintiff and name then-Director of USCIS Leon Rodriguez as a defendant. (Am. Compl. (Dkt. 29).) In November 2016, the Batalla Vidal Plaintiffs moved with Defendants' consent to stay briefing in the case "[d]ue to uncertainty regarding the future of the [DACA] program." (Pls. Nov. 21, 2016, Mot. to Stay (Dkt. 35); Apr. 4, 2017, Joint Mot. to Stay (Dkt. 40).)

         2. Following the DACA Rescission

         Following Defendants' announcement of the decision to rescind the DACA program, Plaintiffs brought these actions challenging that decision and certain other actions that Defendants have taken relating to that decision. On September 6, 2017, fifteen states and the District of Columbia[5] filed suit challenging both the rescission of the DACA program and DHS's alleged changes in its policy regarding the use of DACA applicants' information for immigration-enforcement purposes. (State Pls. Compl. (No. 17-CV-5228, Dkt. 1) ¶¶ 269-301.) The State Plaintiffs asserted claims under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the APA, and the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-12 (the "RFA"). (Id.) Two weeks later, the Batalla Vidal Plaintiffs again amended their complaint to assert certain claims similar to those brought by the State Plaintiffs, as well as a claim that Defendants violated the Due Process Clause by failing to notify DACA recipients that they needed to renew their deferred action and work authorization by October 5, 2017. (SAC ¶¶ 160-66.) Finally, the State Plaintiffs amended their complaint to add claims (1) challenging the notice provided to DACA recipients of the rescission of the DACA program; and (2) further challenging the change in DHS's information-use policy. (State Pls. Am. Compl. (No. 17-CV-5228, Dkt. 54) ¶¶ 246-52, 274-80.) Together, Plaintiffs now assert the following claims:

         Equal Protection. Both sets of Plaintiffs allege that the decision to rescind the DACA program violated the equal-protection principles incorporated in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, see Boiling v. Sharpe. 347 U.S. 497, 498-500 (1954), because that decision was motivated by improper considerations. (SAC ¶¶ 167-70; State Pls. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 233-39.) The State Plaintiffs allege that the DACA Rescission Memo "target[s] individuals for discriminatory treatment, without lawful justification" and that it was "motivated, at least in part, by a discriminatory motive and/or a desire to harm a particular group." (State Pls. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 235-36.) The Batalla Vidal Plaintiffs allege that President Trump, Attorney General Sessions, and Acting Secretary Duke violated the Due Process Clause in deciding to rescind the DACA program because that decision "targets Latinos and, in particular, Mexicans, and will have a disparate impact on these groups, " and "was substantially motivated by animus toward Latinos and, in particular, Mexicans." (SAC ¶¶ 169-70.)

         Due Process-Individualized Notice. Both sets of Plaintiffs also contend that Defendants violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause by failing to provide DACA recipients with adequate notice of the decision to rescind the DACA program. (SAC ¶¶ 160-66; State Pls. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 274-80.) In particular, the Batalla Vidal Plaintiffs allege that, prior to the DACA Rescission Memo, DHS advised DACA recipients to submit applications to renew their deferred action and work authorization "as soon as possible" and, in particular, 120-150 days before expiration, to ensure that those benefits did not expire before DHS could process the renewal applications. (SAC ¶ 164.) Following the issuance of the DACA Rescission Memo, Defendants did not send individual revised notices to alert DACA recipients who were eligible to renew their deferred action and work authorization (i.e., individuals whose benefits expired before March 5, 2018) that they only had until October 5, 2017, to do so. (Id. ¶ 165.) The State Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by failing to provide DACA recipients with "adequate notice" about "the procedures and timeline for renewing their DACA status, " "the general termination of the DACA program after March 5, 2018, " or "their inability to apply for renewal of their DACA status after March 5, 2018." (State Pls. Am. Compl.¶¶ 276-77.)

         Due Process-Information-Use Policy. Both sets of Plaintiffs assert that DHS impermissibly backtracked on its representations that it would use information gleaned from DACA applications for immigration-enforcement purposes only in limited circumstances. (SAC ¶¶ 151, 153; State Pls. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 240-45.) While, as discussed below, the Batalla Vidal Plaintiffs fold this challenge into their substantive APA claim, the State Plaintiffs challenge this decision as "fundamentally unfair, " in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. (State Pls. Am. Compl. ¶ 243.)

         Equitable Estoppel-Information-Use Policy. The State Plaintiffs argue that the doctrine of equitable estoppel bars DHS from changing its policy regarding the use of DACA applicants' information. (Id. ¶¶ 246-52.) The State Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, having "made repeated affirmative statements about the protections that would be given to the personal information provided by DACA applicants" and "placed affirmative restrictions on the use of such information for purposes of immigration enforcement" (id. ¶ 248), are now estopped from using that information for immigration-enforcement purposes (id. ¶¶ 250-51). The court refers to this claim, together with Plaintiffs' constitutional information-use policy claims, as Plaintiffs' "information-use policy claims."

         APA-Arbitrary and Capricious. Both sets of Plaintiffs challenge the decision to end the DACA program under the APA as substantively "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). (SAC ¶¶ 149-54; State Pls. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 253-56.) The Batalla Vidal Plaintiffs contend that Attorney General Sessions and Acting Secretary Duke acted arbitrarily and capriciously by deciding to end the DACA program and by changing DHS's policy regarding the confidentiality of DACA applicants' information because those decisions "(a) lack a rational explanation for the change in policy on which persons had reasonably relied, (b) are based on a legal error, and (c) failed to consider all relevant factors." (SAC ¶ 151.) The State Plaintiffs argue that the implementation of the DACA Rescission Memo and termination of the DACA program "with minimal formal guidance" constituted arbitrary, capricious, and unlawful action in violation of Section 706 of the APA. (State Pls. Am. Compl. ¶ 254-55.) The court refers to these claims together as Plaintiffs' "substantive APA claims."

         APA-Notice and Comment. Both sets of Plaintiffs also contend that DHS's implementation of the DACA Rescission Memo constitutes a substantive or legislative "rule" for purposes of the APA, and thus needed to be made through notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures. See 5 U.S.C. § 553. (SAC ¶¶ 144-48; State Pls. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 257-65.) In particular, the Batalla Vidal Plaintiffs argue that the DACA Rescission Memo is a substantive rule, "as it binds DHS to categorically deny applications for deferred action to individuals who fit the original DACA eligibility criteria." (SAC ¶ 146.) The State Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that the promulgation and implementation of the DACA Rescission Memo "categorically and definitively changed the substantive criteria by which individual DACA grantees work, live, attend school, obtain credit, and travel in the United States, " impacting those beneficiaries' "substantive rights." (State Pls. Am. Compl. ¶ 261.) The court refers to these claims together as Plaintiffs' "procedural APA claims."

         RFA. Finally, both sets of Plaintiffs assert claims under the RFA. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants violated the RFA by issuing the DACA Rescission Memo without conducting an analysis of the rescission's impact on "small entities." (SAC ¶¶ 155-59; State Pls. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 266-73.) MRNY alleges that it is a "small organization" that is directly affected by the DACA Rescission Memo and thus has a cause of action under the RFA. (SAC ¶ 156.) The State Plaintiffs assert that they and their "small governmental jurisdictions, nonprofits, and businesses, and their residents" are harmed by Defendants' failure to conduct such a regulatory impact analysis. (State Pls. Am. Compl. ¶ 273.) The court refers to these claims as Plaintiffs "RFA claims."

         The following chart summarizes these claims:

         a. Table: Claims Presented

Challenged Action

Cause of Action

Batalla Vidal v. Duke[6]

New York v. Trump[7]

Termination of the DACA program

Due Process Clause

Fifth claim, ¶¶ 167-70

First claim, ¶¶ 233-39

APA (substantive)

Second claim, ¶¶ 149-54

Fourth claim, ¶¶ 253-56

APA (substantive)

First claim, ¶¶ 144-48

Fifth claim, ¶¶ 257-65


Third claim, ¶¶ 155-59 (MRNY only)

Sixth claim, ¶¶ 266-73

Notification of DACA recipients of (1) the termination of the DACA program and (2) revised renewal deadlines

Due Process Clause

Fourth claim, ¶¶ 160-66 (notice of revised renewal deadlines only)

Seventh claim, ¶¶ 274-80

Changes to DHS policy regarding the use of DACA applicants' information for immigration-enforcement purposes

Due Process Clause

Second claim, 240-45

APA (substantive)

Second claim, 149-51, 153-54

Equitable estoppel

Third claim, 246-52

         3. District Court Proceedings

         The parties have vigorously litigated these actions before this court. Although the full procedural history can be discerned from the relevant dockets, the court provides the following limited summary of the proceedings to date.

         Consistent with the regular practice of courts in this district in civil cases, discovery matters were referred to the magistrate judge assigned to the case, Magistrate Judge James Orenstein, to decide in the first instance. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Local Civ. R. 72.2. After soliciting the views of the parties as to whether discovery should proceed (Sept. 15, 2017, Order (Dkt. 58)), Judge Orenstein authorized discovery to proceed over Defendants' objections (Tr. of Sept. 26, 2017, Hr'g (Docket Number Pending) 26:21-27:22). Judge Orenstein then issued a case management and scheduling order (the "Case Management Order"), which confirmed the previously announced discovery schedule. (Sept. 27, 2017, Order (Dkt. 67).) Of particular relevance to these proceedings, the Case Management and Scheduling Order required Defendants to produce, by October 6, 2017, an administrative record as well as a privilege log describing "every document considered within any component of the executive branch as part of the process of determining the policy and actions at issue in these actions that are not being produced and as to which the defendants would assert a claim of privilege, regardless of whether the defendants deem such ... record to be part of the official administrative record." (Id. ¶¶ II(c) (the "Privilege Log Requirement").)

         Defendants promptly challenged the Case Management Order. On September 29, 2017, Defendants filed a motion before this court "seek[ing] relief from" the Privilege Log Requirement, which, they argued, "raise[d] substantial separation-of-powers concerns, " to the extent it could be read as applying to White House communications, and required Defendants to assert privilege with respect to documents that were not properly included in the administrative record. (Sept. 29, 2017, Defs. Mot. to Vacate (Dkt. 69) ("Defs. Sept. 29 Mot.") at 2-5.) Defendants also argued that it would be impossible to comply with the Privilege Log Requirement within the deadline set by the Case Management Order (id. at 5), and that the court should consider threshold arguments for dismissal of these cases before allowing discovery to proceed (id. at 5-6). Defendants did not specifically argue that discovery was inappropriate, although they reincorporated arguments against discovery by reference to a letter they had filed with Judge Orenstein a week earlier and briefly outlined three "threshold dismissal arguments." (Id. at 1, 5-6; see also Defs. Sept. 22, 2017, Ltr. Regarding Discovery (Dkt. 65).)

         The court issued two orders in response to Defendants' objections. The first order extended the deadline for complying with the Privilege Log Requirement by two weeks, so that the court could consider whether the as-yet-unproduced administrative record was adequate and whether Defendants retained the presumption that they had correctly compiled the record. (Oct. 3, 2017, Order (Dkt. 72).) Defendants subsequently asked the court to narrow the Privilege Log Requirement or vacate it entirely. (Defs. Oct. 10, 2017, Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Vacate (Dkt. 80) at 2.) At the same time, Defendants also asked the court to stay discovery pending resolution of Defendants' anticipated dispositive motions, which Defendants averred would "raise arguments that are strong, purely legal, and completely dispositive of Plaintiffs' claims." (Id. at 4.) Defendants did not, however, specifically identify what those arguments were (instead cross-referencing their September 29 Motion and string-citing to authority discussed below) or address any of the factors that courts in this district consider in analyzing whether a party has demonstrated "good cause" to stay discovery. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c); Richards v. N. Shore Long Island Jewish Health Svs.. No. 10-CV-4544 (LDW) (ETB), 2011 WL 4407518, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2011).

         The court then issued its second order, which narrowed the scope of the Privilege Log Requirement but denied Defendants' request to stay discovery. (Oct. 17, 2017 Mem. & Order (the "Oct. 17 M&O") (Dkt. 86).) With respect to Defendants' arguments that discovery outside the administrative record was inappropriate, the court noted that Defendants had not identified any reason why its review of Plaintiffs' information-use policy and notice claims should be limited to an administrative record that only purported to document the decision to rescind the DACA program. (Id. at 3-5.) The court declined to vacate the Privilege Log Requirement before Judge Orenstein decided whether the administrative record was complete. (Oct. 17 M&O at 5-6.) The court agreed, however, that the Privilege Log Requirement should be narrowed to exclude materials other than DHS and DOJ communications. (Id. at 7-9.) Finally, the court declined to exempt DOJ from the Privilege Log Requirement, as Defendants had failed to explain their apparent reversal in position regarding whether Attorney General Sessions was responsible for the decision to rescind the DACA program. (Id. at 9-10.)

         The following evening, Defendants renewed their motion to stay discovery, this time threatening to seek mandamus review if the court did not address their objections by 2 p.m. the following day. (Defs. Oct. 18, 2017, Mot. to Stay (Dkt. 87).) The court ruled expeditiously on these requests. On October 19, 2017, Judge Orenstein issued an order granting Plaintiffs' motion to compel Defendants to produce a complete administrative record. (Oct. 19, 2017, Order Granting Motion to Produce (Dkt. 89).) The same day, this court issued another memorandum and order, granting in part and denying in part Defendants' motion for a stay. (Oct. 19, 2017, Mem. & Order (the "Oct. 19 M&O") at 9-11.) In light of Defendants' ongoing (and, this time, factually substantiated) concerns about the burdens of complying with the Privilege Log Requirement, the court agreed to stay the Privilege Log Requirement except with respect to documents directly considered by the Attorney General, Acting Secretary Duke, and their subordinates who directly advised them on ...

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