United States District Court, E.D. New York
M. Azrack United States District Judge.
March 18, 2016, incarcerated pro se plaintiff Brian
Keith Dudley (“plaintiff”) commenced this action
against Nassau County District Attorney Madeline Singas
(“D.A. Singas”), Assistant District Attorney
Michael Bushwack (“A.D.A. Bushwack”), Assistant
District Attorney Jene Kang (“A.D.A. Jene Kang”),
P.O. Gregory Nicholson, Shield #2953/Serial #8342
(“P.O. Nicholson”), P.O. John Monell, Shield
#3440/Serial #8916 (“P.O. Monell”), Nassau
County, P.O. Joseph Sedita, Shield #1951/Serial #8398
(“P.O. Sedita”), and the Nassau County District
Attorney's Office (“D.A's Office” and
collectively, “defendants”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (“Section 1983”), alleging a
deprivation of his constitutional rights. Accompanying the
complaint is an application to proceed in forma
pauperis. The Court grants plaintiff's request to
proceed in forma pauperis and sua sponte
dismisses the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1) for the reasons that follow.
material allegations in the complaint are assumed to be true
for the purpose of this Order. See, e.g., Rogers
v. City of Troy, New York, 148 F.3d 52, 58 (2d Cir.
1998) (stating in reviewing a pro se complaint for sua sponte
dismissal, a court is required to accept the material
allegations in the complaint as true).
voluminous complaint is submitted on the Court's Section
1983 complaint form with an additional 150 pages of exhibits.
Plaintiff seeks to challenge his criminal prosecution and
conviction in state court.
to the complaint, plaintiff was charged with vehicular
manslaughter in the second degree and operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. (Compl. at 5.)
Plaintiff claims that he was not intoxicated and alleges that
the circumstances surrounding the accident “do not
reasonably lead to the exclusive hypothesis of my
recklessness.” (Id.) Rather, plaintiff alleges
that the “accident occurred when the pedestrian crossed
the street against the traffic signal” and that the
victim was an alcoholic. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff
claims that he was not read his Miranda rights at the time of
his arrest and that the results of the “breath
test” administered to plaintiff at the scene were
“defective” because plaintiff's asthma
inhalers (Albuterol and Advir) affected the test.
(Id. at 7.) Plaintiff claims that he has been
“incarcerated for over two years on these fraudulent
charges” and claims “entitlement to either
release from custody or a felony exam. . . .”
(Id. at 8.) In the space on the complaint form that
calls for a description of any injuries suffered as well as
any medical treatment required and/or received, plaintiff
alleges: “Negligence, wrongful imprisonment, malicious
prosecution, severe mental anguish, and pain and
suffering.” (Id. ¶ IV.A.) For relief,
plaintiff seeks, inter alia, compensatory and punitive
damages in total sum in excess of $10 million. (Id.
at ¶ V.)
plaintiff filed his complaint, he was still awaiting trial on
the charges against him. However, on April 28, 2017,
plaintiff submitted a letter to the Court indicating that he
was convicted in state court and is now seeking to vacate
that conviction through a motion brought pursuant to N.Y.
C.P.L.R. § 440.10 in state court. According to
plaintiff's April 28, 2017 submission, plaintiff was
convicted of manslaughter in the second degree and violations
of N.Y. V.T.L. § 1192(2) and & §511(1).
Plaintiff received a sentence of 5-15 years of imprisonment.
In Forma Pauperis Application
review of plaintiff's declaration in support of the
application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court
finds that plaintiff is qualified to commence this action
without prepayment of the filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(1). Therefore, plaintiff's application to proceed
in forma pauperis is granted.
Standard of Review
Prison Litigation Reform Act requires a district court to
screen a civil complaint brought by a prisoner against a
governmental entity or its agents and dismiss the complaint,
or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint is
“frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)(1). Similarly, pursuant to the in forma
pauperis statute, a court must dismiss an action if it
determines that it “(i) is frivolous or malicious, (ii)
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
(iii) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The
Court must dismiss the action as soon as it makes such a
determination. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
se submissions are afforded wide interpretational
latitude and should be held “to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per
curiam); see also Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d
857, 860 (2d Cir. 1997). In addition, the court is required
to read the plaintiff's pro se complaint
liberally and interpret it as raising the strongest arguments
it suggests. United States v. Akinrosotu, 637 F.3d
165, 167 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation
omitted); Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir.
Supreme Court has held that pro se complaints need
not even plead specific facts; rather the complainant
“need only give the defendant fair notice of what the .
. . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted); cf. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do
justice.”). However, a pro se plaintiff must
still plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(citations omitted). The plausibility standard requires
“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. While