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Morisset v. County of Nassau

United States District Court, E.D. New York

November 13, 2017

ABNER MORISSET JR., #16-A-1158, Plaintiff,
v.
COUNTY OF NASSAU, Criminal Term Part 13, Supreme Court of the State of New York; MADELINE SINGAS, Nassau County District Attorney; Defendants.

          ORDER

          AZRACK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         On July 6, 2016, incarcerated pro se plaintiff Abner Morisset Jr. (“plaintiff”) filed a in forma pauperis complaint in this Court against the County of Nassau, Criminal Term Part 13, Supreme Court of the State of New York (“NYS Supreme Court”); and Nassau County District Attorney Madeline Singas (“DA Singas” and together, “defendants”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”), alleging a deprivation of his constitutional rights. Because plaintiff did not filed the required Prisoner Litigation Reform Act authorization form (“PLRA”) together with the complaint, by Notice of Deficiency dated July 14, 2016 (the “Notice”), plaintiff was instructed to complete and return the enclosed PLRA within fourteen (14) days from the date of the Notice. On July 21, 2016, plaintiff timely filed the PLRA. The Court grants plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis and sua sponte dismisses the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii-iii), 1915A(b) for the reasons that follow.

         I. BACKGROUND

         All material allegations in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of this Order. See, e.g., Rogers v. City of Troy, New York, 148 F.3d 52, 58 (2d Cir. 1998) (in reviewing a pro se complaint for sua sponte dismissal, a court is required to accept the material allegations in the complaint as true).

         Plaintiff's brief, handwritten complaint is submitted on the Southern District of New York's Section 1983 complaint form and alleges the following in its entirety:[1]

On May 17, 2015 I was rearrested by the Nassau County District Attorney's Office for the crime of Burg. 2nd (140.25(2)). The crime that the D.A. accused me of happened on Sept. 1st of 2104. Due to me being wrongfully accused of said crime the Court put another bail on me for $25, 000. At the time I was already on Rikers Iland fighting a case Burg 3rd with a bail of $35, 000. At the time Nassau County D.A. Office wrongfully accused me of this crime I was in the process of bailing out but because of the new bail of $25, 000 I was unable to get a chance to be their when my Aunt was laid to rest.

(Compl. ¶ II.D.) As a result of the foregoing, plaintiff claims to have suffered “emotional pain, suffering and mental anguish” and seeks to recover a damages award in the sum of $7.5 million. (Id. ¶¶ III, V.)

         II. DISCUSSION

         A. In Forma Pauperis Application

         Upon review of plaintiff's declaration in support of the application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court finds that plaintiff is qualified to commence this action without prepayment of the filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Therefore, plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

         B. Standard of Review

         The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires a district court to screen a civil complaint brought by a prisoner against a governmental entity or its agents and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint is “frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Similarly, pursuant to the in forma pauperis statute, a court must dismiss an action if it determines that it “(i) is frivolous or malicious, (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (iii) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court must dismiss the action as soon as it makes such a determination. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

         Pro se submissions are afforded wide interpretational latitude and should be held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); see also Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 860 (2d Cir. 1997). In addition, the court is required to read the plaintiff's pro se complaint liberally and interpret it as raising the strongest arguments it suggests. United States v. Akinrosotu, 637 F.3d 165, 167 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation omitted); Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009).

         The Supreme Court has held that pro se complaints need not even plead specific facts; rather the complainant “need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.”). However, a pro se plaintiff must still plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted). The plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. While ...


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