United States District Court, E.D. New York
Nicholas G. Garaufis, United States District Judge.
Taj Patterson moves the court to direct entry of a partial
final judgment against him under Rule 54(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. (Mot. for Entry of J.
("Mot.") (Dkt. 67).) No defendant who has appeared
in this action opposes the motion. (Nov. 6, 2017, City of New
York, Furda, Zaikowski, and Fernandez Ltr. (Dkt. 68); Nov. 6,
2017, Herskovic Ltr. (Dkt. 69); Nov. 8, 2017, Braver Ltr.
(Dkt. 70).) For the reasons that follow, the motion is
relevant facts are set forth in the court's August 9,
2017, memorandum and order ("M&O"). (M&O
(Dkt. 64).) "Plaintiff is a Black, gay, non-Jewish man
who lives in a Brooklyn neighborhood with a large population
of Orthodox Jews." (Id. at 3.) He alleged that,
while he was walking through Brooklyn early in the morning of
December 1, 2013, he was chased and attacked by members of a
"Shomrim" group-a "neighborhood safety
patrol organized and operated by volunteer orthodox Jews in
different neighborhoods throughout Brooklyn." (Am.
Compl. (Dkt. 43) ¶ 10; M&O at 3-4.) His attackers
shouted homophobic slurs while they beat him, and the attack
left him blind in one eye. (M&O at 3-4.) Plaintiff also
alleged that the New York City Police Department
("NYPD") and the police officers named in his
complaint botched their investigation into his attack (Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 35-45) and that inappropriate ties exist
between Shomrim groups, the NYPD, and the Brooklyn District
Attorney's office (id at 46-56; see also M&O
at 6-7). Based on these allegations, Plaintiff brought claims
against Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983 and
1985. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 57-88.)
some Defendants appeared and contested Plaintiffs
allegations. The City of New York and the three NYPD officers
named as defendants-Sergeant Ivan Furda, Sergeant Joseph
Zaikowski, and Officer Rodrigo Fernandez (together with the
City of New York, the "Municipal Defendants")-all
appeared. (M&O at 1.) Two of the individuals who
assaulted Plaintiff-Defendants Pinchas Braver and Mayer
Herskovic-also appeared. (Id.) (The court refers to
these defendants as the "Appearing Defendants.")
The two Shomrim organizations named as defendants did not
appear, however, nor did individual Defendants Abraham
Winkler, Aharon Hollender, Joseph Fried, or Yoeli Itzowitz.
(Id.) (The court refers to these non-appearing
defendants collectively as the "Absent
Municipal Defendants and Herskovic separately moved to
dismiss, and Braver moved for judgment on the pleadings.
(Municipal Defs. Mot. to Dismiss (Dkt. 50); Def. Braver Mot.
for J. on the Pleadings (Dkt. 52); Def. Herskovic Mot. to
Dismiss (Dkt. 63).) On August 9, 2017, the court granted
those motions. (M&O at 6.) Having appealed to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit from that order
(Notice of App. (Dkt. 65)), Plaintiff now moves the court to
enter a partial final judgment under Rule 54(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with respect to his claims
against the Appearing Defendants.
54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
"[w]hen an action presents more than one claim for
relief... or when multiple parties are involved, the court
may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but
fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly
determines that there is no just reason for delay."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). The court thus may certify a partial
final judgment under Rule 54(b) "only when three
requirements have been satisfied: (1) there are multiple
claims or parties; (2) at least one claim or the rights and
liabilities of at least one party has been finally
determined; and (3) the court makes an 'express 
determin[ation] that there is no just reason for
delay.'" Acumen Re Mgmt. Corp. v. Gen. Sec. Nat.
Ins. Co., 769 F.3d 135, 140 (2d Cir. 2014) (alterations
in original) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b)). "The
determination of whether there is no just reason to delay
entry of a final judgment is a matter committed to the sound
discretion of the district court." L.B. Foster Co.
v. Am. Piles. Inc.. 138 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 1998)
(citing Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446
U.S. 1, 8-10(1980)).
considering "whether there are no just reasons to delay
the appeal of individual final judgments ... a district court
must take into account judicial administrative interests as
well as the equities involved." Curtiss-Wright
446 U.S. at 8. In particular, the court must consider
"the historic federal policy against piecemeal appeals,
" and should therefore be mindful of "whether the
claims under review [are] separable from the others remaining
to be adjudicated and whether the nature of the claims
already determined [is] such that no appellate court would
have to decide the same issues more than once even if there
were subsequent appeals." Id. In light of these
considerations, the district court should exercise its
discretion to certify a partial final judgment
"sparingly." Harriscom Svenska AB v. Harris
Corp., 947 F.2d 627, 629 (2d Cir. 1991))
the first two requirements of Rule 54(b) are clearly met:
"there are multiple claims or parties, " and the
court has finally determined Plaintiffs claims against the
Appearing Defendants. See Acumen Re, 769 F.3d at
140. Plaintiff has not, however, met his burden of showing
that there is "no just reason for delay"-Le., that
certification of a partial final judgment is appropriate in
light of the competing considerations of judicial efficiency
and possible prejudice to the parties. Plaintiff argues that
a Rule 54(b) certification is appropriate because the grounds
on which the court resolved his claims against the Appearing
Defendants "apply equally to the claims against"
the Absent Defendants. (Mem. in Supp. of Mot. ("Pl.
Mem.") (Dkt. 67-1) at 3.) Therefore, Plaintiff contends,
"[r]equiring [him] to obtain [a] default judgment
against the remaining defendants ... simply so that the Court
can dismiss them on grounds already established as law of the
case in the [M&O] would unnecessarily delay resolution of
the case" and would not serve the interests of judicial
argument makes clear that Rule 54(b) certification would not
promote the interests of judicial economy. The Second Circuit
has "repeatedly noted that the district court generally
should not grant a Rule 54(b) certification 'if the same
or closely related issues remain to be litigated.'"
Novick v. AXA Network. LLC, 642 F.3d 304, 311 (2d
Cir. 2011) (quoting Harriscom. 947 F.2d at 629).
This is because "'[i]t does not normally advance the
interests of sound judicial administration or efficiency to
have piecemeal appeals that require two (or more) three-judge
panels to familiarize themselves with a given case' in
successive appeals from successive decisions on interrelated
issues." (quoting Harriscom, 947 F.2d at 631)).
Thus, to the extent that Plaintiffs claims against the Absent
Defendants raise the same issues as his claims against the
Appearing Defendants, and will, as he concedes, be dismissed
on the same grounds, the interests of judicial economy would
be better-served if he were to resolve his claims against the
Absent Defendants before this court and then take a single
appeal to the Second Circuit, rather than appealing
separately from the dismissal of his claims against the
Appearing Defendants and the denial of his anticipated motion
for a default judgment against the Absent Defendants. While
this may slow the disposition of Plaintiff s case (see Pl.
Mem. at 3), any such delay is justified in light of the
"historic federal policy against piecemeal
appeals." Curtiss-Wright 446 U.S. at 8.
Plaintiff may minimize this delay by promptly applying for a
renewed certificate of default and renewing his motion for a
Plaintiffs motion for entry of partial final judgment
pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (Dkt. 67) is denied.
 Plaintiff also requests that, in the
alternative, the court "may ... wish to enter a final
judgment as against all defendants" but cites no
authority by which the court may do so. (Mem. in Supp. of