United States District Court, S.D. New York
OPINION AND ORDER
PAUL OETKEN, DISTRICT JUDGE
Warner Gomez moves for reconsideration of this Court's
dismissal of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims.
(Dkt. No. 87.) For the reasons that follow, the motion is
with the background of this case, as set out in this
Court's prior opinion, is presumed. See Gomez v. City
of New York, No. 15 Civ. 7524, 2017 WL 3736693 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 29, 2017). This case arises out of an assault against
Gomez by a fellow police officer, Defendant Jacy Reese, who
intentionally discharged oleoresin capsicum spray (“OC
Spray”) into Gomez's face and eyes. (See
Dkt. No. 47.) The Complaint alleges that Reese's partner,
Officer Taiwo Adeleke, enabled the assault, and that four
additional officers tried to cover up the incident.
subgroup of defendants-which included Defendant Adeleke but
did not include Defendant Reese-moved to dismiss the
Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. (Dkt. No. 78.) The Court noted that Adeleke
“face[s] § 1983 liability for constitutional
violations arising out of Reese's assault only if Reese
himself is suable under the statute.” Gomez,
2017 WL 3736693, at *6. The Court concluded that Reese was
not acting under color of law when he assaulted Gomez, and,
as a result, “none of the moving defendants may be held
liable under § 1983.” Id. The Court
dismissed Counts One and Two as against the moving
defendants. Id. Gomez now asks this Court to
reconsider that dismissal. (Dkt. No. 87 at 1.)
motion for reconsideration is ‘an extraordinary remedy
to be employed sparingly in the interests of finality and
conservation of scarce judicial resources.'”
Drapkin v. Mafco Consol. Grp., Inc., 818 F.Supp.2d
678, 695 (quoting In re Initial Public Offering Sec.
Litig., 399 F.Supp.2d 298, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)).
“A motion for reconsideration should be granted only
when the defendant identifies ‘an intervening change of
controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the
need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest
injustice.'” Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil of
Tartikov, Inc. v. YLL Irrevocable Tr., 729 F.3d 99, 104
(2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd. v.
Nat'l Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir.
1992)). “[R]econsideration will generally be denied
unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or
data that the court overlooked-matters . . . that might
reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the
court.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d
255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995).
the parties' shared belief, this Court did not formally
dismiss any claims against Defendant Reese, who has not yet
appeared in this action nor answered the Complaint. The Court
dismissed Gomez's § 1983 claims only “with
respect to Movants.” Gomez, 2017 WL
3736693, at *6 (emphasis added).
the Court cautions that if Gomez moved for a default judgment
against Defendant Reese, the Court could not award any
damages. Although “a district court must accept as true
all of the factual allegations of [a] non-defaulting party
and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor, ”
Belizaire v. RAV Investigative & Sec. Servs.
Ltd., 61 F.Supp.3d 336, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), a court
“need not agree that the alleged facts constitute a
valid cause of action, ” Au Bon Pain Corp. v.
Artect, Inc., 653 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1981). A court
must “determine whether the [plaintiff's]
allegations establish [the defendant's] liability as a
matter of law.” Belizaire, 61 F.Supp. at 344
(alterations in original) (quoting Finkel v.
Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2009)). With
respect to Defendant Reese, the Court concluded that the
Complaint does not.
advances three arguments in support of his request for
reconsideration with respect to Defendant Adeleke. All three
Gomez argues that Reese was acting under color of law when he
assaulted Gomez. (See Dkt. No. 88 at 5‒13.)
But Gomez merely repeats the arguments he previously made in
opposing the motion to dismiss, and the Court will not rehash
arguments already considered and rejected. See Anwar v.
Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., 745 F.Supp.2d 379, 382
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“A court must narrowly construe and
strictly apply [the rule permitting motions for
reconsideration] so as to avoid duplicative rulings on
previously considered issues . . . .”). Having ...