United States District Court, S.D. New York
OPINION AND ORDER
STEWART D. AARON, United States Magistrate Judge
the Court is a fee application of Defendant, Sloan-Kettering
Institute for Cancer Research ("SKI") (ECF No.
155). For the reasons set forth below, SKI's fee
application is granted. Plaintiff, Errant Gene Therapeutics,
LLC ("EGT"), is ordered to pay to SKI
$88;339.00 in attorneys' fees.
Opinion and Order, dated June 5, 2017 (ECF No. 149;
hereinafter "June 5 Order"), Magistrate Judge Ellis
ordered that EGT pay the reasonable attorneys' fees and
costs of SKI in bringing two motions for sanctions
[i.e., ECF Nos. 100 & 134). Magistrate Judge
Ellis also ordered that "SKI submit hours and rates for
the Court's approval." Pursuant to the June 5 Order,
SKI submitted its hours and rates, and filed a fee
application, dated June 19, 2017 (ECF No. 155). On its application, SKI
currently is seeking fees in the amount of $122,
opposed SKI's fee application and supplement. (ECF Nos.
168 & 180.) EGT asserts in its opposition that SKI's
application is "excessive, " and EGT requests at
least a "90% reduction." (PL's Opp. to
Def.'s Fee Appl., ECF No. 168 at 3.) EGT also asserts
that the hours spent by SKI's attorneys were
"staggering." (Id. at 4.)
the retirement of Magistrate Judge Ellis, SKI's fee
application was assigned to this Court.
Applicable legal Standards
June 5 Order requires EGT to pay SKI's "reasonable
attorneys' fees." (ECF No. 149.) In determining
reasonable attorneys' fees in this case, the Court will
use the lodestar approach to determine a "presumptively
reasonable fee" by calculating the number of hours
reasonably expended by counsel on the litigation and multiply
that number of hours by reasonable hourly rates. Milled
v. Metro-North R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir.
2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court
"enjoys broad discretion in determining the amount of a
fee award." Vincent v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec,
651 F.3d 299, 307 (2d Cir. 2011).
determine the reasonable hourly rate, the Court's
analysis is guided by the market rate "prevailing in the
community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably
comparable skill, experience and reputation." Blum
v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.ll (1984). Generally,
the relevant community is the district in which the district
court sits. Arbor Hilt Concerned Citizens Neighborhood
Ass'n v. Cty. of Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 190 (2d Cir.
2008). The Court is to evaluate the "evidence proffered
by the parties" and may take "judicial notice of
the rates awarded in prior cases and the court's own
familiarity with the rates prevailing in the district."
Farbotko v. Clinton Cty., 433 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir.
making its determination, the Court "examines the
particular hours expended by counsel with a view to the value
of the work product of the specific expenditures to the
client's case." Luciano v. Olsten Corp.,
109 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 1997). A court-awarded
attorneys' fee must compensate only for "hours
reasonably expended on the litigation, " not for
"hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise
unnecessary." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.
424, 433-34 (1983). if the number of hours recorded by
counsel is disproportionate to the work performed, the Court
should reduce the stated hours in making its fee award.
See Id. at 433.
the determination of fees "should not result in a second
major litigation." Id. at 437. "[T]rial
courts need not, and indeed should not, become green-eyeshade
accountants. The essential goal in shifting fees (to either
party) is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing
perfection. So trial courts may take into account their
overall sense of a suit, and may use estimates in calculating
and allocating an attorney's time." Fox v.
Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011).
Court has carefully reviewed SKl's fee application, reply
papers and time records, as well as EGT's opposition and
sur-reply papers, and concludes in its discretion that a