United States District Court, E.D. New York
Plaintiff: RICHARD J. CARDINALE The Law Firm of Richard J.
Cardinale, IZABEL OLSZOWA GARCIA Law Office of Izabel O.
Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff: JOSEPH AARON GUTMANN DANIEL
H. OLINER New York City Law Department.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
FREDERIC BLOCK SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Atreyu Kennedy, a former inmate at Rikers Island Correctional
Facility (“Rikers”), sued the City of New York,
Mayor Bill de Blasio, former Department of Corrections and
Community Services Commissioner Joseph Ponte, and Rikers
officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on injuries he
received when he was allegedly assaulted by two other
inmates. The City seeks a change of venue under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1391 and 1404. The motion is denied.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), a civil action may be brought in:
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if
all defendants are residents of the State in which the
district is located;
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the
events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a
substantial part of property that is the subject of the
action is situated; or
(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise
be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district
in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal
jurisdiction with respect to such action.
purpose of venue, “an entity with the capacity to sue
and be sued in its common name . . . shall be deemed to
reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which
such defendant is subject to the court's personal
jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question . .
. .” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2). Section 1391(c) thus
“equates jurisdiction with venue . . . for corporate
defendants.” PDK Labs, Inc. v. Proactive
Labs, Inc., 325 F.Supp.2d 176, 182 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)
(quoting Laumann Mfg. Corp. v. Castings USA, 913
F.Supp. 712, 719 (E.D.N.Y.1996)). If a state has multiple
judicial districts and has personal jurisdiction over a
corporation at the beginning of the suit, the corporation is
deemed to reside in any district that would have sufficient
contacts for personal jurisdiction if the district were a
separate state. Id. § 1391(d).
venue is proper under § 1391(b)(1): All Defendants are
residents of the State of New York, and the City is
“subject to personal jurisdiction in the Eastern
District and is thus deemed a ‘resident' of the
Eastern District.” Springle v. City of New
York, 2013 WL 592656, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2013).
City argues that venue is improper because the actions
underlying the Complaint took place at Rikers in Bronx County
and “presumably most of the officers involved in this
incident work in Bronx County.” The location of the
underlying actions would be pertinent under §
1391(b)(2), but the Court need not consider that provision
because jurisdiction is proper under § 1391(b)(1). That
most of the officers involved work in Bronx County is also
irrelevant because venue is proper in “a judicial
district in which any defendant resides.” 28
U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) (emphasis added). The City is deemed
to reside in the Eastern District, so venue is proper here.
City also moves to transfer venue for the convenience of the
parties. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), “[f]or the
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to
any other district . . . where it might have been
brought.” “‘The determination whether to
grant a change of venue requires a balancing of conveniences,
which is left to the sound discretion of the district
court.'” Forjone v. Cal., 425 F. App'x
73, 74 (2d Cir. 2011), (quoting Filmline (Cross-Country)
Prods., Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 865 F.2d 513, 520
(2d Cir. 1989)). The relevant factors are:
(1) the plaintiff's choice of forum, (2) the convenience
of witnesses, (3) the location of relevant documents and
relative ease of access to sources of proof, (4) the
convenience of parties, (5) the locus of operative facts, (6)
the availability of process to compel the attendance of