United States District Court, W.D. New York
DECISION AND ORDER
MICHAEL A. TELESCA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
pro se, Vickie Dianne Byrd (“Plaintiff”)
instituted this action against defendants “Dunn Towers
I, Apt's” and “Dunn Towers I
Apartments” (collectively, “Dunn Towers I”)
and Phillipone Realty, Inc. (“Phillipone”) by
filing a complaint (Dkt #1) dated December 1, 2016, alleging
that defendants violated the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3601 et seq. (“FHA”) and
generally discriminated against her on the basis of
disability. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Decision and Order dated November 15, 2017, the Court
converted Dunn Towers I's pre-answer Motion to Dismiss
into a Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 56”).
Also in the November 15thDecision and Order, the
Court converted Phillipone's Answer with its attached
exhibits into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff was served with a copy of the Western District of
New York's Rule 56 Notice to Pro Se Litigants,
in accordance with Western District of New York Local Rule
56(b) and Irby v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 262 F.3d
412, 414 (2d Cir. 2001).
filed her own Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment, to which
Dunn Towers I submitted a Reply. Phillipone has not filed any
additional papers subsequent to the Court's November
15thDecision and Order. The motions are fully
submitted and ready for decision.
Rule 56 Standard
judgment is required where ‘the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'”
Rodriguez v. Vill. Green Realty, Inc., 788 F.3d 31,
39-40 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)). “In
assessing the record to determine whether there is a genuine
issue to be tried as to any material fact, the court is
required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible
factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary
judgment is sought.” Stone v. City of Mount
Vernon, 118 F.3d 92, 99 (2d Cir. 1997). “A fact is
‘material' for these purposes if it ‘might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law.'” Rodriguez, 78 F.3d at 39 (quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986)). “A dispute of fact is ‘genuine' if
‘the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'”
Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
Overview of Plaintiff's Claims and the Parties
Plaintiff's pleadings are rather difficult to decipher,
the gist of her Complaint alleges that her rental application
was unlawfully denied by Dunn Towers I on the basis of
to its website, Dunn Towers I provides “housing for
seniors 62 years of age or over, disabled veterans who submit
satisfactory proof of physical and/or mobility eligibility
according to the Civil Service Law ‘Section 85:
Definition of Disabled Veteran', and anyone 18 years of
age and older with a physical or mobility
disability.” Dunn Towers I also denominates itself
an Equal Housing Opportunity by its use of the official logo
sanctioned by the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(“HUD”) under the terms of the FHA. Dunn Towers I
is managed by Phillipone.
Discriminatory Practices Prohibited Under the FHA
prohibits discrimination across a spectrum of housing-related
activities, including the provision of brokerage services,
real estate transactions, and housing sales and rentals.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606. Subject to
certain exceptions not applicable here, the FHA makes it
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide
offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of,
or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any
person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial
status, or national origin.
(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms,
conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or
in the provision of services or facilities in connection
therewith, because of race, color, ...