United States District Court, S.D. New York
OPINION AND ORDER
RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, DISTRICT JUDGE.
before the Court is the motion of Petitioner Armando Colon
seeking reconsideration of the 1992 denial of his habeas
petition. (Doc. No. 24.) For the reasons set forth below, the
motion is denied.
March 1, 1979, Petitioner was sentenced to twenty-five years
to life in prison following his conviction for second-degree
murder in New York State Supreme Court, Bronx County. See
People v. Colon, 128 A.D.2d 422, 422 (1st Dep't
1987). On September 25, 1991, Petitioner filed a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254,
seeking federal collateral review of his conviction. (Doc.
Nos. 1, 8.) See also Colon v. McClellan, No.
91-cv-9475 (JSM), 1992 WL 162644 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 1992).
Petitioner advanced two arguments in his petition: first,
that the evidence at his trial was legally insufficient
because the testimony of his accomplice was not sufficiently
corroborated and, second, that he was mentally incompetent to
stand trial. See Colon, 1992 WL 162644, at *1. On
June 19, 1992, Judge John Martin, formerly of this district,
denied the motion, finding that there was no constitutional
rule requiring corroboration of accomplice testimony, and
that there was no reason to second-guess the trial
judge's thoughtful consideration of Petitioner's
competency to stand trial. See Id. at *l-2. The
Second Circuit affirmed Judge Martin's ruling in an
unpublished summary order on March 2, 1993. See 992
F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1993) (table). Given the age of this case,
the information available from the electronic docket is
lacking in its completeness, but it is clear that on May 27,
2003 and again on December 16, 2013, the Second Circuit
denied Petitioner's requests that the Court of Appeals
authorize a successive habeas petition. (See Doc.
Nos. 22, 23.) Nevertheless, on June 29, 2017, Petitioner
tiled a motion seeking reconsideration of Judge Martin's
June 19, 1992 order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b)(6). (Doc. No. 24.) In this motion, Petitioner
seeks reconsideration of Judge Martin's conclusion that
the state court's competency determination was
constitutionally sound. (See Id. at 6-7.) Because
Judge Martin retired from this Court in 2003, the case was
assigned to my docket on September 15, 2017.
Rule 60(b)(6) allows courts to relieve a party from a final
judgment for "any ., . reason that justifies relief,
" Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6), such a motion "must be
made within a reasonable time, " Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c).
Moreover, the use of a Rule 60 motion for reconsideration in
the habeas context is further complicated by the potential
overlap between a motion for reconsideration and a successive
habeas petition. Thus, when reviewing habeas petitions filed
by state prisoners, federal courts must dismiss a successive
petition under all but three extremely stringent
circumstances. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).
Specifically, the Supreme Court has cautioned that in order
to give meaning to the limitations Congress has placed on
successive habeas filings through the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), a
Rule 60(b) motion that merely advances
'"claims" - that is, '"an asserted
federal basis for relief from a state court's judgment of
conviction" - must be treated as a successive habeas
petition. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 531-32
(2005), It is only where the motion attacks "some defect
in the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings,
" for example voiding a judgment for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction or vacating a default judgment,
that it should be treated as a proper motion for
reconsideration. Id. at 532 (emphasis added).
the Court concludes that Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of Judge Martin's decision clearly
advances old and new "claims" for relief from the
state court conviction, and, accordingly, it must be treated
as a successive petition. While several components of
Petitioner's argument are not entirely clear, he appears
to merely renew his challenge to Judge Martin's
conclusion that habeas relief was inappropriate. For example.
Petitioner argues that "this court did err in denying
[Petitioner's] habeas petition.'" (Doc. No. 24
at 3.) Furthermore, Petitioner appears to be contesting the
constitutional propriety of the state court proceeding, an
issue already decided by Judge Martin, by arguing that
"the State Court's decision was an 'unreasonable
application' of clearly established Federal law."
(Id., at 9.) Again, these amount to attacks on the
merits of the prior federal court habeas determination, and
may not be raised under Rule 60(b). See Gonzalez,
545 at 532 n.4.
concluded that Petitioner's motion amounts to a
successive petition, the Court is obliged to dismiss it
unless (1) Petitioner's claim is based on a "new
rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on
collateral review by the Supreme Court, " (2)
Petitioner's claim is based on a newly established
"factual predicate" that "could not have been
discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence,
" or (3) Petitioner is actually innocent in that he can
"establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but
for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have
found [Petitioner] guilty of the underlying offense." 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b). None of these apply here, and Petitioner
has made no attempt to argue otherwise. As a result, the
Court has no choice but to dismiss the petition.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Petitioner's motion is DENIED.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the
motion pending at docket number 24 and to mail a copy of this
order to Petitioner.
 While Petitioner's 1991 habeas
petition was filed before the enactment of AEDPA, the
successive petition considered here was filed in 2017,
clearly long after AEDPA came into effect, and consideration
of this petition is thus subject to AEDPA's requirements
and standards. See Mancuso v. Herbert,166 F.3d 97,
101 (2d Cir. 1999) T'AEDPA applies to a habeas petition
filed after the AEDPA's effective date, regardless of
when the petitioner filed his or ...