United States District Court, E.D. New York
States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New
York By: Allen Lee Bode, Assistant United States Attorney
Office of Kevin J. Keating Attorney for the Defendant By:
Kevin James Keating, Esq., of Counsel
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
D. SPATT United States District Judge
November 1, 2017, this Court granted the portion of the
Defendant Tyrone Robinson's (the “Defendant”)
omnibus motion requesting a suppression hearing regarding the
seizure of the Defendant's cell phone during the
execution of a parole arrest warrant on June 10, 2016. The
Court referred the suppression hearing to Magistrate Judge
Anne Y. Shields.
January 8, 2018, Judge Shields held a suppression hearing,
and issued a report and recommendation (the
“R&R”) on January 16, 2018 recommending that the
Defendant's motion to suppress the cell phone be denied.
before the Court are the Defendant's objections to the
R&R. For the following reasons, the R&R is adopted in its
purposes of the instant decision, the parties familiarity
with the facts, procedural history, and the record are
presumed. Citations to the suppression hearing transcript are
denoted as “Tr.”
The Standard of Review
district court reviewing a magistrate judge's report and
recommendation “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole
or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the
magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
Parties may raise objections to the magistrate judge's
report and recommendation, but they must be “specific,
” “written, ” and submitted “[w]ithin
14 days after being served with a copy of the recommended
disposition.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2); accord 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). A district court must conduct a
de novo review of those portions of the R&R or
specified proposed findings or recommendations to which
timely and proper objections are made. 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(C); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3)
(“The district judge may accept, reject, or modify the
recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return
the matter to the magistrate judge with
instructions.”). The district court may adopt those
portions of a report and recommendation to which no timely
objections have been made, provided no clear error is
apparent from the face of the record. Lewis v. Zon,
573 F.Supp.2d 804, 811 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Nelson v.
Smith, 618 F.Supp. 1186, 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
addition, “[t]o the extent . . . that the party makes
only conclusory or general arguments, or simply
reiterates the original arguments, the Court will review
the [R&R] strictly for clear error.” IndyMac Bank,
F.S.B. v. Nat'l Settlement Agency, Inc., No.
07-CV-6865, 2008 WL 4810043, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2008)
(emphasis added); see also Toth v. N.Y. City Dep't of
Educ., No. 14CV3776SLTJO, 2017 WL 78483, at *7 (E.D.N.Y.
Jan. 9, 2017) (“Reviewing courts should review a report
and recommendation for clear error where objections are
merely perfunctory responses, argued in an attempt to engage
the district court in a rehashing of the same arguments set
forth in the original petition.” (quoting Ortiz v.
Barkley, 558 F.Supp.2d 444, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2008))).
“The goal of the federal statute providing for the
assignment of cases to magistrates is to increase the overall
efficiency of the federal judiciary.” McCarthy v.
Manson, 554 F.Supp. 1275, 1286 (D. Conn. 1982),
aff'd, 714 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting
Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 (Former 5th
Cir. 1982) (en banc)) (footnote omitted).
“There is no increase in efficiency, and much extra
work, when a party attempts to relitigate every argument
which it presented to the Magistrate Judge.”
Toth, 2017 WL 78483, at *7 (quoting Camardo v.
Gen. Motors Hourly-Rate Employees Pension Plan, 806
F.Supp. 380, 382 (W.D.N.Y. 1992)).
Application to the Defendant's Objections
Defendant addressed his objections in a letter to Judge
Shields. Nevertheless, the Court construes the
Defendant's letter as objections addressed to this Court.
The Defendant argues that suppression should be granted
because the phone was not seized from the Defendant's
person by the parole officers; the Defendant's residence
was secure before and after parole entered the location, so
there was not need to keep the cell phone for safekeeping;
the parole officers could not articulate how keeping a cell
phone would help the Defendant contact parole; and most