Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen

United States District Court, E.D. New York

March 29, 2018

MARTIN JONATHAN BATALLA VIDAL Plaintiffs,
v.
KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security,, Defendants. STATE OF NEW YORK Plaintiffs,
v.
DONALD TRUMP, President of the United States, Defendants.

          MEMORANDUM & ORDER

          NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

         Plaintiffs in the above-captioned cases challenge Defendants' decisions to end the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals ("DACA") program and, Plaintiffs allege, to relax the restrictions on federal authorities' use of DACA applicants' personal information for immigration-enforcement purposes. The court assumes familiarity with the factual and procedural history of these cases and in particular with its November 9, 2017, Memorandum and Order (the "November 9 M&O") (Dkt. 104), [1] which granted in part and denied in part Defendants' motion to dismiss these cases for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, [2] and its February 13, 2018, Amended Memorandum and Order (the "February 13 M&O") (Dkt. 254), which granted Plaintiffs' motions for a preliminary injunction barring Defendants from terminating the DACA program in its entirety. Before the court are Defendants' motions to dismiss the Batalla Vidal Plaintiffs' third amended complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and to dismiss the State Plaintiffs' amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (3d Am. Compl. ("BV TAC") (Dkt. 113); Am. Compl. ("State Pls. AC") (Dkt. 71, No. 17-CV-5228); Defs. Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss the BV TAC ("BV MTD") (Dkt. 207-1); Defs. Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss the State Pls. AC ("State MTD") (Dkt. 71-1); see also Pls. Mem. in Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss the BV TAC ("BV Pls. Opp'n") (Dkt. 240); Pls. Mem. in Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss the State Pls. AC ("State Pls. Opp'n) (Dkt. 202, No. 17-CV-5228).) For the reasons that follow, Defendants' motions are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

         I. LEGAL STANDARDS

         A. Rule 12(b)(1)

         A Rule 12(b)(1) motion tests the court's subject-matter jurisdiction to hear a claim or case. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Under Rule 12(b)(1), the court must dismiss a claim "when the ... court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it." Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). When considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the court "must take all uncontroverted facts in the complaint... as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party asserting jurisdiction." Tandon v. Captain's Cove Marina of Bridgeport. Inc., 752 F.3d 239, 243 (2d Cir. 2014). Nevertheless, "the party asserting subject matter jurisdiction 'has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it exists.'" Id. (quoting Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113).

         B. Rule 12(b)(6)

         A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal adequacy of the plaintiffs complaint. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In considering the sufficiency of the complaint, the court "accept[s] all [well-pleaded] factual allegations in the complaint as true, and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor, " Chambers v. Time Warner. Inc., 28 2 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002), but does need not to credit "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, " Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Determining "plausibility" is a "context-specific task, " Id. at 679, which "depends on a host of considerations: the full factual picture presented by the complaint, the particular cause of action and its elements, and the existence of alternative explanations so obvious that they render plaintiffs inferences unreasonable, " L-7 Designs. Inc. v. Old Navy. LLC, 647 F.3d 419, 430 (2d Cir. 2011).

         The court's review of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is generally limited to "the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, " as well as documents "integral" to the complaint. DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable LLC, 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010).

         II. DISCUSSION

         The court first analyzes Plaintiffs' claims challenging the decision to end the DACA program, then turns to the Batalla Vidal Plaintiffs' claims challenging Defendants' (1) alleged changes to the policy regarding the protection of DACA applicants' personal information (the "information-use policy") (BV TAC ¶¶ 177-82); and (2) rejections of DACA renewal requests that were delayed due to postal errors, received late in the day on October 5, 2017, or contained "real or perceived clerical errors" (id. ¶¶ 199-205).

         A. DACA Rescission

         Plaintiffs have stated a claim that the decision to end the DACA program was substantively arbitrary and capricious, in violation of Section 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2), and substantially motivated by discriminatory animus, in violation of the equal-protection principle inherent in the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Plaintiffs have not, however, stated a claim that the rescission of the DACA program was invalid because it was not implemented through notice-and-comment rulemaking, nor have they stated a claim that Defendants violated the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. ("RFA"), by failing to consider the rescission's impact on small entities.

         1. Substantive APA

         Plaintiffs challenge the decision to end the DACA program as substantively "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). (BV TAC ¶¶ 177-82; State Pls. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 253-56.) In its February 13 M&O, the court found that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of this claim. For the reasons stated in that opinion, Defendants' motion to dismiss these claims is DENIED.[3] Additionally, the court notes that it would be inappropriate to dismiss Plaintiffs' substantive APA claims at this stage of the litigation, as "there is a strong suggestion" that the administrative record previously produced by Defendants is incomplete, "entitling [Plaintiffs] to discovery regarding the completeness of the record." (Dec. 27, 2017, USCA Order (Dkt. 210) at 2-3 (quoting Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d 644, 654 (2d Cir. 1982)).)[4]

         2. Procedural APA

         Plaintiffs next claim that the decision to end the DACA program was procedurally defective, in violation of Section 7O6(2)(D) of the APA, because the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") did not use notice-and-comment rulemaking to rescind the program. These claims raise challenging questions but are ultimately unavailing.

         Under the APA, an agency generally must use notice-and-comment procedures to make any "rule." 5 U.S.C. § 553.[5] The APA exempts from this requirement, however, "general statements of policy, " among other types of rule. Id. § 553(b)(A). The parties dispute whether the memorandum announcing the rescission of the DACA program (the "DACA Rescission Memo") (Mem. from Elaine C. Duke, Acting Sec'y, DHS, Rescission of the June 15, 2012 Memorandum Entitled "Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children" (Dkt. 77-1 at ECF p.252)) is a "general statement of policy" exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements or instead a "legislative rule" subject to these requirements. (Compare BV MTD at 18-20, and State MTD at 28-31, with BV Pls. Opp'n at 12-16, and State Pls. Opp'n at 15-19.) The DACA Rescission Memo was not formulated through notice-and-comment rulemaking, so if it is a legislative rule, it is invalid. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 706(2)(D).

         As the court has already noted, the line between legislative rules and non-legislative rules "is enshrouded in considerable smog." (Feb. 13 M&O at 30 (quoting Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023, 1030 (2d Cir. 1975)).) See also Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 251 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (characterizing the inquiry for determining whether an agency action is a legislative rule, an interpretive rule, or a general statement of policy as "quite difficult and confused"). There are, however, general principles to guide the court's inquiry. If the rule alters the rights or obligations of regulated parties "or produces other significant effects on private interests, " it is legislative. White v. Shalala, 7 F.3d 296, 303 (2d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted); see also Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979) (legislative rules "affect[] individual rights and obligations" (citation omitted)); Lewis-Mota v. Sec'v of Labor, 469 F.2d 478, 482 (2d Cir. 1972). The D.C. Circuit has summarized what makes a "legislative" rule:

An agency action that purports to impose legally binding obligations or prohibitions on regulated parties-and that would be the basis for an enforcement action for violations of those obligations or requirements-is a legislative rule. An agency action that sets forth legally binding requirements for a private party to obtain a permit or license is a legislative rule.

Nat'l Mining Ass'n. 758 F.3d at 251-52.

         If, however, the rule does not alter regulated parties' rights and obligations but instead "educat[es]... agency members in the agency's work, " or is "directed primarily at the staff of an agency describing how it will conduct agency discretionary functions, " the rule is a general policy statement. Noel 508 F.2d at 1030 (first quoting Henry Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies 145-46 (1962), and then quoting Arthur E. Bonfield, Some Tentative Thoughts on Public Participation in the Making of Interpretative Rules and General Statements of Policy Under the APA, 23 Admin. L. Rev. 101, 115 (1971)); see also Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 197 (1993) (general statements of policy are "issued by an agency to advise the public prospectively of the manner in which the agency proposed to exercise a discretionary power" (quoting Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 302 n.3l)); Nat'l Mining Ass'n, 758 F.3d at 252 ("An agency action that merely explains how the agency will enforce a statute or regulation-in other words, how it will exercise its broad enforcement discretion or permitting discretion under some extant statute or rule-is a general statement of policy.").

         The Second Circuit's decision in Noel helps reveal the uncertain boundary between legislative rules and general statements of policy. In Noel two Haitian nationals unlawfully present in the United States and subject to orders of deportation married U.S. lawful permanent residents and sought "extended voluntary departure, " a form of discretionary relief from deportation that would have enabled them to remain in this country for up to two years while waiting for visas. 508 F.2d at 1024. Between 1968 and 1972, it was the practice of the New York District Director for Immigration and Naturalization Services ("INS") routinely to grant extended voluntary departure to such Western Hemisphere aliens who were present in this country and married to permanent resident aliens. Id. at 1025. In 1972, however, INS issued a directive stating that such aliens "should not routinely be granted extended departure time, but rather should be offered that privilege only in those cases where compelling circumstances warranted the relief." Id. at 1025-26. The plaintiffs argued, among other things, that this directive was a legislative rule that was invalid because it was not made through notice-and-comment rulemaking. Id. at 1029. The Second Circuit rejected this argument, concluding that the directive was a "general statement of policy" exempt from notice-and-comment requirements. Id. First, the Second Circuit noted that the directive did not purport to amend an existing regulation vesting the district director with sole discretion to extend deportable aliens' time in the United States or otherwise to oust him of this discretion. Id. at 1030. Instead, the directive only offered "a statement by the agency of its general policy as a guideline for the District Directors" in their exercise of this discretion. Id. Second, the directive did not "change [] the existing right of the [aliens] to have their applications for extensions of time to depart authorized in the sole discretion of the district director, " because those aliens remained eligible to seek deferred voluntary departure, albeit only on the more limited basis of hardship.

         Like the directive at issue in Noel the DACA Rescission Memo appears to be a general statement of policy, not a legislative rule. The DACA Rescission Memo does not deprive individuals of a substantive right to receive deferred action or work authorization, or to have these benefits renewed for additional terms. As the memorandum that launched the DACA program (the "2012 DACA Memo") states clearly, no such rights exist. (Mem. from Janet Napolitano, Sec'y, DHS, "Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children" ("2012 DACA Memo") (Dkt. 77-1 at ECF p.1).) Instead, the decision to grant or deny an individual deferred action and work authorization continues to lie within immigration authorities' discretion. Like the 2012 DACA Memo, the DACA Rescission Memo offers guidance to DHS employees as to how the agency intends to exercise this discretion prospectively: Whereas the 2012 DACA Memo advises DHS staff to consider exercising prosecutorial discretion with respect to individuals meeting certain identified criteria (such as age of entry into the United States and absence of a meaningful criminal record), the DACA Rescission Memo directs those staff not to consider those criteria when exercising their prosecutorial discretion. The DACA Rescission Memo is thus "directed primarily at the staff of [DHS] describing how it will conduct agency discretionary functions." Noel, 508 F.2d at 1030 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

         It is true that, if the DACA Rescission Memo were to take effect, hundreds of thousands of individuals would no longer have the opportunity to seek deferred action and work authorization through the DACA program. As Defendants note, however, the DACA Rescission Memo does not purport to strip immigration authorities of the ability to grant deferred action and work authorization, but only provides that they should not do based on the criteria identified in the 2012 DACA Memo, or on the submission of D AC A application materials. (BV MTD at 7 ("[A]s was true before implementation of the DACA Policy in 2012, deferred action remains available on an individualized basis.").) At least in theory, individuals who would have been eligible for deferred action and work authorization under the DACA program may still qualify for those benefits based on their individual circumstances. As a practical matter, the DACA Rescission Memo almost certainly means that fewer individuals will receive for deferred action and work authorization. But the directive at issue in Noel surely reduced the number of aliens eligible for discretionary relief, too, and that did not render the directive a legislative rule. See Noel, 508 F.2d at 1025-26.

         Plaintiffs contend that the DACA Rescission Memo nevertheless is a legislative rule because it binds DHS's discretion and requires the agency to reject all DACA applications and renewal requests not meeting certain criteria. (BV Pls. Opp'n at 12-14; State Pls. Opp'n at 15-19.) As Plaintiffs point out, a number of courts outside this circuit-most notably the D.C. Circuit-have determined whether a rule is legislative at least partly by looking to whether the rule constrains the agency's own discretion. See, e.g., Clarian Health W., LLC v. Hargan, 878 F.3d 346, 357 (D.C. Cir. 2017). In this view, a rule "'cabining ... an agency's prosecutorial discretion can in fact rise to the level of a substantive, legislative rule' when it 'is in purpose or likely effect one that narrowly limits administrative discretion.'" Ass'n of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 494 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Cmty. Nutrition Inst, v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam)). Plaintiffs note that the DACA Rescission Memo mandates the rejection of certain DACA applications, and therefore contend that the memo eliminates DHS's discretion to consider those applications and thus constitutes a legislative rule.

         While there is some force to Plaintiffs' arguments, they are unavailing. As an initial matter, it is not clear to this court that an agency's compliance with its stated policy is reason to deem that policy a legislative rule. Because one might expect functional organizations generally to abide by their own policies, treating general compliance with internal policies as evidence that those policies were in fact legislative rules risks writing the "general statements of policy" exception to notice-and-comment rulemaking out of the APA.[6] Moreover, it is important to remember that the DACA Rescission Memo purports to end a program that was itself created by a policy statement. Plaintiffs' view that Defendants must use notice and comment to stop what started without notice and comment is not only counterintuitive, but also at odds with the general principle that the procedures needed to repeal or amend a rule as the same ones that were used to make the rule in the first place. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S.Ct. 1199, 1206 (2015) ("Because an agency is not required to use notice-and-comment procedures to issue an initial interpretive rule, it is also not required to use those procedures when it amends or repeals that interpretive rule.") To whatever extent the DACA Rescission Memo is in fact "binding" on DHS, the court cannot agree that this prospective limitation on the agency's exercise of its discretion renders the memo a legislative rule.

         Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.