United States District Court, E.D. New York
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Pamela
K. Chen United States District Judge.
Plaintiff
Darren White filed this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (“Section 1983”) and New York common law,
seeking damages based on his arrests on April 18 and 20,
2013, and subsequent detention and prosecution. (Dkt. 1.)
Before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary
judgment. (Dkt. 32.) For the reasons set forth herein, the
Court grants Defendants' motion in its entirety.
BACKGROUND
I.
Relevant Facts[1]
On
April 17, 2013, Plaintiff's half-brother, Dorel Lias, was
arrested for possession of a stolen phone. (Defs.' 56.1,
Dkt. 33, ¶ 1.) Lias was taken to the New York City
Police Department (“NYPD”) Brooklyn Robbery Squad
office, where he was questioned by Defendant Detective
William Schierle (“Det. Schierle”). (Id.
at ¶ 2.) Early the following morning, Lias provided Det.
Schierle with a written statement (Declaration of Jeff Henle
(“Henle Decl.”), Dkt. 37, ¶ 4) stating,
inter alia, that on February 13, 2013, Plaintiff
gave Lias the phone for which Lias was arrested. Lias told
the officers that Plaintiff had gotten the phone from a
robbery of a Radio Shack in which Plaintiff had participated
earlier that day.[2] (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 4; Dkt. 34-9, at
ECF[3]
2.) Lias also identified Plaintiff in a wanted poster that
had been created from surveillance video of a robbery of a
Radio Shack in Queens on November 13, 2012. (Deposition of
William Schierle (“Schierle Dep.”), Dkt. 34-2, at
15:02-08[4]; Dkt. 34-10.) Lias signed an ATF consent
form authorizing the officers to search Plaintiff's
apartment at 360 Dumont Avenue in Brooklyn. (Defs.' 56.1
¶ 6; Dkt. 34-11.)[5]
The
same day, April 18, 2013, Det. Schierle and several non-party
officers went to Plaintiff's apartment. While the
officers did not have a search or arrest warrant, Schierle
knew that there was an outstanding warrant for
Plaintiff's arrest in connection with a series of
robberies. (Schierle Dep., 16:7-17:6; 17:13-19; 37:8-15.)
According to Schierle, Plaintiff's sister let them into
the apartment (id. at 28:9-29:2), and Plaintiff
signed a consent form authorizing the officers to search the
apartment for contraband (Dkt. 34-12). Plaintiff, however,
claims that when the officers arrived at his apartment, they
“started kicking” Plaintiff's door in and
“there was a gun placed into [his] face”
(Deposition of Darren White (“White Dep.”), Dkt.
37-1, at 63:6-16), and that he signed the consent form-which
he claims he did not read-because he was “afraid”
(White Dep., Dkt. 34-4, 68:14-25).
During
the search of Plaintiff's apartment, Plaintiff told Det.
Schierle that he had an air rifle that was stored in a
shoebox in the living room, and “gave it” to the
officers. (Id. at 74:23-75:9.) Because Plaintiff did
not have a license for the air rifle, the officers took him
into custody and brought him to the NYPD Robbery Squad office
in Brooklyn. (Id. at 75:10-13; 81:21-82:23.) After
arriving there, Plaintiff was advised of his Miranda
rights, which he waived by signing a rights waiver form.
(Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 12; Henle Decl. ¶¶ 11-12.)
However, Plaintiff asserts that he did not knowingly or
voluntarily sign the waiver, but did so under duress. (Henle
Decl. ¶¶ 11-12.)[6]
On
April 19, 2013, Defendant Detective Sheldon Franklyn
(“Det. Franklyn”) learned that Plaintiff was in
custody, and went to the Brooklyn Robbery Squad office to
question Plaintiff about a pattern of burglaries Det.
Franklyn had been investigating. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 13.)
During the interview, Plaintiff signed a confession admitting
his involvement in the November 13, 2012 Radio Shack robbery
in Queens. (Dkt. 34-7, at ECF 2-3; Defs.' 56.1
¶¶ 14-15.) According to Defendants, Plaintiff also
identified himself in, and then signed, a photograph that
appears to be from surveillance footage of the November 2012
robbery. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 16-17; Henle Decl.
¶ 15; compare Dkt. 34-10 (Wanted Poster)
with Dkt. 34-14 (photograph signed by Plaintiff).)
Plaintiff does not dispute that he signed the photograph, but
asserts that he “would have signed anything, including
a photograph, so that his interrogation would be
concluded.” (Pl.'s 56.1, Dkt. 25, at ¶
16.)[7]
Plaintiff
was then taken to Brooklyn Central Booking, and arraigned in
Kings Criminal Court the following day, April 20, 2013, on a
single misdemeanor charge for possession of an illegal air
rifle in violation of New York City Administrative Code
§ 10-131(b). (Dkts. 34-15, 34-16.) At arraignment,
Plaintiff was released on his own recognizance. However,
because there was an outstanding investigation card
indicating that Plaintiff was wanted by the Queens Robbery
Squad in connection with the November 2012 Queens Radio Shack
robbery, Det. Franklyn arrested Plaintiff. (Deposition of
Sheldon Franklyn (“Franklyn Dep.”), Dkt. 34-3,
14:6-15:7.)[8]
On
April 21, 2013, Plaintiff was interviewed by members of the
Queens County District Attorney's Office
(“QCDA”), where he made additional inculpatory
statements regarding the November 2012 robbery. (Defs.'
Br. at 25; QCDA April 21, 2013 Video, Dkt. 34-8.) Following
the interview, Det. Franklyn signed a felony complaint
charging Plaintiff with Robbery in the First and Second
Degree. (Dkt. 34-17.)
The air
rifle charge was eventually dismissed on July 8, 2014 on
speedy trial grounds, pursuant to § 30.30 of the New
York Criminal Procedure Law. (See Dkt. 34-18, at ECF
2.) A few weeks later, the Queens robbery charges were also
dismissed, although the specific basis for dismissal is not
evident from the record. (Dkt. 34-19, at ECF 2-3.)
On
September 10, 2014, Plaintiff was indicted in this Court in
connection with Hobbs Act robbery charges.
(Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 30.) On April 3, 2015, Plaintiff pled
guilty to Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy. (See
id.; Dkt. 34-20, at ¶ 1.)
II.
Relevant Procedural History
Plaintiff
commenced this action on June 8, 2015. (Dkt. 1.) On December
6, 2015, Plaintiff withdrew his claims for malicious abuse of
process, unreasonable detention, abuse of authority,
harassment, Monell, conspiracy, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress, leaving only his federal
claims under Section 1983. (Dkt. 27.) The only claims
remaining in this action as to the Individual Defendants are:
(1) false arrest; (2) malicious prosecution; and (3)
violation of due process under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, for each of the two arrests.[9] Plaintiff also
alleges violations of New York state law as to the City on a
theory of respondeat superior. (Dkt. 1 at
¶¶ 40-41.) On June 23, 2017, Defendants moved for
summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's remaining claims.
(Dkt. 32.)
LEGAL
STANDARD
Summary
judgment may be granted only where there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In ruling on
a motion for summary judgment, a court must resolve all
ambiguities and draw all factual inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party. McClellan v. Smith, 439 F.3d 137,
144 (2d Cir. 2006). “To grant the motion, the court
must determine that there is no genuine issue of material
fact to be tried.” Id. (citing Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)). A
genuine factual issue exists where the “evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The
initial burden of “establishing the absence of any
genuine issue of material fact” rests with the moving
party. Zalaski v. City of Bridgeport Police
Dep't, 613 F.3d 336, 340 (2d Cir. 2010). Once this
burden is met, however, the burden shifts to the nonmoving
party to put forward some evidence establishing the existence
of a question of fact that must be resolved at trial.
Spinelli v. City of N.Y., 579 F.3d 160, 166-67 (2d
Cir. 2009); see also Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at
322-23. A mere “scintilla of evidence” in support
of the nonmoving party is insufficient; “there must be
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the
[non-movant].” Hayut v. State Univ. of N.Y.,
352 F.3d 733, 743 (2d Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted;
alterations in original). In other words, “[t]he
nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Caldarola
v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2002)
(quotation omitted). In determining whether a genuine issue
of fact exists, the court must resolve all ambiguities and
draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party.
Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc.,
542 F.3d 290, 309 (2d Cir. 2008). However, “the mere
existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties
will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for
summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at
247-48. “[What] is required [from a nonmoving party] is
that sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual
dispute be shown to require a jury ...