United States District Court, W.D. New York
DECISION AND ORDER
HON.
FRANK P. GERACI, JR. JUDGE
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff
Michael Keeney brings this action against Defendant Patricia
Brinkman, in her individual and official capacities, for
alleged violations of the First Amendment (pursued under 42
U.S.C. § 1983) and Article I, § 8 of the New York
State Constitution. See ECF No. 1.
Plaintiff
filed his Complaint on February 23, 2016. ECF No. 1. On May
5, 2016, Defendant Brinkman filed her Answer, ECF No. 11, and
then-defendants Joseph Woodward and Housing Options Made
Easy, Inc. (“HOME”) filed their joint Answer, ECF
No. 12. The next day, Defendant Brinkman filed an Amended
Answer. ECF No. 13. On March 2, 2017, the Court issued a
Stipulation and Order dismissing the claims against
then-defendants Mr. Woodward and HOME with prejudice, ECF No.
21, pursuant to the agreement of the parties, ECF No. 20.
Defendant Brinkman-the only remaining defendant-filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment on August 14, 2017. ECF No. 23.
Plaintiff submitted a Memorandum in Opposition on October 16,
2017, ECF No. 26, and Defendant Brinkman filed her Reply on
November 2, 2017, ECF No. 27.
For the
reasons that follow, Defendant Brinkman's Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 23) is GRANTED, and this action is
DISMISSED.
BACKGROUND[1]
Plaintiff
was formerly employed by HOME, “a peer-run organization
that provides supportive housing and other recovery,
transitional[, ] and reintegration programs and services for
individuals with serious, persistent mental health
issues.” ECF No. 23-1, at 2. HOME receives funding
through annual contracts with Chautauqua County's
Department of Mental Hygiene, which acts as a conduit for
state funds. Plaintiff worked as a Peer Specialist for
HOME's Mobile Transition Team in Chautauqua County from
April 21, 2015 until September 8, 2015, when his employment
was terminated. Plaintiff alleges that he was fired at the
behest of Defendant Brinkman, the Chautauqua County Director
of Mental Hygiene Services. Per Plaintiff's account,
Defendant Brinkman ordered his termination based on
Plaintiff's public criticism of Chautauqua County's
response to its “drug epidemic.” ECF No. 23-1, at
4.
Chautauqua
County has facilitated a number of “drug forums”
to address its “growing opioid epidemic.”
Id. Members of the public were invited to speak at
these forums, and Plaintiff claims that he spoke at forums
held on March 12, 2014, September 1, 2014, and March 16,
2015.[2]At the March 16, 2015 forum, Plaintiff
allegedly “criticized the lack of services provided in
Chautauqua County related to the drug epidemic.”
Id. at 5.
The
next month-on April 21, 2015-Plaintiff was hired by HOME as
an at-will employee. As part of the hiring process, Plaintiff
interviewed with Mr. Woodward, HOME's then-CEO, and Denis
Bouchard, HOME's COO. After approximately one week,
Defendant Brinkman learned of Plaintiff's hiring and that
he had “spoken very angrily about the lack of services
in the community and inadequacy of the services that
existed.” Id. at 6. Upon receiving that
information, Defendant Brinkman called Mr. Woodward. While
the parties dispute the substance of this conversation, they
agree that it related to the propriety of Plaintiff serving
as a Peer Specialist, given his perception of Chautauqua
County's services. After that call, Mr. Woodward spoke to
Richard Huber, a then-member of HOME's Board of
Directors. On May 5, 2015, Defendant Brinkman called Mr.
Woodward a second time to “follow up to their first
phone call.” Id. at 7. Once again, the parties
dispute the substance of the second conversation between Mr.
Woodward and Defendant Brinkman, but they agree on the broad
contours: among other things, it again involved
Plaintiff's capacity to serve as a Peer Specialist.
Approximately four months later-on September 8, 2015-
Plaintiff was fired from his position with HOME.
LEGAL
STANDARD
Summary
judgment is warranted “if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The Court must take genuinely disputed
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant- here,
Plaintiff. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380
(2007) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). If, based on the
admissible evidence, a reasonable jury could return a verdict
in favor of the nonmovant, summary judgment is not
appropriate. E.g., Kaytor v. Elec. Boat
Corp., 609 F.3d 537, 545-46 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242
(1986)). In deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the
Court must resolve “all permissible inferences and
credibility questions . . . in favor of [the
nonmovant].” Id. That assessment requires the
Court to “disregard all evidence favorable to the
[movant] that the jury is not required to believe.”
Id. at 545 (quoting Jasco Tools, Inc. v. Dana
Corp., 574 F.3d 129, 152 (2d Cir. 2009)) (emphasis
omitted).
“The
[movant] bears the initial burden of showing why it is
entitled to summary judgment.” Salahuddin v.
Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 272 (2d Cir. 2006). Where the
[movant] would not “bear[] the burden of proof at
trial, ” it “may show its prima facie entitlement
to summary judgment” by “point[ing] to evidence
that negates its opponent's claims or . . . [by]
identify[ing] those portions of its opponent's evidence
that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact.” Id. at 272-73. The latter approach
“requires identifying evidentiary
insufficiency”-“not simply denying the
opponent's pleadings.” Id. at 273.
If the
movant shows that it is entitled to summary judgment,
“the burden shifts to the nonmovant to point to record
evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact.”
Id. “Like the movant, the nonmovant
cannot” simply rely “on allegations in the
pleadings”-it “must point to specific evidence in
the record to carry its burden on summary judgment.”
Id. If the nonmovant fails to set forth admissible
evidence to support an essential element of its claim, then
summary judgment is warranted. See Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (“The moving
party is ‘entitled to judgment as a ...