United States District Court, E.D. New York
L. IRIZARRY, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
se Petitioner Kevin Williams
(“Petitioner”) filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus on August 23, 2010. (See Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”), Dkt. Entry
No. 1.) The Petition was stayed pending Petitioner's
exhaustion of state remedies. On November 6, 2014, Petitioner
moved for appointment of counsel (See Motion to
Appoint Counsel, Dkt. Entry No. 36), which this Court denied.
(See Order denying Motion to Appoint Counsel
(“Summary Order”), Dkt. Entry No. 40.) On March
30, 2016, this Court denied the Petition in its entirety.
(See Order Dismissing Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus (“Opinion & Order”), Dkt. Entry No.
55.) On April 22, 2016, Petitioner appealed the Opinion &
Order. (See Notice of Appeal, Dkt. Entry No. 58.)
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal.
(See Mandate of USCA, Dkt. Entry No. 59.)
now moves to vacate the denial of his Petition, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) and (6).
(See Notice of Motion to Vacate (“Mot. to
Vacate”), Dkt. Entry No. 60.) Respondent opposes.
(See Affidavit in Opposition (“Opp.”),
Dkt. Entry No. 61.) For the reasons set forth below,
Petitioner's motion to vacate is denied.
Standard of Review for a Rule 60(b) Motion
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court
may relieve parties from final judgments, orders, or
proceedings for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5)
the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or
a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 (b).
motion for reconsideration under Rule 60(b) is addressed to
the “sound discretion of the district court and . . .
[is] generally granted only upon a showing of exceptional
circumstances.” Mendell v. Gollust, 909 F.2d
724, 731 (2d Cir. 1990), aff'd, 501 U.S. 115
(1991). Specifically, “a movant must establish that the
Court overlooked controlling decisions or factual matters
that were put before the Court.” Rodriguez v.
Keane, 2003 WL 21673624, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. July 16, 2003)
(citing Chan v. Reno, 6 F.Supp.2d 273, 274-75
(S.D.N.Y. 1998)). Thus, “reconsideration will generally
be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling
decisions or data that the court overlooked-matters, in other
words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the
conclusion reached by the court.” Shrader v. CSX
Trans., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995) (citations
seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6) “for any other
reason” is required to show “extraordinary
circumstances” justifying the reopening of a final
judgment and “[s]uch circumstances will rarely occur in
the habeas context.” Gonzales v. Crosby, 545
U.S. 524, 535 (2005). To prevail on a motion for
reconsideration under Rule 60(b), the movant must satisfy a
heavy burden, and although “a pro se litigant
‘should not be impaired by harsh application of
technical rules, ' he is not excused from producing
‘highly convincing evidence in support of his motion to
vacate a final judgment.'” Rodriguez, 2003
WL 21673624 at *1. Additionally, “it is well
established that a motion to reconsider should not be granted
where the moving party seeks solely to relitigate an issue
already decided . . . .” Niederland v. Chase,
425 Fed.Appx. 10, 12 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotations
Petitioner states that he seeks reconsideration of the
Opinion & Order, Petitioner's motion instead appears
to seek reconsideration of this Court's prior Summary
Order denying Petitioner's motion to appoint counsel.
(Mot. to Vacate at 3, 12.) In support of his motion, Petitioner
“asserts that the integrity of the habeas
corpus proceedings was impaired by the ‘Summary
Order' dated: November 12, 2014, in which
Petitioner's motion for the Assignment of
Counsel/Evidentiary Hearing was denied.” (Id.
at 12.) (emphasis in original). Petitioner argues that
“[h]ad this Court granted counsel and a hearing,
” the outcome of his habeas petition would have been
different, because “Petitioner would have been able to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was/is Actually
Innocent.” (Id. at 12-13.) Petitioner does not
argue that anything in the Opinion & Order was erroneous.
Accordingly, the Court construes Petitioner's motion as a
motion to vacate the Summary Order, and not a motion to
vacate the Opinion & Order.
brings his motion under Rule 60(b)(1) and 60(b)(6). (Mot. to
Vacate at 11.) Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c), a
motion filed under Rule 60(b)(1) must be made no more than a
year after the entry of the judgment. Petitioner has moved to
vacate the Summary Order over two years after it was filed
and after ...