United States District Court, E.D. New York
F. BIANCO, District Judge.
the Court is a Report and Recommendation
("R&R", ECF No. 65) from Magistrate Judge
Tomlinson recommending that the Court grant defendants'
motions to dismiss for failure to prosecute (ECF Nos. 60-63);
that the instant case accordingly be dismissed based on
plaintiffs failure to prosecute his claims as well as his
failure to comply with the Court's orders; and that
defendants' motions to dismiss on the merits (ECF Nos.
22-23, 46) be terminated as moot.Magistrate Judge
Tomlinson's R&R sets forth a detailed description of
the history of this case, including plaintiffs repeated
failures to prosecute his claims and to comply with Court
orders. The Court assumes familiarity with that history, and
will not repeat it here. For the reasons explained below, the
Court adopts the R&R in its entirety.
district judge may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in
part, the findings and recommendations of the Magistrate
Judge. See DeLuca v. Lord, 858 F.Supp. 1330, 1345
(S.D.N.Y. 1994); Walker v. Hood, 679 F.Supp. 372,
374 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). As to those portions of a report to
which no "specific, written objection" is made, the
Court may accept the findings contained therein, as long as
the factual and legal bases supporting the findings are not
clearly erroneous. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b);
Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); Greene
v. WCI Holdings Corp., 956 F.Supp. 509, 513 (S.D.N.Y.
1997). Rule 41(b) authorizes a district court to
"dismiss a complaint for failure to comply with a court
order, treating the noncompliance as a failure to
prosecute." Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 87
(2d Cir. 1995) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370
U.S. 626, 633 (1962)); see Lucas v. Miles, 84 F.3d
532, 535 (2d Cir. 1996) ("[Dismissal [pursuant to Rule
41(b)] is a harsh remedy and is appropriate only in extreme
situations."); Wynder v. McMahon, 360 F.3d 73,
79 (2d Cir. 2004) ("Rule [41(b)] is intended to serve as
a rarely employed, but useful, tool of judicial
administration available to district courts in managing their
specific cases and general caseload."); see also
Original Ballet Russe, Ltd. v. Ballet Theatre, Inc., 133
F.2d 187, 188 (2d Cir. 1943) (citing Blake v. De
Vilbiss Co., 118 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1941)); Refwr v.
Lansing Drop Forge Co., 124 F.2d 440, 444 (6th Cir.
1942) ("The cited rule [41(b)] enunciates a well settled
concept of practice that a court of equity, in the exercise
of sound judicial discretion, has general authority ... to
dismiss a cause for want of diligence in prosecution or for
failure to comply with a reasonable order of the court made
in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion.").
have repeatedly found that "[d]ismissal of an action is
warranted when a litigant, whether represented or instead
proceeding pro se, fails to comply with legitimate
court directives...." Yulle v. Barkley, No.
9:05-CV-0802 (LEK/DEP), 2007 WL 2156644, at *2 (N.D.N.Y.July
25, 2007). A district court contemplating dismissal of a
plaintiffs claims for failure to prosecute and/or to comply
with court orders pursuant to Rule 41(b) must consider:
1) the duration of plaintiff s failures or non-compliance; 2)
whether plaintiff had notice that such conduct would result
in dismissal; 3) whether prejudice to the defendant is likely
to result; 4) whether the court balanced its interest in
managing its docket against plaintiffs interest in receiving
an opportunity to be heard; and 5) whether the court
adequately considered the efficacy of a sanction less
draconian than dismissal.
Baffa v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec.
Corp., 222 F .3d 52, 63 (2d Cir. 2000); see, e.g.,
Lucas, 84 F.3d at 535; Jackson v. City of New
York, 22 F.3d 71, 74-76 (2d Cir. 1994). In deciding
whether dismissal is appropriate, "[g]enerally, no one
factor is dispositive." Nita v. Conn. Dep 't of
Env. Prof., 16 F.3d 482, 485 (2d Cir. 1994); see
Peart v. City of New York, 992 F.2d 458, 461
("[D]ismissal for want of prosecution is a matter
committed to the discretion of the trial judge... [and] the
judge's undoubtedly wide latitude is conditioned by
certain minimal requirements." (quoting Merker v.
Rice, 649 F.2d 171, 173-74 (2d Cir. 1981))).
"the duty to inform the Court and defendants of any
change of address is 'an obligation that rests with all
pro se plaintiffs.'" Alomar v.
Recard, No. 07-CV-5654 (CS) (PED), 2010 WL 451047, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2010) (quoting Handlin v. Garvey,
No. 91-CV-6777 (AGS), 1996 WL 673823, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
20, 1996)); see also English v. Azcazubi, 13-CV-
5074 (RRM) (LB), 2015 WL 1298654, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 20,
2015) ("[W]hen a party, even a pro se litigant,
changes addresses, it is that party's obligation to
notify the Court of the new address."); Thornton v.
Moroney, No. 13 Civ. 8912 (ER), 2014 WL 2805236, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2014) (pro se litigants have a
"duty to diligently pursue [their] case and to inform
th[e] Court .. . of any change of address."). If a
pro se litigant fails to keep the Court apprised of
his or her current mailing address, "the Court may
dismiss the action under Rule 41(b), for failure to
prosecute." Mercedes v. N.Y. Dep't of
Corrections, No. 12 Civ. 2293 (LTS) (DF), 2013
WL6153208, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2013); see also
Thornton, 2014 WL 2805236, at *2.
above-referenced factors favor dismissal here. As explained
in detail in the R&R, more than six months have passed
since Magistrate Judge Tomlinson issued the Initial Discovery
Order in this case. That Order instructed plaintiff to submit
his written narrative statement by August 25, 2017. (ECF No.
27.) Magistrate Judge Tomlinson has since granted plaintiff
two extensions of time, totaling an additional 127 days, to
submit his narrative statement. The second extension was
granted over defendants' objections, and expressly warned
plaintiff that a failure to comply would result in Magistrate
Judge Tomlinson recommending to the Court that plaintiffs
case be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Plaintiffs time
to submit his narrative statement has since passed, and to
date plaintiff has not submitted it. Moreover, despite
express orders from the Court to notify the Court of any
change to his address, plaintiff did not-and has not-notified
the Court that he was released from prison or provided a
current address. Finally, plaintiff has failed to respond
to Nassau University Medical Center's September 18, 2017
motion to dismiss. Nor has he responded to any of
defendants' motions to dismiss for failure to prosecute.
these circumstances, no sanction less than dismissal will
alleviate the prejudice to defendants of keeping these
actions open. Moreover, the Court must avoid calendar
congestion and ensure an orderly and expeditious disposition
of cases. Thus, having conducted a review of the full record
and the applicable law, and having reviewed the R&R
de novo (and conducted its own independent analysis
in this Order), the Court adopts the findings and
recommendations contained in the R&R in their entirety
and dismisses the complaint under Rule 41 (b) for failure to
prosecute. The Clerk of the Court is directed to
close the case.
 The R&R, issued on March 4, 2018,
directed plaintiff to file any objections within fourteen
days of service of the same, and instructed counsel to Nassau
County Correctional Center ("NCCC") to serve
plaintiff forthwith by overnight and first-class mail.
However, counsel for NCCC did not serve defendant until March
20, 2018. (ECF Nos. 66-67.) On March 22, 2018, Magistrate
Judge Tomlinson ordered plaintiff to notify the Court by
March 30, 2018 if he intended to file objections to the
R&R, (ECF No. 68), and notified plaintiff that if he did
not submit a notice to the Court, the Court would treat the
R&R as unopposed. In any event, as noted infra,
the Court has conducted its own analysis (independent of the
R&R), and grants the motions to dismiss for failure to
 As explained in the R&R, upon
inquiry to the Inmate Records Department at the NCCC, the
Court was notified that plaintiff had been released and