Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Anderson v. County of Nassau

United States District Court, E.D. New York

March 31, 2018

PAUL ANDERSON, Plaintiff,
v.
COUNTY OF NASSAU, ARMOR CORRECTIONAL HEALTH OF NEW YORK, JOSE ARMAS, M.D., CHILDA MARGOS, M.D., and SHERIFF MICHAEL J. SPOSATO, Defendants.

          Paul Anderson Pro Se Plaintiff

          John J. Doody Dale Nicholson McLaren Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP Attorney for Defendants County of Nassau, Armor Correctional Health of N.Y., Jose Armas, M.D. and Childa Margos, M.D.

          Liora M. Ben-Sorek Thomas Lai Attorney for Defendants County of Nassau and Sheriff Michael J. Sposato

          ORDER

          JOAN M. AZRACK UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         Pro se plaintiff Paul Anderson (“Anderson” or “Plaintiff”) brings this action against defendants the County of Nassau (the “County”), Sherriff Michael J. Sposato (“Sherriff Sposato”) (collectively the “County Defendants”), Armor Correctional Health of New York (“Armor”), Jose Armas, M.D. (“Dr. Armas”), and Childa Margos, M.D. (“Dr. Margos”) (collectively the “Armor Defendants”) (all the defendants collectively the “Defendants”). The Complaint alleges deprivation of Plaintiff's civil rights pursuant to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as a state-law negligence claim.

         Presently before this Court are the Defendants' motions to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). (See ECF Nos. 23 and 27.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motions are granted.

         I. BACKGROUND

         A. Documents Considered

         As is required in the context of this motion to dismiss, the factual allegations in the Complaint, though disputed by Defendants, are accepted to be true for purposes of this motion, and all reasonable inferences are drawn therefrom in favor of the Plaintiff.

         While facts to consider in the context of a Rule 12 motion to dismiss are generally limited to those set forth in the pleadings, a court may consider matters outside of the pleadings under certain circumstances. Specifically, in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may consider: (1) documents attached to the Complaint as exhibits or incorporated by reference therein; (2) matters of which judicial notice may be taken; or (3) documents upon the terms and effects of which the Complaint “relies heavily” and which are, thus, rendered “integral” to the Complaint.” Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2002); see Int'l Audiotext Network, Inc. v. Am. Tel. and Tel. Co., 62 F.3d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1995). Moreover. “[a] court may take judicial notice of a documents filed in another court not for the truth of the matters asserted in the other litigation, but rather to establish the fact of such litigation and related filings.” Glob. Network Commc'ns, Inc. v. City of New York, 458 F.3d 150, 157 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Int'l Star Class Yacht Racing Ass'n Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc., 146 F.3d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 1998)).

         Where, as here, the Complaint was filed pro se, it must be construed liberally with “special solicitude” and interpreted to raise the strongest claims that it suggests. Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless, a pro se Complaint must state a plausible claim for relief. See Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 73 (2d Cir. 2009).

         The Court turns now to discuss the facts set forth in Plaintiff's Complaint, construed in his favor.

         B. Facts

         1. Background

         Plaintiff, an inmate at the Nassau County Correctional Center (“NCCC”), alleges that he suffers from several ailments, among them end stage renal disease and back pain due to a pinched nerve. (Complaint (“Compl.”) at 2.).[1] Armor is a private company that provides medical services to inmates at the NCCC pursuant to a contract with the County. (Declaration of John J. Doody, ¶ 3, ECF No. 23-1.) Dr. Armas appears to be the sole owner and operator of Armor and Dr. Margos appears to be the chief medical officer of Armor at NCCC. (Armor Defendants' Memorandum of Law In Support of Their Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (“Defs'. Br.”) at 15, ECF No. 23-2; Compl. at 3.)

         Plaintiff alleges that his renal disease requires both dialysis and that he be monitored weekly by a board certified nephrologist. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that the weekly nephrologist monitoring is necessary to review his blood test reports and various critical levels in his body such as phosphate and potassium as well as fluid retention. (Id. at 2-3.) However, Plaintiff alleges that due to an alleged policy promulgated by Armor, Dr. Armas, and Dr. Margos, Plaintiff was denied access to a community-based nephrologist. (Compl. at 3; Declaration of John J. Doody, ¶ 3, ECF No. [23-1].) Plaintiff does not allege that he suffered any injury (or exacerbation of his condition) as a result of being denied access to a community-based nephrologist.

         The Court notes that Plaintiff's complaint is devoid of any allegations that Dr. Armas personally treated Plaintiff or denied him access to any community-based medical care. Plaintiff's allegations against Dr. Armas solely concern his alleged promulgation of policies for the NCCC. Similarly, Plaintiff's allegations against Dr. Margos primarily concern her promulgation of policies for the NCCC. It is unclear to this Court what, if any role Dr. Margos had in personally treating Plaintiff.

         Plaintiff also alleges that he suffers from an “AIV Fistula, ” which is caused by his renal disease and requires him to be monitored by a vascular surgeon. (Compl. at 3.) Plaintiff again alleges that access to this type of doctor was denied to him to due to the same alleged policy promulgated by Armor/Dr. Armas, and Dr. Margo that denied him access to a community-based nephrologist. (Id.) Plaintiff does not allege that he suffered any injury (or exacerbation of his condition) as a result of being denied access to a vascular surgeon.

         Next, Plaintiff claims that he suffers from a pinched nerve and is supposed to be prescribed “Neurontin and Ultram.” (Compl. at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that Armor and Dr. Armas have a policy of not prescribing pain medications, and therefore will not give Plaintiff “a sufficient dose of Neurontin, within therapeutic level.” (Id.) Plaintiff does not allege that he suffered any pain or increase in pain as a result of the denial of Plaintiff's desired dosage of medication.

         Finally, Plaintiff alleges that he suffered a fall due to a wet floor on both June 30, 2015 and on July 2, 2015. (Compl. at 4.) Plaintiff claims that the July 2, 2015 fall caused pain and swelling in his right knee. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that after filing a grievance he was provided treatment by an orthopedic specialist, who he claims recommended an MRI. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that as a result of the cost and the Armor/Dr. Armas policy, Dr. Margos refused to approve the recommended MRI. Plaintiff's complaint does not include any allegations concerning the condition of his right knee after the denial of the MRI.

         2. Procedural History

         Plaintiff commenced this action on September 11, 2015. (See Compl.) On the same day, Plaintiff submitted an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), which the Court granted on October 22, 2015. (See ECF No. 7.) On November 20, 2015, the Armor Defendants requested a pre-motion conference for leave to file a motion to dismiss.[2] (See DE [15]. On January 7, 2016, the Court waived the pre-motion conference and entered a briefing schedule for the Armor Defendants' motion to dismiss with the fully briefed motion being due on March 18, 2016. (See ORDER dated 01/07/2016.) On January 8, 2016, the County Defendants requested a pre-motion conference for leave to file a motion to dismiss, (see ECF No. 20), and on the same day, the Court waived the pre-motion conference and entered the same briefing schedule as the Armor Defendants' motion to dismiss. (See ORDER dated 01/08/2016.)

         On January 26, 2017, the District Court directed defense counsel to provide the status of the case by February 10, 2017, as a review of the docket indicated that the motions to dismiss had not been filed. (See STATUS REPORT ORDER dated 01/26/2017.) On February 1, 2017, the Armor Defendants filed a status report explaining that they had timely served Plaintiff with their motion and subsequently filed an affidavit of service indicating such, but as of February 1, 2017, Plaintiff had still not provided his Opposition. (See ECF No. 24.) The Armor Defendants further moved the Court to accept their motion to dismiss as fully briefed or in the alternative, dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to prosecute pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Id.)

         On March 8, 2017, the Court directed the Plaintiff to either “(1) file his opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss, or (2) indicate by letter to the Court that plaintiff does not wish to file an opposition but still intends to prosecute this lawsuit.” (ECF No. 25.) On April 10, 2017, the Plaintiff filed a response indicating that he still intended to prosecute this lawsuit. (ECF No. 26.) On March 22, 2018, the County Defendants filed their fully briefed motion to dismiss, which was served on plaintiff on February 5, 2016. (ECF No. 27.) To date, Plaintiff has not filed opposition to either motion.

         3. ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.