United States District Court, E.D. New York
SAYYID D. MUHAMMADALI, Plaintiff,
THE CITY OF NEW YORK; P.O. SOLIS (Tax Reg. 943832); P.O. BARUCCHERI (Tax Reg. 952448); SGT. CORDINER (Tax Reg. 929940); and SGT. HONSTETTER (Tax Reg. 936777), Defendants.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
WILLIAM F. KUNTZ, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT
Sayyid Muhammadali ("Plaintiff), proceeding pro
se, filed the above-captioned case on March 8, 2018,
ostensibly as a notice of removal of a case he previously
filed in New-York State court. Plaintiff alleges the
defendants violated his constitutional rights. For the
reasons that follow, this case is dismissed.
action, Plaintiff alleges that his constitutional rights were
violated when, at an unspecified time and place, three of the
officer defendants struck him with a police car, assaulted
him. caused him to suffer an epileptic seizure, and arrested
him. Complaint ("Compl.") at 5-6, ECF No. 1.
Plaintiff seeks $2 million in damages. Id. at 7.
Plaintiff attaches the complaint he filed, with the
assistance of counsel, against the same defendants in New
York Supreme Court, Queens County, Index No. 704576/2014.
That complaint alleges Plaintiff was assaulted and arrested
on March 30, 2013, in Far Roekaway. New York, and again on
April 3, 2013,  at the 101st Precinct of the
New York Police Department. Id. at 12. Plaintiff was
prosecuted until June 2014, when the charges were resolved by
an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal. Id. at
13. Plaintiff has not indicated the status of the state court
federal complaint is untimely. The statute of limitations for
civil rights actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 in federal courts in New York State is three years.
Patterson v. Cty. of Oneida, N.Y., 375 F.3d 206, 224
(2d Cir. 2004) ("The statute of limitations applicable
to claims brought under [section] 1983 in New York is three
years."); Rodriguez v. Westbury Pub. Sch.,
13-CV-4976, 2015 WL 4459351, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. July 15, 2015)
(Wexler, J.) (citations omitted). Generally, a § 1983
claim accrues "when the plaintiff knows or has reason to
know of the harm" he or she has suffered. Connolly
v. McCall, 254 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting
Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 871 (2d Cir.
1994)). The Supreme Court has clarified that the statute of
limitations for a claim of false imprisonment, which includes
false arrest, begins to run at the time the claimant
"becomes held pursuant to [legal] process-when, for
example, he is bound over by a magistrate or arraigned on
charges." Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389
(2007); see also Lynch v. Suffolk Cty. Police Dep't
Inc., 348 Fed.Appx. 672, 675 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding
under Wallace that plaintiffs § 1983 false
arrest claim was time-barred). The statute of limitations for
claims of malicious prosecution begins when "the
underlying criminal action is conclusively terminated."
Murphy v. Lynn, 53 F.3d 547, 548 (2d Cir. 1995)
(citing Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185,
189, 193 (2d Cir. 1980)). Furthermore, "[i]n the context
of an excessive force claim, the clock starts running when
the use of force occurred." Jennings v. Municipality
of Suffolk Cty., 11-CV-911, 2013 WL 587892, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2013) (Bianco, J.) (quotation marks and
citations omitted). The incidents of which Plaintiff
complains here occurred, at the latest, in June 2014, when
the criminal charges against Plaintiff were resolved.
Plaintiff did not file the instant federal Complaint until
March 8, 2018. As Plaintiffs claims accrued more than three
years prior to the filing of this Complaint, these claims are
time-barred by the statute of limitations and must be
dismissed. See Milan v. Wertheimer, 808 F.3d 961,
963-64 (2d Cir. 2015) (affirming sua sponte
dismissal of claims that fell outside of the statute of
limitations for § 1983 actions).
these claims are time-barred, this Court need not consider
whether it has jurisdiction over a case which was previously
timely filed in state court and which may remain pending or
have been finally resolved. See Colorado River Water
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
817-18 (1976) (holding that "in situations involving the
contemporaneous exercise of concurrent jurisdictions, "
a federal court, in "exceptional" circumstances,
may abstain from exercising jurisdiction if pending parallel
state court litigation might result in "comprehensive
disposition of litigation" and abstention would conserve
judicial resources); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic
Indus., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (summarizing the
doctrine derived from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
263 U.S. 413 (1923) and Dist. of Columbia Court of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), under which
federal district courts may not review cases "brought by
state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by
state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and
rejection of those judgments").
reasons set forth above, the Complaint is dismissed as
time-barred, without prejudice to any pending state court
litigation in Index No. 704576/2014. The court certifies
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal would
not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma
pauperis status is denied for purpose of an appeal.
See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45
 Plaintiffs attached state court
complaint notes the date of the second arrest as April 3,
3013, which the Court ...