Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Pearsall v. Sposato

United States District Court, E.D. New York

April 5, 2018

DIYA JAMAL PEARSALL, Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL J. SPOSATO, and ARMOR CORRECTIONAL HEALTH, INC., Defendants.

          For Plaintiff: Diya Jamal Pearsall, pro se Sing Sing Correctional Facility

          For Defendants: Armor Correctional Health Inc. John J. Doody, Esq. Dale Nicholson McLaren, Esq. Lewis, Brisbois, Bisgaard & Smith LLP

          Michael J. Sposato Samantha Goetz, Esq. Liora M. Ben-Sorek, Esq. Nassau County Attorney's Office

          MEMORANDUM & ORDER

          JOANNA SEYBERT, U.S.D.J.

         Plaintiff Diya Jamal Pearsall (“Pearsall” or “Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed this lawsuit against Sheriff Michael J. Sposato (“Sposato”) and Armor Correctional Health Incorporated (“Armor”), claiming violations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 USC § 1983. (Compl., Docket Entry 1.) Currently pending before the Court is Armor's motion to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim. (Def.'s Mot., Docket Entry 29.) For the following reasons, Armor's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

         BACKGROUND [1]

I. The Medical Condition In January 2016, Plaintiff was an inmate at Nassau County Correctional Center (“NCCC”), a facility with medical services provided by Armor Correctional Health Inc. (Compl. at 4, 6.)[2]While housed at NCCC, Plaintiff was exposed to artificial lighting in his cell that caused him to suffer epileptic seizures. (Compl. at 4-5.)

         Specifically, starting in January of 2016, maintenance workers at the facility began removing manual light switches from inside cells, allowing only Correction Officers control over the lights. (Compl. at 4-5.) As a result, from approximately 6:30 a.m. through 11:30 p.m. artificial lights inside Plaintiff's cell remained on. (Compl. at 5.) To avoid being exposed to the artificial lights, on January 31, 2016, Plaintiff placed articles of clothing over the lights in his cell and he was disciplined as a result. (Compl. at 5.) In the months that followed, the constant exposure to the cell lights caused Plaintiff to have multiple seizures and he received medication for his condition. (Compl. at 5.) However, the medication caused him to feel sick. (Compl. at 6.) As a result of Plaintiff's condition, he suffers headaches, dizziness, blurred vision, as well as minor abrasions to his head and face due to falling during seizures. (Compl. at 4.) As of February 2016, Plaintiff began requesting treatment by a neurologist and protective glasses to diminish the effects of the artificial lighting on his epileptic episodes. (Compl. at 6-7.)

         II. Procedural History

         Plaintiff commenced this action on November 28, 2016. (See Compl.) Plaintiff contends that Armor was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in connection with his recurring epilepsy, including ignoring his requests to be seen by a neurologist and not receiving protective glasses to shield him from the artificial lighting. (Compl. at 4-7.) Plaintiff seeks $1.5 million dollars and an order directing Armor to allow him to be seen by an outside specialist. (Compl. at 8.)

         On August 14, 2017, Armor moved to dismiss the Complaint. (See Def.'s Mot.) Armor argues that: (1) Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by failing to demonstrate that he provided the requested medical information to verify his condition; (2) Plaintiff fails to allege a plausible Section 1983 claim because he does not allege that Armor was directly participating in a policy to deprive him of his rights; (3) Plaintiff fails to raise a plausible constitutional violation; and (4) Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief should be dismissed as moot as he is no longer housed at the facility. (See Def.'s Br., Docket Entry 29-2, at 9-17.) Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to Armor's motion to dismiss on August 31, 2017; Armor filed a response on September 26, 2017. (See Pl.'s Br.; Def.'s Reply Br., Docket Entry 33.)

         DISCUSSION

         As a threshold matter, Armor moves for dismissal of Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief on the grounds of mootness given that Plaintiff is no longer housed at NCCC. (Def.'s Br. at 17.) “It is settled in [the Second] Circuit that a transfer from a prison facility moots an action for injunctive relief against the transferring facility.” Prins v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 504, 506 (2d Cir. 1996). Accordingly, Armor's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief is GRANTED, and this claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

         I. Legal Standard

         According to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, dismissal is appropriate if a complaint fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To avoid dismissal, a complaint must provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007). Claims are deemed plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.