United States District Court, S.D. New York
OPINION & ORDER
NELSON
S. ROMAN United States District Judge
Plaintiff
William Constant commenced this action against Defendants
Anthony J. Annucci, Commissioner of the New York State
Department of Corrections and Community Supervision
("DOCCS"), Albert Prack, Director of Special
Housing and Inmate Disciplinary Programs for DOCCS, William
Lee, Superintendent of the Green Haven Correctional Facility
("Green Haven"), Frederick Bernstein, M.D.,
Facility Health Services Director for Green Haven, Robert
Bentivegna, M.D., a physician at Green Haven, and Corrections
Officers N. Dapcevic, R. Cabral, A. Alban, B. Sturtevent, J.
Markwick, B. Hess, M. Vennero, and John and Jane Does 1-20 in
their individual and official capacities. Plaintiff asserts
five claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and
1985(3), alleging that Defendants: (1) deprived him of the
right to be free from excessive force in violation of the
Eighth Amendment; (2) acted with deliberate indifference to
the serious risk of violence against Plaintiff in violation
of the Eighth Amendment; (3) acted with deliberate
indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical needs in
violation of the Eighth Amendment; (4) deprived Plaintiff of
his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by
denying him a fair and impartial disciplinary hearing; and
(5) deprived Plaintiff of his due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment by subjecting him to atypical and
substantial hardship during his one year sentence in the
Special Housing Unit. Before the Court are Defendants William
Lee and Albert Prack's Partial Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). For the following reasons, Defendants' motion
is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
BACKGROUND
This
case stems from a grisly incident at the Green Haven
Correctional facility (“Green Haven”)-a maximum
security facility run by the New York State Department of
Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”).
(Compl. ¶ 11, ECF No. 1.) On May 27, 2013, Plaintiff,
who was incarcerated at Green Haven, was playing cards with
another inmate at one of the facility's yards
(Id.) when, without provocation, another inmate by
the name of William Reyes slashed Plaintiff repeatedly with a
razor-like object on the head, face, and ear. After slashing
Plaintiff, Reyes began running towards an area where various
corrections officers stood. Plaintiff, who began bleeding
profusely, ran after Reyes. (Id. ¶¶
12-13.) When both Plaintiff and Reyes approached the area
where the officers stood, the officers backed away, leaving
Plaintiff vulnerable to another attack. (Id. ¶
14.)
Reyes
attacked Plaintiff once again. (Id. ¶¶
16-17.) This time they both fell to the ground, with
Plaintiff on top of Reyes, at which point one of the
Correction Officers “brutally beat plaintiff twice in
the side of the head with his baton.” (Id.
¶ 17.)[1] Correction Officers then took Plaintiff
and Reyes to the facility's medical clinic where the
clinic staff determined that Plaintiff suffered serious
injuries and required emergency hospital treatment.
(Id. ¶¶ 20-21.) Plaintiff was taken to St.
Francis Hospital where he received more than sixty-five
stitches to close the wounds to his face, head, and ear.
(Id. ¶¶ 21-22.) Plaintiff was later
informed that he sustained brain injury to the side of his
head where Officer Dapcevic had struck him twice with his
baton. (Id. ¶ 22.)
Upon
Plaintiff's release from the hospital, one of the
Defendants served him with a “Tier III disciplinary
ticket.” (Id. ¶ 27.) Plaintiff was then
sent to the Special Housing Unit (“SHU”), where
he awaited resolution of his disciplinary hearing over the
course of two months. (Id. ¶¶ 27-28.)
Meanwhile, his purported attacker, Reyes, who was not charged
with slashing Plaintiff, returned to the general population.
(Id. ¶ 29.) Several inmates were set to testify
on Plaintiff's behalf at his disciplinary proceeding,
however, they refused to testify soon thereafter,
“fearing retribution.” (Id.) Once the
disciplinary proceeding began, the hearing officer denied
Plaintiff's requests to call several witnesses on his
behalf. (Id. ¶ 30.) Further, although the
hearing officer recorded each day's proceedings, the
hearing officer did not record the day Officer Vennero, an
eyewitness from the yard, testified, or the day Plaintiff
argued his request for inmate witnesses. (Id. ¶
31.) The hearing officer found Plaintiff guilty on “all
charges” and sentenced him to one year's
confinement in the SHU along with other
“deprivations.” (Id. ¶ 32.)
Plaintiff appealed the findings and his sentence, which
Defendant Albert Prack, Director of Special Housing and
Inmate Disciplinary programs for DOCCS, upheld. (Id.
¶ 33.)
While
in the SHU, Plaintiff suffered “numerous physical and
emotional hardships.” (Id. ¶ 34.) He
frequently suffered from migraines, dizziness, muscle spasms,
nausea, impaired vision, and hearing loss (Id.) as
well as “excruciating pain” from headaches
including migraines. (Id. ¶ 38.) Plaintiff made
repeated requests for medical assistance, yet he did not
receive any medical treatment to alleviate his severe pain or
debilitating symptoms. (Id. ¶ 34, 39.) Further,
Plaintiff often found parts of his meal missing or that
someone had tampered with the food. (Id. ¶ 35.)
Plaintiff lost significant weight as a result. (Id.)
Plaintiff
was also subjected to smoke inhalation from a fire set by an
inmate in his cell block. This caused lung problems and
difficulty breathing. Plaintiff again requested medical
treatment but received none. (Id. ¶ 36.)
Plaintiff further asserts that Defendants left urine and
feces in the hallway outside of Plaintiff's cell without
cleaning it up for extended periods of time. Plaintiff, as a
result, ate his meals in close proximity to the urine and
feces. (Id. ¶ 37.)
Plaintiff
alleges that he continues to suffer from physical injuries,
severe pain from those injuries, and emotional distress.
(Id. ¶ 40.)
STANDARD
ON MOTION TO DISMISS
Under
Rule 12(b)(6), the inquiry for motions to dismiss is whether
the complaint “contain[s] sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a
complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations.” Id. at 679. The Court must take
all material factual allegations as true and draw reasonable
inferences in the non-moving party's favor, but the Court
is “‘not bound to accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation, '” or
to credit “mere conclusory statements” or
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In determining whether a
complaint states a plausible claim for relief, a district
court must consider the context and “draw on its
judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at
679. A claim is facially plausible when the factual content
pleaded allows a court “to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. at 678.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff
brings two claims against Defendants Lee and Prack in their
individual capacity pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983.[2] First, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
Lee and Prack violated his due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by
subjecting him to atypical and substantial hardship during
his one year sentence in the SHU. (Compl. ¶¶
69-76.) Second, Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Prack
violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment by denying him a fair and impartial disciplinary
hearing. (Compl. ¶¶ 61-68.) Defendants argue that
both of these claims should be dismissed because Defendants
were not personally involved in the purported constitutional
violations under § 1983 and they are both entitled to
qualified immunity.
42
U.S.C. ยง 1983 and ...