United States District Court, N.D. New York
KIMBERLY J. CLARK, Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY BERRYHILL Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
LAW
OFFICES OF STEVEN R. DOLSON STEVEN R. DOLSON, ESQ. Counsel
for Plaintiff.
SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION JUNE L. BYUN, ESQ. OFFICE OF GENERAL
COUNSEL-REGION II Special Assistant U.S. Attorney Counsel for
Defendant.
DECISION AND ORDER
GLENN
T. SUDDABY, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Currently
before the Court, in this action filed by Kimberly J. Clark
(“Plaintiff”) against the Commissioner of Social
Security (“Defendant”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), are Plaintiff's
motion for judgment on the pleadings and Defendant's
motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Dkt. Nos. 9, 12.) For
the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motion for
judgment on the pleadings is denied, and Defendant's
motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted. The
Commissioner's decision denying Plaintiff's
disability benefits is affirmed, and Plaintiff's
Complaint is dismissed.
I.
RELEVANT BACKGROUND
A.
Factual Background
Plaintiff
was born in 1975, making her 37 years old at the alleged
onset date, 38 years old at the application filing date, and
40 years old at the date of the ALJ's decision. Plaintiff
reported obtaining a GED. The vocational expert found that
Plaintiff had past work as a disability aide, home health
aide, and pharmacy technician. In her application, Plaintiff
alleged disability due to hypertension, bipolar disorder,
depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, Crohn's disease,
migraines, asthma, and a right arm deformity.
B.
Procedural History
Plaintiff
applied for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental
Security Income on January 28, 2014, alleging disability
beginning October 10, 2012. Plaintiff's applications were
initially denied on June 4, 2014, after which she timely
requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”). Plaintiff appeared at a video hearing
before ALJ Julia D. Gibbs on October 29, 2015. On December
17, 2015, the ALJ issued a written decision finding Plaintiff
was not disabled under the Social Security Act. (T.
21-26.)[1] On April 27, 2017, the Appeals Council
denied Plaintiff's request for review, making the
ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner.
(T. 1-3.)
C.
The ALJ's Decision
Generally,
in her decision, the ALJ made the following seven findings of
fact and conclusions of law. (T. 21-26.) First, the ALJ found
that Plaintiff was insured for benefits under Title II until
March 31, 2015. (T. 21.) Second, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her
application filing date. (Id.) Third, the ALJ found
that Plaintiff's right elbow injury status post surgery,
degenerative disc disease, sinusitis, and migraines
(controlled with medication) are severe impairments; however,
the ALJ found that her bipolar disorder is not a severe
impairment. (T. 21-22.) Fourth, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff's severe impairments do not meet or medically
equal one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. § 404,
Subpart P, App. 1 (the “Listings”). (T. 22.)
Fifth, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform
light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b)
except she is limited to unskilled work and cannot rotate her
right arm more than 90 degrees. She has no limitation on
fingering. There can be no excessive exposure to
environmental irritants and no rapid rotation of the
neck.[2]
(T. 22.) Sixth, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is unable to
perform her past work. (T. 25.) Seventh, and finally, the ALJ
found that Plaintiff remains able to perform a significant
number of other jobs in the national economy including as a
usher, ticket taker, counter clerk, and cafeteria cashier.
(T. 26.) The ALJ therefore concluded that Plaintiff is not
disabled.
D.
The Parties' Briefings on the Their
Cross-Motions
1.
Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
Generally,
Plaintiff makes two arguments in support of her motion for
judgment on the pleadings. (Dkt. No. 9, at 5-11 [Pl.'s
Mem. of Law].) First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's
decision is not supported by substantial evidence because she
failed to consider all of the medical source statements when
formulating the RFC. (Id. at 5-8.) More
specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing
to discuss or weigh the opinion from State Agency medical
consultant K. Liber-Diaz, Ph.D., which Plaintiff argues is
not harmless error because Dr. Liber-Diaz's opinion
indicates limitations in accepting instructions, responding
to criticism, setting goals, making plans, and handling
stress that are not accounted for in the RFC limitation for
unskilled work. (Id. at 6-8.) Plaintiff ...