United States District Court, S.D. New York
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
B. DANIELS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Rolando Santi, pro se, brings this action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, asserting claims against Defendants City
of New York (the "City"), the New York City
Department of Corrections, and Doctors Landis Barnes and
Brenda Harris, arising out of his alleged mistreatment as a
pretrial detainee at the Manhattan Detention Center
("MDC"). (See Am. Compl., ECF No. 8.)
Plaintiff alleges that while he was detained at the MDC,
Defendants exhibited deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs by failing to transport him to the hospital for
a scheduled surgery and then falsifying records to cover it
up. (Id. at 4-6.) Defendants move to dismiss
Plaintiffs' amended complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Defs.'
Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 23.)
this Court is Magistrate Judge Sarah Netburn's May 8,
2018 Report and Recommendation (the "Report," ECF
No. 54), recommending that Defendants' motion to dismiss
be granted with respect to Plaintiffs claims against the City
and Dr. Harris, but denied as to the claim asserted against
Dr. Barnes. (Id. at 16.) In her Report,
Magistrate Judge Netburn advised the parties that failure to
file timely objections to the Report would constitute a
waiver of those objections on appeal. (Id. at 17.)
No. objections have been filed. Having reviewed the Report
for clear error and finding none, this Court ADOPTS the
Report in full.
Report and Recommendations
"may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the
findings or recommendations" set forth within a
magistrate judge's report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
The court must review de novo the portions of a
magistrate judge's report to which a party properly
objects. Id. Portions of a magistrate judge's
report to which no or "merely perfunctory"
objections are made are reviewed for clear error. See
Edwards v. Fischer, 414 F.Supp.2d 342, 346-47 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (citation omitted). Clear error is present only when
"upon review of the entire record, [the court is] left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed." United States v. Snow, 462 F.3d 55,
72 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
survive a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6),
"a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In deciding a 12(b)(6)
motion, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded
allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiffs favor. See N.J. Carpenters
Health Fundv. Royal Bank of Scot. Grp., PIC,
709 F.3d 109, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2013); Chambers v. Time
Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002). The
court, however, need not credit "mere conclusory
statements," Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, nor must
it give effect to "legal conclusions couched as factual
allegations." Port Dock & Stone Corp. v.
Oldcastle Ne., Inc., 507 F.3d 117, 121 (2d Cir. 2007)
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
se litigants are generally "entitled to some
latitude in meeting these requirements, as [their complaints]
are held to 'less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Martinez v.
Ravikumar, 536 F.Supp.2d 369, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(quoting Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 860 (2d
Cir. 1997)). Nonetheless, to withstand a motion to dismiss,
"a pro se plaintiff must still plead sufficient
facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face."
Chukwueze v. NYCERS, 891 F.Supp.2d 443, 450
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). "Even from pro se plaintiffs, bald assertions
and conclusions of law are not adequate." Ruotolo v.
Fannie Mae, 933 F.Supp.2d 512, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Deliberate Indifference Claims under Section 1983
pretrial detainee may bring a claim under Section 1983
challenging allegedly unconstitutional conditions of
confinement "by showing that the officers acted with
deliberate indifference to the challenged conditions."
Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017).
In order to prevail on such a claim, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that: (1) the challenged conditions were
"sufficiently serious to constitute objective
deprivations of the right to due process," and (2) the
defendant "acted with at least deliberate indifference
to the challenged conditions." Id.
claim of inadequate medical care, as here, a plaintiff may
satisfy the first element by alleging he was "actually
deprived of adequate medical care," and that "the
inadequacy in medical care [was] sufficiently serious."
Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 279 (2d Cir.
2006). To assess whether the deprivation of adequate medical
care is "sufficiently serious," courts consider a
number of factors, including whether "a reasonable
doctor or patient would find it important and worthy of
comment, whether the condition significantly affects an
individual's daily activities, and whether it causes
chronic and substantial pain." Id. at 280
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To establish
deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must adequately allege
"the defendant-official acted intentionally to impose
the alleged condition, or recklessly failed to act with
reasonable care to mitigate the risk that the condition posed
to the pretrial detainee even though the defendant-official
knew, or should have known, that the condition posed an
excessive risk to health or safety." Darnell,
849 F.3d at 35.
Municipal Liability under Section 1983
well settled that a municipality may be held liable under
Section 1983 "for the violation of a person's civil
rights only if the moving force behind that violation was an
official policy or custom of the municipality."
Williams v. Town of Southington,205 F.3d 1327 (2d
Cir. 2000) (citing Monell v. Dep 't of Social
Servs.,436 U.S. 658, 690-94 (1978). Thus, to prevail on
a Section 1983 claim against a municipality, the plaintiff
must allege facts showing: (1) the existence of a municipal
policy, custom, or practice, and (2) that the policy, custom,
or practice caused the violation of the plaintiffs rights.
See Jones v. Town of East Haven,691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d
Cir. 2012). To be actionable, the policy must be both