United States District Court, W.D. New York
RONALD M. JONES, Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
DECISION AND ORDER
HON.
FRANK P. GERACI, JR. CHIEF JUDGE
INTRODUCTION
Ronald
M. Jones brings this action pursuant to the Social Security
Act (“the Act”) seeking review of the final
decision of the Acting Commissioner of Social Security that
denied his applications for disability insurance benefits
(“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income
(“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the Act. ECF
No. 1. The Court has jurisdiction over this action under 42
U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).
Both
parties moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). ECF Nos. 12, 14. For
the reasons that follow, the Commissioner's motion is
GRANTED and Plaintiff's motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
On
April 5, 2013, Jones protectively applied for DIB and SSI
with the Social Security Administration (“the
SSA”). Tr.[1] 198-210. He alleged disability since
October 18, 2010, due to chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease (“COPD”), asthma, and glaucoma in both
eyes. Tr. 220-21. On May 29, 2015, Jones and vocational
expert (“VE”) David Sypher appeared and testified
at a hearing before Administrative Law Judge Sharon Seeley
(“the ALJ”). Tr. 34-99. After the hearing, the
ALJ served vocational interrogatories upon VE Jay
Steinbrenner, and his responses became part of the record.
Tr. 282-85. On March 15, 2016, the ALJ issued a decision
finding that Jones was not disabled within the meaning of the
Act. Tr. 15-29. On December 21, 2016, the Appeals Council
denied Jones's request for review. Tr. 1-7. Thereafter,
Jones commenced this action seeking review of the
Commissioner's final decision. ECF No. 1.
LEGAL
STANDARD
I.
District Court Review
“In
reviewing a final decision of the SSA, this Court is limited
to determining whether the SSA's conclusions were
supported by substantial evidence in the record and were
based on a correct legal standard.” Talavera v.
Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotation
marks omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Act
holds that a decision by the Commissioner is
“conclusive” if it is supported by substantial
evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial
evidence means more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Moran v.
Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (quotation
marks omitted). It is not the Court's function to
“determine de novo whether [the claimant] is
disabled.” Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 501
(2d Cir. 1998) (quotation marks omitted); see also Wagner
v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856,
860 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that review of the
Secretary's decision is not de novo and that the
Secretary's findings are conclusive if supported by
substantial evidence).
II.
Disability Determination
An ALJ
must follow a five-step sequential evaluation to determine
whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Act.
See Parker v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 470-71
(1986). At step one, the ALJ must determine whether the
claimant is engaged in substantial gainful work activity. See
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). If so, the claimant is not
disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step two and determines
whether the claimant has an impairment, or combination of
impairments, that is “severe” within the meaning
of the Act, meaning that it imposes significant restrictions
on the claimant's ability to perform basic work
activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If the claimant
does not have a severe impairment or combination of
impairments, the analysis concludes with a finding of
“not disabled.” If the claimant does, the ALJ
continues to step three.
At step
three, the ALJ examines whether a claimant's impairment
meets or medically equals the criteria of a listed impairment
in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of Regulation No. 4 (the
“Listings”). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). If the
impairment meets or medically equals the criteria of a
Listing and meets the durational requirement (20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1509), the claimant is disabled. If not, the ALJ
determines the claimant's residual functional capacity
(“RFC”), which is the ability to perform physical
or mental work activities on a sustained basis,
notwithstanding limitations for the collective impairments.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e)-(f).
The ALJ
then proceeds to step four and determines whether the
claimant's RFC permits him or her to perform the
requirements of his or her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(f). If the claimant can perform such
requirements, then he or she is not disabled. Id. If
he or she cannot, the analysis proceeds to the fifth and
final step, wherein the burden shifts to the Commissioner to
show that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(g). To do so, the Commissioner must present evidence
to demonstrate that the claimant “retains a residual
functional capacity to perform alternative substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy” ...