United States District Court, E.D. New York
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
DONNELLY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
20, 2018, the pro se plaintiff Johnnie Davis,
commenced this action against Judge Roslynn R. Mauskopf and
Judge Lois Bloom of the Eastern District of New York and the
New York City Housing Authority ("NYCHA"). The
plaintiffs request to proceed in forma pauperis is
hereby granted. For the reasons discussed below, the
complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2016, the plaintiff filed an action in this court against
NYCHA, alleging that NYCHA denied him a Section 8 subsidy and
discriminated against him based on his race, criminal
history, drug use and psychological issues. See Davis v.
NYCHA, No. 16-CV-2374 (RRM)(LB) (Compl., ECF No. 1, at
4). By order dated March 9, 2017, Judge Mauskopf dismissed
the complaint and granted the plaintiff leave to amend the
complaint. (Id. at ECF No. 7.) Judge Mauskopf
instructed the plaintiff that if he chose to amend his
complaint, he must allege sufficient facts to show that
NYCHA's refusal to issue him a Section 8 subsidy violated
his rights under the Fair Housing Act, the Americans with
Disabilities Act, or the Rehabilitation Act. (Id. at
7.) The plaintiff did not file an amended complaint and the
Clerk of the Court entered judgment dismissing the case.
(Id. at ECF No. 8). The plaintiff did not file a
notice of appeal.
plaintiff filed this action, alleging that Judge Mauskopf and
Judge Bloom have "repeatedly placed [his claim] on
hold." (ECF No. 1, at 5-6.) The judges also allegedly
"mishandle[ed]" the above case and "chose to
not persue [sic] Justice, but their own selfish needs."
(Id.) The plaintiff seeks monetary damages as well
as "immediate placement in the Section 8 program."
complaint must plead sufficient facts to "state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). At the
pleadings stage of the proceeding, the court must assume the
truth of "all well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual
allegations" in the complaint. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). Pro
se complaints are held to less stringent standards than
pleadings drafted by attorneys; the court must read the
plaintiff s pro se complaint liberally and interpret
it raising the strongest arguments it suggests. See,
e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007); Hughes
v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); Sealed Plaintiff v.
Sealed Defendant #7, 537 F.3d 185, 191-93 (2d Cir.
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), I am required to
dismiss a complaint, filed in forma pauperis, if the
complaint "(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (iii)
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief." An action is frivolous as a matter of law
when the claim is based on an "indisputably meritless
legal theory"-that is, when it "lacks an arguable
basis in law ... or [when] a dispositive defense clearly
exists on the face of the complaint." Livingston v.
Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir.
the plaintiff does not allege a basis for the exercise of the
court's jurisdiction, I construe the complaint to raise
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six
Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
Judges have absolute immunity from suits for damages arising
out of judicial acts performed in their judicial capacities.
See, e.g., Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991);
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988);
Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 2009).
The absolute judicial immunity of the court and its members
"is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or
malice," nor can a judge "be deprived of immunity
because the action he took was in error... or was in excess
of his authority." Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11, 13
(quotations and citations omitted). Judicial immunity may be
overcome only if the judge is alleged to have taken
"nonjudicial actions, i.e. actions not taken in
the judge's judicial capacity," or if the judicial
actions taken were "in the complete absence of all
jurisdiction." Id. at 11-12.
plaintiff appears to be suing Judge Mauskopf and Judge Bloom
for damages in connection with Judge Mauskopf s decision to
dismiss his action in Davis v. NYCHA, No. 16-CV-2374
(RRM)(LB). But Judge Mauskopf s decision is clearly a
judicial function for which absolute immunity applies.
See, e.g., Babaev v. Farinella, No. 17-CV-873, 2017
WL 2256643, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.May 22, 2017) (judicial immunity
doctrine barred claims brought against the judge);
XiuJian Sun v. Pollak, No. 17 CV 1570, 2017 WL
5515850, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.Apr. 10, 2017) (same); Johnson v.
Raggi, No. 16 CV 2765, 2016 WL 3647865, at *l-2
(E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2016) (same).
extent that the plaintiff also seeks injunctive
relief-immediate placement in Section 8 housing-his claims
are precluded by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996
("FCIA"), which extends judicial immunity to most
actions seeking prospective injunctive relief. See
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, § 309(c), Pub.
L. No. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847, 3853 (1996) (amending 42
U.S.C. § 1983) ("[I]n any action brought against a
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not
be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or
declaratory relief was unavailable"); Huminski v.
Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 74, n.23 (2d Cir. 2005); see
also Shtrauch v. Dowd, 651 Fed.Appx. 72, 73 (2d Cir.
2016) (summary order).
to the extent that the plaintiff seeks monetary damages
against the United States for alleged violations of his
constitutional rights, his claim is barred by the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. See U.S. v. Mitchell, 445 U.S.
535, 538 (1980) ("It is elementary that the United
States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents
to be sued, and the terms of its consent to be sued in any
court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the
suit." (internal quotation marks and alterations
omitted)); accord Makarova v. United States, 201
F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). Because the doctrine of
sovereign immunity is jurisdictional, the burden is on the
plaintiff to establish that his claim falls within an
applicable waiver. Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113. The
plaintiff has not alleged any facts to show that waiver is
the plaintiff does not plead any factual allegations against
the defendant, NYCHA. See Chavis v. Chappius, 618
F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010) (although courts are
''obligated to draw the most favorable inferences
that [a pro sc plaintiffs] complaint ...