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Panchitkaew v. Nassau County Police Department

United States District Court, E.D. New York

June 27, 2018

MARUT PANCHITKAEW, Plaintiff,
v.
NASSAU COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT, THOMAS J. RYDER, Commissioner; DET. SGT. DANIEL J. DANZI/Nassau PD Internal Affair; JOHN DOES, 8th Precinct, Nassau County Police; Defendants.

          ORDER

          JOAN M. AZRACK UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         On November 21, 2017, pro se plaintiff Marut Panchitkaew (“plaintiff”) filed an in forma pauperis complaint against the Nassau County Police Department (“the NCPD”), Thomas J. Ryder, Commissioner (“Ryder”), Det. Sgt. Daniel J. Danzi (“Danzi”), and “John Does” alleged to work at the Nassau County Police Department's 8th Precinct (“John Does” and collectively, “defendants”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. By Transfer Order dated February 6, 2018, the complaint was transferred to this Court and, on February 14, 2018, it was assigned to the undersigned. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis and sua sponte dismisses the complaint, in part, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii).

         I.BACKGROUND[1]

         Plaintiff's brief complaint is submitted on the Court's Section 1983 complaint form.

         Plaintiff alleges that, on January 18, 2016, he was visited at his home by Danzi and his unidentified partner and was threatened that if he did not stop complaining to the FBI, plaintiff would be incarcerated at the Nassau County Jail or in a psychiatric hospital. (Compl. ¶ III.) Plaintiff also alleges that, on February 16, 2016, unnamed police officers from the NCPD's 8th Precinct “broke into my house” without a warrant and “forcefully arrested me.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he was then taken to the Nassau University Medical Center (“NUMC”) where he was held against his will for three days. (Id.) As a result, plaintiff claims to have suffered physical and emotional pain and suffering for which he seeks a monetary award in total sum of one million dollars ($1, 000, 000.00). (Id. ¶ IV.)

         II. DISCUSSION

         A. In Forma Pauperis Application

         Upon review of plaintiff's declaration in support of the application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court finds that plaintiff is qualified to commence this action without prepayment of the filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Therefore, plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

         B. Standard of Review

         Pursuant to the in forma pauperis statute, a court must dismiss an action if it determines that it “(i) is frivolous or malicious, (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (iii) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B). The Court must dismiss the action as soon as it makes such a determination.

         Pro se submissions are afforded wide interpretational latitude and should be held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); see also Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 860 (2d Cir. 1997). In addition, the Court is required to read the plaintiff's pro se complaint liberally and interpret it as raising the strongest arguments it suggests. United States v. Akinrosotu, 637 F.3d 165, 167 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation omitted); Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009).

         The Supreme Court has held that pro se complaints need not even plead specific facts; rather the complainant “need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.”). However, a pro se plaintiff must still plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted). The plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. While “‘detailed factual allegations'” are not required, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

         C. ...


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