- February 22, 2018
Kahn, New York, NY, for appellant.
William V. Grady, District Attorney, Poughkeepsie, NY
(Kirsten A. Rappleyea of counsel), for respondent.
C. DILLON, J.P. CHERYL E. CHAMBERS SYLVIA O. HINDS-RADIX
LINDA CHRISTOPHER, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court,
Dutchess County (Stephen Greller, J.), rendered December 14,
2015, convicting him of rape in the second degree (two
counts), upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence. The
appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of
that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was
to suppress his statements to law enforcement officers.
that the judgment is affirmed.
defendant's argument that statements he made before and
after the administration of Miranda warnings
(see Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436) should have
been suppressed as part of a ''single continuous
chain of events'' in which he was subjected to
custodial interrogation (People v Paulman, 5 N.Y.3d
122, 130 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v
Chapple, 38 N.Y.2d 112, 115), is without merit. Even if
the defendant was subjected to a period of custodial
interrogation or its functional equivalent prior to the
administration of Miranda warnings (see People v
Ferro, 63 N.Y.2d 316, 322-323), he made no inculpatory
statement, or any statement relating to his conduct in
connection with the crime under investigation, until after
such warnings had been properly given and his
Miranda rights were effectively waived (see
People v White, 40 A.D.3d 662, 662, afd 10
N.Y.3d 286; People v Prater, 258 A.D.2d 600, 601).
"In the absence of any such pre- Miranda
statement, there was no need to determine whether the pre-
and post-Miranda sessions were part of a 'single
continuous chain of events'" (People v
White, 40 A.D.3d at 663, quoting People v
Paulman, 5 N.Y.3d at 130; see People v Chapple,
38 N.Y.2d at 115). Nor was there evidence that the length or
conditions of the defendant's pre-interrogation detention
affected the voluntariness of his subsequent Miranda
waiver (see People v Anderson, 42 N.Y.2d 35, 39-41;
People v White, 40 A.D.3d at 663). Accordingly, that
branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to
suppress his statements to law enforcement officers was
addition, we agree with the County Court's determination
to limit the defendant's cross-examination of a police
officer at the Huntley hearing (People v
Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72; see People v McKenzie,
148 A.D.3d 936, 937; People v Amaya, 103 A.D.3d 907,
908). The court only limited the cross-examination after
defense counsel asked the officer why his partner made a
certain remark during the defendant's digitally recorded
interview. Since this question called for speculation, the
People's objection thereto was properly sustained
(see People v Bhagwandin, 119 A.D.3d 810, 811;
People v Francisco, 44 A.D.3d 870, 870; People v
Barney, 277 A.D.2d 460, 460).
as the defendant argues that the County Court should have
directed him to submit to a psychiatric examination before
accepting his plea of guilty, the argument is not preserved
for appellate review since the defendant failed to raise the
issue at a time when it might have been remedied (see CPL
470.05; People v Carbone, 159 A.D.2d 511, 511).
In any event, the colloquy between the defendant and the
court at the plea proceeding did not reveal a reasonable
ground to believe that the defendant lacked the capacity to
understand the proceeding against him or to assist in his own
defense (see People v Keiser, 100 A.D.3d 927, 929;
People v Ramirez, 29 A.D.3d 1022, 1022; People v
Rowley, 222 A.D.2d 718, 718).
of the defendant's contention that the indictment
contained duplicitous counts was forfeited by his plea of
guilty (see People v Hansen, 95 N.Y.2d 227, 230;
People v Beattie, 80 N.Y.2d 840, 842; People v
Shand, 105 A.D.3d 777, 777; People v Bracewell,
26 A.D.3d 812, 812; People v Aiello, 153 A.D.2d 988,
990; People v Caban, 129 A.D.2d 721, 721).
sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v
Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 83).
extent the defendant argues that the County Court improperly
denied his motion for resentencing, this contention is not
properly before this Court since the order determining that
motion was issued after ...