Lincoln Square Legal Services, Inc., New York (Elizabeth A.
Maresca of counsel), for appellant.
T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York (Linda Fang of
counsel), for respondents.
Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, Washington, DC
(Danielle Conley of the bar of the State of Washington,
admitted pro hac vice of counsel), for Chiraag Bains, amicus
Roeing, Washington, DC, for Brooklyn Legal Services, Brooklyn
Legal Services, Corp. A, The Legal Aid Society, Syracuse
University College of Law Low Income Taxpayer Clinic, amici
Friedman, J.P., Tom, Mazzarelli, Singh, JJ.
Supreme Court, New York County (Carol Edmead, J.), entered
July 6, 2017, dismissing plaintiff's complaint and
declaring Tax Law § 171-v constitutional, and bringing
up for review an order, same court and Justice, entered June
21, 2017, which granted defendants' motion pursuant to
CPLR 3211 to dismiss the complaint, unanimously affirmed,
was served with a notice pursuant to Tax Law § 171-v to
suspend his license for failure to pay outstanding taxes. Tax
Law § 171-v was enacted to require NYS Department of
Taxation and Finance and Department of Motor Vehicles to
"cooperate in a program to improve tax collection
through the suspension of drivers' licenses of taxpayers
with past-due tax liabilities equal to or in excess of [$10,
000]" (Tax Law § 171-v ). The notice informed
plaintiff that he had 60 days within which to satisfy his tax
liability or prove that he fell within one of the
statute's exceptions, such as mistaken identity, being
subject to a prior wage garnishment, or being the holder of a
commercial driver's license, or his license would be
suspended (see Tax Law § 171-v ).
argument that Bearden v Georgia (461 U.S. 660');">461 U.S. 660
) warrants a finding that he has stated a cause of
action that Tax Law § 171-v is unconstitutional is
without merit (see Jacobi v Tax Appeals Trib. of the
State of N.Y., 156 A.D.3d 1154, 1157 [3d Dept 2017],
lv denied ___ N.Y.3d ___, 2018 NY Slip Op 71379 [May
3, 2018]). While a "driver's license is a
substantial property interest that may not be deprived
without due process of law" (Pringle v Wolfe,
88 N.Y.2d 426, 435 ; cert denied 519 U.S. 1009');">519 U.S. 1009
); see Bell v Burson, 402 U.S. 535');">402 U.S. 535, 539
). it is not a fundamental right as to warrant review
pursuant to Bearden (compare MLB v SLJ, 519
U.S. 102 ; Boddie v Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371');">401 U.S. 371
is a rational basis to the law, as the government has a
legitimate interest in tax collection (see Big Apple Ice
Cream v City of New York, 7 A.D.3d 282');">7 A.D.3d 282 [1st Dept 2004]).
Further, the notice was reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise plaintiff of the pendency of the
action and afford him an opportunity to present his
objections (see Bell v Burson, 402 U.S. 535');">402 U.S. 535 ).
The prohibition against excessive fines does not apply here,
since the condition may be lifted upon action by the
plaintiff (see Matter of Seril v New York State Div. of
Hous. & Community Renewal, 205 A.D.2d 347');">205 A.D.2d 347 [1st Dept
1994]). Nor can plaintiff press a claim pursuant to 42 USC
§ 1983, as state law provides an adequate remedy
(see National Private Truck Council, Inc. v Oklahoma Tax
Commn., 515 U.S. 582, 586, 588 ).
the statute is not facially invalid, since plaintiff cannot
prove that there is no set of circumstances under which the
Act would be valid (see Amazon.com, LLC v New York State
Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 81 A.D.3d 183, 194 [1st
Dept 2010], affd20 N.Y.3d 586');"> ...