United States District Court, S.D. New York
OPINION AND ORDER
EDGARDO RAMOS, U.S.D.J
Howard, proceeding pro se, sues correction officer
Captain Brown pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
that the conditions of his confinement and the denial of
medical treatment at the Manhattan Detention Center
(“MDC”) amounted to cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Captain Brown now moves
to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below,
Captain Brown's motion is GRANTED.
Factual Background 
November 5, 2015, Howard was placed in a cell with four other
inmates in the intake area of the MDC. Am. Compl. ¶
II(D), Doc. 28. Howard alleges that the sink in the cell did
not have running water and that “the toilet did not
flush, and was filled with feces.” Id. In
addition, the cell floor and toilet area were littered with
“food . . ., papers, urine, and other un-sanitary
things.” Id. Howard also alleges that there
was no ventilation in the cell, making it difficult to
breathe. Statement of Facts, Compl. 6, Doc. 2. Howard, along
with two other inmates, became nauseated and complained to
correction officers about shortness of breath, headaches,
dizziness, and stomach pains,  but they were left in the cell
for several hours. Id. Howard's nausea and
headaches did not subside for “over a day and a half,
” but he never received medical treatment despite
requesting it. Am. Compl. ¶ III.
alleges that he filed a grievance with the MDC, but the staff
said they “don't handle these kinds of
issues.” Id. ¶ IV(D), (E)(2). Howard then
wrote a letter to the warden, but she did not respond.
Id. ¶ IV(E)(3).
filed this action on November 13, 2015, Compl. 5, and filed
an Amended Complaint on May 23, 2017, Am. Compl.
Howard asserts claims under the Eighth Amendment challenging
the conditions of his confinement and the denial of his
request for medical treatment. Id. ¶¶
Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)
ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),
district courts are required to accept as true all factual
allegations in the complaint and to draw all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Walker v.
Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2013). However, this
requirement does not apply to legal conclusions, bare
assertions, or conclusory allegations. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 681 (2009) (citing Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In
order to satisfy the pleading standard set forth in Rule 8, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 570). Accordingly, a plaintiff is required to support
his claims with sufficient factual allegations to show
“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Id. “Where a
complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between
possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.”
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Pro Se Plaintiff
should read pro se pleadings “liberally and
interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they
suggest.” Jorgensen v. Epic/Sony Records, 351
F.3d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting McPherson v.
Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir. 1999)). The
obligation to read a pro se litigant's pleadings
leniently “applies with particular force when the
plaintiff's civil rights are at issue.” Jackson
v. NYS Dep't of Labor, 709 F.Supp.2d 218, 224
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357
F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004)). “However, even pro se
plaintiffs asserting civil right claims cannot withstand a
motion to dismiss unless their pleadings contain factual
allegations sufficient to raise a ‘right to relief
above the speculative level.'” Id.
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
1983 provides a private cause of action for ‘the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws' of the United
States.” Boyland v. Wing, 487 F.Supp.2d 161,
167 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
“Section 1983 ‘is not itself a source of
substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method
for vindicating federal rights elsewhere
conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S.
266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.
137, 144 n.3 (1979)).