United States District Court, S.D. New York
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
VALERIE CAPRONI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
Salvador Diaz is charged with failure to register as a
convicted sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration
and Notification Act (“SORNA”), in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2250. See Compl., Dkt. 1;
Indictment, Dkt. 12. Diaz, appearing pro se, moves
for reconsideration of the Court's July 13, 2018 Opinion
and Order, Dkt. 71, which denied Diaz's motion to dismiss
the Indictment. See Def.'s Mot. for
Reconsideration, Dkt. 72. For the following reasons,
Diaz's motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
Standard of Review
is well established that the submissions of a pro se
litigant must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise
the strongest arguments that they suggest.”
Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471,
474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and emphasis
omitted) (collecting cases).
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not provide for
reconsideration motions, such motions are tacitly accepted in
criminal cases in this District by virtue of Local Crim. R.
49.1(d), which requires a movant to submit a
‘memorandum setting forth concisely the matters or
controlling decisions which counsel believes the Court has
overlooked.'” United States v. Baldeo, No.
13-CR-125, 2015 WL 252414, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2015);
see also United States v. FNU LNU, No. 09-CR-543,
2015 WL 13307424, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2015); United
States v. Yannotti, 457 F.Supp.2d 385, 388 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (citing United States v. Clark, 984 F.2d 31,
33 (2d Cir. 1993)).
District, motions for reconsideration in criminal cases are
decided under the same standard as motions for
reconsideration in civil cases. See, e.g.,
United States v. Smith, No. 11-CR-724, 2012 WL
1700465, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2012); United States v.
Leaver, 358 F.Supp.2d 273, 277 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). The
standard for granting a motion for reconsideration in a civil
case is “strict, ” and it “will generally
be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling
decisions or data that the court overlooked.”
Salveson v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 663 Fed.Appx.
71, 75 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Shrader v. CSX Transp.,
Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995)). “A motion
for reconsideration is not a vehicle for relitigating old
issues, . . . securing a rehearing on the merits, or
otherwise taking a second bite at the apple.”
Gustavia Home, LLC v. Rice, 724 Fed.Appx. 87, 88-89
(2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Analytical Surveys, Inc. v. Tonga
Partners, L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d Cir. 2012)). Put
differently, “[r]econsideration is not intended for the
court to reexamine a decision or the party to reframe a
failed motion.” Fan v. United States, 710
Fed.Appx. 23, 24 (2d Cir. 2018).
Diaz's Motion for Reconsideration Is Denied
raises no new arguments or facts in his motion. He simply
presents an alternative reading of the cases discussed in the
Court's July 13, 2018 opinion, essentially seeking to
relitigate the arguments raised in his motion to dismiss.
citing United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828
(1987), Diaz argues that he was “unconstitutionally
blocked from challenging in court the fundamental fairness of
the proceeding” that resulted in his sex-offense
conviction. Def.'s Mem. of Law, Dkt. 73, at 1. This
argument fails. As the Court explained, Diaz has received
more than ample review of his prior conviction, both on
direct appeal and on collateral review. See Op. and
Order, Dkt. 71, at 2-4. Diaz's opportunity for judicial
review thus makes this case distinguishable from
Mendoza-Lopez. See Id. at 8 n.3; United
States v. Delgado, 592 Fed.Appx. 602, 603 (9th Cir.
2015) (distinguishing SORNA from the statute at issue in
Diaz quarrels with the Court's reliance on Custis v.
United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994), and Lewis v.
United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980). See
Def.'s Mem. of Law at 2-3. As to Custis, Diaz
states that he “adopt[s]” the argument of that
case's dissenting opinion and quotes the dissent in full.
Id. at 3. As to Lewis, Diaz states that
numerous Courts of Appeals allowed collateral attacks of
prior convictions before Lewis overruled those
decisions and foreclosed that avenue of relief. Id.
at 2. It goes without saying that this Court is bound to
follow controlling decisions of the Supreme Court,
notwithstanding the merit vel non of the arguments
raised by the dissenting justices. And, of course, this Court
may not follow decisions of the Courts of Appeals that the
Supreme Court has overruled. Diaz offers no reason to believe
that Custis and Lewis are not controlling,
and, thus, his argument fails.
citing Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967), Diaz
argues that “[t]he admission into evidence of a
constitutionally invalid prior conviction is inherently
prejudicial.” Def.'s Mem. of Law at 20. Putting
aside the question of whether Diaz's prior conviction is
constitutionally invalid-and numerous courts have decided
that it is not-the Court's July 13, 2018 opinion
explained that Burgett applies only to prior
convictions that were obtained in violation of a
defendant's right to counsel. See Op. and Order
at 8 n.3. For the reasons that the Court has explained, that
exception does not apply to Diaz's case. See id.
the foregoing reasons, Diaz's motion for ...