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Lewis v. Commissioner of Social Security

United States District Court, W.D. New York

August 1, 2018

MICHAEL G. LEWIS, Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

          DECISION AND ORDER

          ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         INTRODUCTION

         Represented by counsel, Plaintiff Michael G. Lewis ("Plaintiff) brings this action pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), seeking review of the final decision of the Acting Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner" or "Defendant") denying his application for disability insurance benefits ("DIB"). The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Presently before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings (Diet. 12; Dkt. 15) pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiffs motion (Dkt. 12) is granted in part, the Commissioner's motion (Dkt. 15) is denied, and the case is remanded to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings.

         BACKGROUND

         Plaintiff protectively filed an application for DIB with the Social Security Administration (the "SSA") on August 13, 2013, alleging disability as of June 19, 2010. (Dkt. 5 at 36).[1] Plaintiffs application was initially denied. (Id.). At Plaintiffs request, administrative law judge ("ALJ") Timothy M. McGuan held a hearing on November 18, 2015. (Id.). On March 18, 2016, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. (Id. at 36-41). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiffs request for review on May 16, 2017, rendering the ALJ's determination the final decision of the Commissioner. (Id. at 6-11). This action followed.

         LEGAL STANDARD

         I. District Court Review

         "In reviewing a final decision of the SSA, this Court is limited to determining whether the SSA's conclusions were supported by substantial evidence in the record and were based on a correct legal standard." Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Act holds that a decision by the Commissioner is "conclusive" if it is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). "Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009). It is not the Court's function to "determine de novo whether [the claimant] is disabled." Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Wagner v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2dCir. 1990) (holding that review of the Secretary's decision is not de novo and that the Secretary's findings are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence).

         II. Disability Determination

         An ALJ must follow a five-step sequential evaluation to determine whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Act. See Parker v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 470-71 (1986). At step one, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful work activity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step two and determines whether the claimant has an impairment, or combination of impairments, that is "severe" within the meaning of the Act, meaning that it imposes significant restrictions on the claimant's ability to perform basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the analysis concludes with a finding of "not disabled." If the claimant does, the ALJ continues to step three.

         At step three, the ALJ examines whether a claimant's impairment meets or medically equals the criteria of a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of Regulation No. 4 (the "Listings"). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). If the impairment meets or medically equals the criteria of a Listing and meets the durational requirement (20 C.F.R. § 404.1509), the claimant is disabled. If not, the ALJ determines the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC"), which is the ability to perform physical or mental work activities on a sustained basis, notwithstanding limitations from the collective impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 4O4.l52O(e)-(f).

         The ALJ then proceeds to step four and determines whether the claimant's RFC permits him or her to perform the requirements of her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). If the claimant can perform such requirements, then she is not disabled. If she cannot, the analysis proceeds to the fifth and final step, wherein the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant is not disabled. To do so, the Commissioner must present evidence to demonstrate that the claimant "retains a residual functional capacity to perform alternative substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy" in light of her age, education, and work experience. See Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c).

         DISCUSSION

         I. The ...


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