- April 27, 2018
Cirrito & Nally, LLP, Hempstead, NY (Christopher M. Lynch
of counsel), for appellants.
Urbano-DiSalvo, Village Attorney, Hempstead, NY (Keisha N.
Marshall of counsel), for respondents.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P. MARK C. DILLON FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY
ANGELA G. IANNACCI, JJ.
DECISION & JUDGMENT
pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the
Planning Board of the Incorporated Village of Hempstead. The
determination denied an application for site plan approval.
that the determination is confirmed, the petition is denied,
and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits, with costs.
petitioners own two contiguous parcels of property in the
industrial zone in the Incorporated Village of Hempstead,
which they currently use for storage of construction material
and equipment. The petitioners submitted an application to
the Village's Planning Board (hereinafter the Planning
Board) for site plan approval of a "green waste and
construction debris transfer station.'' After a
public hearing, the Planning Board denied the
petitioners' application due to concerns about traffic
and congestion. The petitioners commenced this proceeding
pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review the determination. The
Supreme Court transferred this proceeding to this Court
pursuant to CPLR 7804(g).
the Supreme Court should not have transferred this proceeding
to this Court pursuant to CPLR 7804(g) because the
determination to be reviewed was "not made after a
trial-type hearing held pursuant to direction of law at which
evidence was taken" (Matter of M&V 99 Franklin
Realty Corp. v Weiss, 124 A.D.3d 783, 784; see
CPLR 7803; Village Law § 7-725-a; Matter of
Navaretta v Town of Oyster Bay, 72 A.D.3d 823, 824;
Matter of Halperin v City of New Rochelle, 24 A.D.3d
768, 769). Municipal land use agencies are
''quasi-legislative, quasi-administrative bodies,
'' and "the public hearings they conduct are
informational in nature and [do] not involve the receipt of
sworn testimony or taking of evidence within the meaning of
CPLR 7803(4)" (Matter of Halperin v City of New
Rochelle, 24 A.D.3d at 770 [internal quotation marks and
citations omitted]). "Accordingly, determinations of
such agencies are reviewed under the 'arbitrary and
capricious' standard of CPLR 7803(3), and not the
'substantial evidence' standard of CPLR 7803(4)"
(id.; see Matter of M&V 99 Franklin Realty Corp. v
Weiss, 124 A.D.3d at 784). In the interest of judicial
economy, this Court will nevertheless decide the petition on
the merits, as the full administrative record is before this
Court (see Matter of M&V99 Franklin Realty Corp. v
Weiss, 124 A.D.3d at 784; Matter of Halperin v City
of New Rochelle, 24 A.D.3d at 772-773).
local planning board has broad discretion in reaching its
determination on applications . . . and judicial review is
limited to determining whether the action taken by the board
was illegal, arbitrary, or an abuse of discretion'"
(Matter of In-Towne Shopping Ctrs., Co. v Planning Bd. of
the Town of Brookhaven, 73 A.D.3d 925, 926, quoting
Matter of Kearney v Kita, 62 A.D.3d 1000, 1001;
see Matter of Ostojic v Gee, 130 A.D.3d 927, 928;
Matter of Kaywood Props., Ltd. v Forte, 69 A.D.3d
628; Matter of Davies Farm, LLC v Planning Bd. of Town of
Clarkstown, 54 A.D.3d 757). "'When reviewing
the determinations of a local planning board, courts consider
substantial evidence only to determine whether the record
contains sufficient evidence to support the rationality of
the [b]oard's determination'" (Matter of
In-Towne Shopping Ctrs., Co. v Planning Bd. of the Town of
Brookhaven, 73 A.D.3d at 926, quoting Matter of
Kearney v Kita, 62 A.D.3d at 1001 [internal quotation
to the petitioners' contentions, the Planning Board's
determination had a rational basis, was not illegal, and was
not arbitrary and capricious (see Matter of Ostojic v
Gee, 130 A.D.3d at 929; Matter of Fairway Manor,
Inc. v Bertinelli, 81 A.D.3d 821, 823).
petitioners' remaining contentions are without merit.
MASTRO, J.P., DILLON, CONNOLLY and ...