Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Davis v. Capra

United States District Court, N.D. New York

August 2, 2018

RODNEY DAVIS, Petitioner,
v.
MICHAEL CAPRA, Respondent.

          RODNEY DAVIS Petitioner, pro se.

          DECISION AND ORDER

          MAE A. D'AGOSTINO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

         I. INTRODUCTION

         On July 26, 2018, petitioner Rodney Davis filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Dkt. No. 1, Petition ("Pet."). He has paid the statutory filing fee. Dkt. Entry dated 7/26/2018. For the reasons that follow, the petition is dismissed without prejudice to refiling once petitioner has exhausted his claims in state court.

         II. THE PETITION

         Petitioner challenges a 2013 judgment of conviction in Schenectady County, upon a jury verdict, of second degree murder, attempted murder, assault, criminal possession of a weapon, and attempted assault. Pet. at 1-2.[1] On November 3, 2016, the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, affirmed the judgment of conviction, and, on January 23, 2017, the New York Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. Id. at 2-3; see also, People v. Davis, 144 A.D.3d 1188, 1190 (3d Dep't 2016), lv. denied, 28 N.Y.3d 1144 (2017). Petitioner asserts that, on or about March 20 or 26, 2018, he filed a writ of error coram nobis for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and that, on May 3, 2018, the Third Department denied his motion without an evidentiary hearing. Pet. at 3-4, 14. Petitioner then states that on or about May 20, 2018, he sought leave to appeal the denial to the Court of Appeals. Id. at 14. That appeal is apparently still pending.

         Petitioner contends that he is entitled to federal habeas relief because (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel during both his trial and appeal and (2) there was prosecutorial misconduct which deprived petitioner of a fair trial. Pet. at 5-9. For a more complete statement of petitioner's claims, reference is made to the petition.

         III. DISCUSSION

         An application for a writ of habeas corpus may not be granted until a petitioner has exhausted all remedies available in state court unless "there is an absence of available State corrective process" or "circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant." 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b)(1)(A), (B)(i), (ii). The exhaustion requirement "is principally designed to protect the state courts' role in the enforcement of federal law and prevent disruption of state judicial proceedings[.]" Jimenez v. Walker, 458 F.3d 130, 149 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982)).

         To properly exhaust his claims, petitioner must do so both procedurally and substantively. Procedural exhaustion requires that the petitioner raise all claims in state court prior to raising them in a federal habeas corpus petition. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). Substantive exhaustion requires that the petitioner "fairly present" each claim for habeas relief in "each appropriate state court (including a state supreme court with powers of discretionary review), thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim." Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (citations omitted). In other words, petitioner "must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845.

         Here, it is clear that petitioner has not exhausted his state court remedies because petitioner asserts that he timely sought leave to appeal from the denial of his writ of error coram nobis and his appeal is currently pending before the Court of Appeals. Pet. at 3-4, 14. Accordingly, the highest state court capable of reviewing petitioner's claims has not yet had the opportunity to do so. See Brown v. Ercole, No. 1:07-CV-2611, 2007 WL 2769448, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2007) (explaining that tolling pursuant to the AEDPA occurs "while state post-conviction motions are pending. . . . Therefore, once the Court of Appeals issued its order denying leave to appeal, the coram nobis petition was no longer pending because no further state court remedies were available.")

         There is no basis on the record before this Court to conclude that there is an absence of available State corrective process (e.g., where there is no further state proceeding for a petitioner to pursue) or circumstances exist that render that state court process ineffective to protect petitioner's rights (e.g. where further pursuit would be futile). 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(i), (ii); Lurie v. Wittner, 228 F.3d 113, 124 (2d Cir. 2000). Petitioner has state court remedies available to him, and is in the process of exhausting those remedies by pursuing his appeal of the denial of his collateral motion. It is not futile to require him to complete exhaustion of his state court remedies before pursuing a federal habeas petition.

         While petitioner's papers do not reflect his awareness that his petition was filed prematurely as a protective filing, to the extent that petitioner may be understood to request that this action be stayed and his petition held in abeyance, that request is denied. The Supreme Court has stated, in dicta, that a habeas petitioner "might avoid" the application of the statute of limitations resulting from "reasonable confusion" about the timeliness of a state filling "by filing a 'protective' petition in federal court and asking the federal court to stay and abey" the habeas proceedings. Pace v. Diguglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 416 (2005); see also Zarvela v. Artuz, 254 F.3d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that a stay and abeyance may be warranted "where an outright dismissal" of a mixed petition "could jeopardize the timeliness of a collateral attack") (internal quotation marks omitted). However, "Pace suggests that whether a stay and abeyance is appropriate in a particular case is governed by the" considerations set forth in Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 275-76 (2005). Rivera v. Kaplan, No. 1:17-CV-2257, 2017 WL 3017713, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2017). Under Rhines, a stay and abeyance should be "available only in limited circumstances" where the petitioner can show both (1) "good cause" for failing to "exhaust his claims first in state court" and (2) that his unexhausted claims are not "plainly meritless." 544 U.S. at 277.

         Here, petitioner has not argued, much less established, that he had "good cause" for failing to exhaust his claims in state court before filing his petition. Additionally, it does not appear that a subsequent habeas petition, if necessary and if filed promptly after petitioner's claims are exhausted in state court, will be jeopardized by the statute of limitations. The AEDPA's one-year limitations period generally begins to run from the date on which the state criminal conviction became final by the conclusion of direct review or by the expiration of the time to seek direct review. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). When petitioners do not seek certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, a state conviction becomes final ninety (90) days after the New York Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. Gonzales v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 148-49 (2012); Saunders v. Senkowski, 587 F.3d 543, 547 (2d Cir. 2009). Properly filed state court applications for relief operate to toll the limitations period if those applications are filed before the one-year limitations period expires. 28 U.S.C. ยง ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.