United States District Court, N.D. New York
IN RE JEFFREY S. JACKSON, Respondent.
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
GLENN T. SUDDABY CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.
the undersigned has determined that grounds may exist to
enjoin Jeffrey S. Jackson (“Respondent”) from
filing any future pleadings or documents of any kind
(including motions) in this District pro se without
prior permission of the Chief Judge or his or her designee.
well settled that “[a] district court may, in its
discretion, impose sanctions against litigants who abuse the
judicial process.” Shafii v. British Airways,
PLC, 83 F.3d 566, 571 (2d Cir. 1996). Where a litigant
persists in the filing of vexatious and frivolous suits, it
may be appropriate to place certain limitations on the
litigant's future access to the courts. See Hong Mai
Sa v. Doe, 406 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing
Iwachiw v. New York State Dep't of Motor
Vehicles, 396 F.3d 525, 528 [2d Cir. 2005]); see
also Shafii, 83 F.3d at 571 (“The filing of
repetitive and frivolous suits constitutes the type of abuse
for which an injunction forbidding further litigation may be
an appropriate sanction.”). Before imposing such
limitations, the court should consider the following:
(1) the litigant's history of litigation and in
particular whether it entailed vexatious, harassing or
duplicative lawsuits; (2) the litigant's motive in
pursuing the litigation, e.g., does the litigant have an
objective good faith expectation of prevailing?; (3) whether
the litigant is represented by counsel; (4) whether the
litigant has caused needless expense to other parties or has
posed an unnecessary burden on the courts and their
personnel; and (5) whether other sanctions would be adequate
to protect the courts and other parties.
Iwachiw, 396 F.3d at 528 (quoting Safir v.
United States Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 19, 24 [2d Cir.
after carefully reviewing the record, the Court concludes
that, unless he shows cause otherwise, Respondent should be
enjoined from filing any future pleadings or documents of any
kind (including motions) in this District pro se
without prior permission of the Chief Judge or his or her
October 16, 2019, Respondent, while proceeding pro
se, has filed five Complaints in this Court, and pursued
a sixth Complaint that was properly removed to this District
based on federal-question jurisdiction. Jackson v. Gen.
Motors, 19-CV-1276, Complaint (N.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 16,
2019); Jackson v. Alcon Labs., 19-CV-1277, Complaint
(N.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 16, 2019); Jackson v. Intuit,
Inc., 19-CV-1278, Complaint (N.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 16, 2019);
Jackson v. Bloomberg L.P., 19-CV-1281, Complaint
(N.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 17, 2019); Jackson v. STF Servs.
Corp., 19-CV-1326, Complaint (N.D.N.Y. filed in state
court on Oct. 2, 2019, and removed to federal court on Oct.
25, 2019); Jackson v. Intuit Inc., 19-CV-1331,
Complaint (N.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 29, 2019).
Respondent has had the good sense to voluntarily discontinue
two of these actions (after being expressly warned that
intentionally filing duplicative actions may result in
sanctions). (Dkt. No. 11 in 19-CV-1278, Notice of Voluntary
Dismissal [N.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 18, 2019]; Dkt. No. 6 in
Action 19-CV-1331, Notice of Voluntary Dismissal [N.D.N.Y.
filed Nov. 18, 2019].) However, through his mere filing of
one of those two actions, and through his litigation of the
four other of his actions, Respondent has demonstrated a
degree of vexatiousness that warrants action by the
undersigned. More specifically, the Court has identified five
ways that Respondent's litigation practices appear to be
Respondent filed an action in this Court (i.e., one of the
two above-referenced voluntarily discontinued actions)
thirteen days after filing a virtually identical action in
this Court (i.e., the other of the two above-referenced
voluntarily discontinued actions). (Compare Dkt. No.
1 in Action 19-CV-1278 [Plf.'s Compl., filed Oct. 16,
2019, asserting claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and Section 296 of the New York State Human
Rights Law against Intuit, Inc., and four of its employees,
arising from his employer's alleged discovery and use of
his arrest record] with Dkt. No. 1 in Action
19-CV-1331 [Plf.'s Compl., filed Oct. 29, 2019, asserting
claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
Section 296 of the New York State Human Rights Law against
Intuit, Inc., arising from his employer's alleged
discovery and use of his arrest record].) Although Respondent
was ultimately persuaded not to engage in such duplicative
litigation, he wasted the Court's resources before doing
Respondent filed an action in this Court fifteen days after
filing a virtually identical action in state court.
(Compare Dkt. No. 1 in Action 19-CV-1281 [Plf.'s
Compl., filed Oct. 17, 2019, in federal court, asserting
claims of gender and age discrimination against STF Services
Group, Bloomberg LP, Bloomberg BNA and Michael Bloomberg,
arising from events occurring during the course of his
employment between Nov. 4, 2015, and March 23, 2017]
with Dkt. No. 2 in Action 19-CV-1326 [Plf.'s
Compl., filed Oct. 2, 2019, in state court, asserting claims
of gender and disability discrimination against STF Services
Group, Bloomberg LP, Bloomberg BNA, Bloomberg Industry Group
and John Doe, arising from events occurring during the course
of his employment between Nov. 4, 2015, and March 31, 2017].)
difficult for the Court to imagine how Respondent could
sincerely believe that these two instances of duplicative
litigation were permitted. This is particularly true after
October 25, 2017, when Respondent's state-court Complaint
was removed to federal court. (Dkt. No. 1 in Action
19-CV-1326.) Moreover, any benefit of the doubt afforded to
Respondent on this issue dissipates when one considers his
other conduct, described below.
Respondent has repeatedly filed motions knowing them to be
improper and/or without merit. For example, on one occasion,
he filed the same motion twice on the same
date. On another occasion, he re-filed a motion
after apparently becoming impatient that he had not received
a decision on the first motion. Even more egregiously, he has
repeatedly filed procedurally improper motions after being
specifically and repeatedly advised of the procedural defects
in those motions (i.e., the lack of a memorandum of law
and/or affidavit). The specific advice was delivered to
Respondent in four different ways: the first way being
through the delivery of courtesy copies of Local Rules 7.1(a)
and 72.1(b) of the District's Local Rules of Practice and
pages 35 and 36 of the District's Pro Se
Handbook on October 17, October 29, and November 6,
2019; the second way being through a Text Order
filed on November 7, 2019; the third way being through Text Orders
filed on November 19, 2019; and the fourth way being through
a Text Notice filed on November 26, 2019. The filing of
these procedurally improper motions occurred at least
seventeen times between November 6 and December 18, 2019
(each time becoming less forgivable due to the accumulation
of notices). This too has wasted the Court's
Respondent has made material misrepresentations in his
applications to proceed in forma pauperis. For the
sake of brevity, the Court will not linger on the numerous
inconsistencies between statements made in certain
applications and those made in others, which might be
overlooked due to the use of different forms or the
completion of the forms on different dates (at least for a
plaintiff who has not committed the other litigation abuses
described in this Order to Show Cause). Far more
troubling are the numerous material contradictions between
statements made in applications submitted on the
same forms on the same date.
(Compare Dkt. No. 9 at 2 in Action 19-CV-1278,
Motion for IFP [N.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 12, 2019] with
Dkt. No. 11 at 2 in Action 19-CV-1276, Motion for IFP
[N.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 12, 2019] and Dkt. No. 16 at 2
in Action 19-CV-1281, Motion for IFP [N.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 12,
2019].) The Court can conceive of no excuse for such conduct.
and finally, after being specifically advised of the
reassignment of one of his actions to the undersigned on
October 31, 2019, Respondent has repeatedly labeled motions
returnable before U.S. District Judge Brenda K. Sannes (in
both the aforementioned action and an action that had never
been assigned to Judge Sannes), confusing docket clerks,
courtroom deputies and law clerks. (Compare Dkt. No.
9 in Action 19-CV-1326, Text Order of Reassignment [N.D.N.Y.
filed Oct. 31, 2019] with Dkt. Nos. 23, 24 and 25 in
Action 19-CV-1326 [N.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 6, 2019] and
Dkt. Nos. 30, 31, 32 and 33 in Action 19-CV-1326 [N.D.N.Y.
filed Nov. 7, 2019] and Dkt. No. 37 in Action
19-CV-1326 [N.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 15, 2019] and Dkt.
Nos. 6 and 7, Action 19-CV-1281 [N.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 6, 2019]
and Dkt. Nos. 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 in Action
19-CV-1281 [N.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 7, 2019] and Dkt.
No. 33 in Action 19-CV-1281 [N.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 13, 2019].)
The Court notes that this conduct persisted even after the
issuance of not only the Text Order of Reassignment and
various Orders by the undersigned but a specific notice by
the Clerk's Office that ...