United States District Court, S.D. New York
OPINION & ORDER
HONORABLE PAUL A. CROTTY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
case is on remand from the Second Circuit to determine
whether the District Court properly exercised supplemental
jurisdiction to dismiss the state law claims, or whether the
District Court should have declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction, and should now dismiss the state law claims
without prejudice to be adjudicated in the state courts. The
Court finds that it properly exercised supplemental
jurisdiction in the first instance when it granted summary
judgment in favor of Defendant Moody's Analytics, Inc.
("Defendant," "Moody's") on the state
Gregory Clemens ("Plaintiff," "Clemens")
sued the Defendant, his former employer, for alleged
violations of: (1) the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29
U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. ("FMLA"); (2)
the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code §
8-101 etseq. ("NYCHRL"); (3) breach of
contract; and (4) the New York Labor Law § 191 et
seq. ("NYLL"). Clemens v. Moody's
Analytics, 17-cv-410 (PAC), 2018 WL 1750586
(S.D.N.Y.Apr. 9, 2018), off din part, vacated in part,
and remanded 770 Fed.Appx. 10 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary
order), The Complaint in this case was filed nearly three
years ago on January 19, 2017, and the Answer filed a little
less than two months later. Dkts. 1, 9. The Parties agreed in
their Civil Case Management Plan that all initial requests
for document production and service of interrogatories would
be completed by May 25, 2017, all depositions would be taken
by September 13, 2017, and fact discovery would be completed
no later than September 15, 2017. Dkt. 14, at 3. An Initial
Pre-Trial Conference was held before this Court on May 18,
2017. Minute Entry dated May 18, 2017.
Plaintiff, writing on behalf of both Parties, filed a letter
motion on September 13, 2017 seeking a one-month extension of
discovery. Dkt. 15, at 1. As of that time, the Parties had
exchanged approximately 5, 000 pages of documents and
electronically stored information, and taken the Plaintiffs
deposition. Id. The Court granted the request,
extending the discovery deadline to October 17, 2017. Dkt,
16. In a letter dated November 14, 2017, the Plaintiff,
consistent with this Court's Individual Practices, wrote
that he might move to compel the Defendant to produce certain
documents. Dkt. 19, at 1. The Plaintiff contended that these
documents, divided into three categories, might substantiate
the Plaintiffs allegations that his former manager, as a
cover-up for the alleged FMLA violations, had devised the
compliance investigation that led to the Plaintiffs
termination. Id. As of that time, the Defendant had
already produced 4, 000 pages of documents, and six current
and former Moody's employees had been deposed. Dkt. 20,
at 2. At a Pre-Motion Conference held on November 20, 2017,
the Court denied the Plaintiffs motion to compel as to
contribution unit reports for three other members of the
Plaintiffs team, granted it as to emails between the
Plaintiff and a former co-worker with whom he claimed to have
done work relevant to claimed contribution units, and held
that the request as to handwritten notes Clemens had left on
his desk before being terminated was moot. Minute Entry dated
Nov. 20, 2017.
Defendant moved for summary judgment on December 21, 2017.
Dkt. 22. This Court granted summary judgment for the
Defendant on the FMLA claims, and the state law claims as
well. Id. at *9.
Second Circuit affirmed this Court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the Defendant on the FMLA claims, and
vacated and remanded as to this Court's exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.
Clemens, 11$ Fed. App'x at 12. The Court held
that it was "not able on review to determine [the
District Court's] reasons" for exercising
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.
U.S.C. § 1367(a) grants federal courts
"supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that
are so related to claims in the action within such original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or
controversy under Article III" of the Constitution. 28
U.S.C, § 1367(a). "The state and federal claims
must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact."
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
725 (1966). "[O]nce it is determined that a supplemental
claim is related to the claim within the court's original
jurisdiction such that they form the same case or
controversy, supplemental jurisdiction over the related claim
is mandatory." Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v.
Russian Kurier, Inc., 140 F.3d 442, 447 (2d Cir. 1998);
Catzin v, Thank You & Good Luck Corp.,
899 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2018).
may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction where
"(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State
law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim
or claims over which the district court has original
jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims
over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in
exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons
for declining jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c);
Shahriar v. Smith & Wollensky Restaurant Grp.,
659 F.3d 234, 245 (2d Cir. 2011).
federal court's exercise of supplemental jurisdiction
over state law claims has its "justification ... in
considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness
to litigants; if these are not present a federal court should
hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state claims, even
though bound to apply state law to them."
Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. "Gibbs
emphasized that 'pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of
discretion, not of plaintiff s right, '" and
"articulated ... a doctrine of flexibility, designed to
allow courts to deal with cases involving pendent claims in
the manner that most sensibly accommodates a range of
concerns and values." Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v.
Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988) (quoting
Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726).
statutory basis for declining to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction may be found among 28 U.S.C. §
l367(c)'s four factors, a district court may still
exercise supplemental jurisdiction after "balancing] the
supplemental jurisdiction factors." Catzin, 899
F.3d at 86. "[T]he discretion to decline supplemental
jurisdiction is available only if founded upon an enumerated
category of subsection 1367(c)." Itar-Tass, 140
F.3d at 448. Where one of the categories in 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c) applies, a court has discretion to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction '"unless it also
determines that doing so would not promote the values
articulated in Gibbs: economy, convenience,
fairness, and comity.'" Catzin ...