United States District Court, S.D. New York
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
COLLEEN McMAHON, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
brings this action pro se. By order dated January 8, 2020,
the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed without
prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis
(“IFP”). The Court dismisses this action for the
reasons set forth below.
Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or portion thereof, that
is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage
Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must
also dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, when the Court
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the
Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally,
Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and
interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that
they suggest, ” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted, emphasis in original).
is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in
law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); see also
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (holding
that “a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate
when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or
the wholly incredible”); Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437
(“[A]n action is ‘frivolous' when either: (1)
the factual contentions are clearly baseless . . .; or (2)
the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal
theory.”) (internal quotation marks and citation
brings this action on his own behalf and on behalf of
“Edward Snow” against “Sportefy Inc.”
and four individuals. In the fact section of the complaint,
Plaintiff writes: “claim to support me, claim to pass
me money, asset, propertys [sic], businesses we they make
contact. Attament: New defendant: Victoria Secret model
Swagle [sic] F. With respect to the relief he seeks,
Plaintiff asserts: “transfer of money unlimited,
transfer of asset, transfer of business, explanation.”
when read with the “special solicitude” due pro
se pleadings, Triestman, 470 F.3d at 475, Plaintiff's
claims rise to the level of the irrational, and there is no
legal theory on which he can rely. See Denton, 504 U.S. at
33; Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437.
courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to
amend a complaint to cure its defects, but leave to amend is
not required where it would be futile. See Hill v.
Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011);
Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988).
Because the defects in Plaintiff's complaint cannot be
cured with an amendment, the Court declines to grant
Plaintiff leave to amend and dismisses this action as
frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Plaintiff
has filed numerous actions in this Court beginning in
December 2019, some of which have been dismissed as
frivolous. See, e.g., Calvino v. Jones, ECF
1:19-CV-11601, 3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2019). Plaintiff has
already been warned that further vexatious or frivolous
litigation in this Court will result in an order barring him
under 28 U.S.C. § 1651 from filing new civil actions in
this Court IFP unless he receives prior permission.
(Id.) The Court reiterates that warning.
Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this order to
Plaintiff and note service on the docket.
Court dismisses this action as frivolous under 28 U.S.C.
Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any
appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and
therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal.