United States District Court, S.D. New York
COLLEEN McMAHON, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Royce Corley, currently incarcerated in F.C.I. Petersburg,
appeared pro se and proceeded in forma
pauperis (IFP). He brought this action under the Labor
Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), the Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
(“LMRDA”), the Family and Medical Leave Act
(“FMLA”), and New York law, alleging that his
former employer violated the FMLA and breached the collective
bargaining agreement between the employer and the union, and
that the union breached its duty of fair representation.
review of the Public Access to Electronic Court Records
(PACER) system revealed that on June 16, 2016, Plaintiff
filed an action in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York, suing the same Defendants and
asserting the same claims raised in this complaint. See
Corley v. Farrell, No. 16-CV-3367 (NGG) (SMG) (E.D.N.Y.
Nov. 9, 2016). By Memorandum and Order dated July 18, 2016,
Plaintiff's complaint in that case was dismissed for
failure to state a claim, and Plaintiff was granted thirty
days' leave to file an amended complaint. Id. at
ECF No. 7. Rather than file an amended complaint, Plaintiff
moved for reconsideration of the July 18, 2016 Memorandum and
Order. By Memorandum and Order dated September 16, 2016,
Plaintiff's motion was denied, but Plaintiff was granted
a final opportunity to submit an amended complaint.
Id. at ECF No. 10. After the time for Plaintiff to
submit an amended complaint had elapsed, and Plaintiff had
not submitted an amended complaint, on November 9, 2016, the
Eastern District of New York directed the Clerk of Court to
enter judgment dismissing Plaintiff's case. Id.
at ECF. No. 12. By Mandate issued on April 4, 2017,
Plaintiff's appeal was dismissed. See Corley v.
Farrell, No. 16-3963 (2d Cir. Apr. 4, 2017).
Plaintiff sought to reassert the claims that were asserted
and adjudicated in the Eastern District of New York action,
by order dated May 9, 2018, the Court dismissed the action
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), as barred by
the doctrine of res judicata. (ECF No. 7.) On May
21, 2019, Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, and by Mandate
issued on December 27, 2018, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed Plaintiff's
appeal because “it lack[ed] an arguable basis in either
law or fact.” See Corley v. Farrell, No.
18-1570 (2d Cir. Dec. 27, 2018) (quoting Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
January 8, 2020, Plaintiff filed a motion and memorandum of
law with exhibits, totaling 328 pages, challenging this
Court's May 9, 2018 dismissal order.
Court liberally construes this submission as a motion under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) to alter or amend judgment and a motion
under Local Civil Rule 6.3 for reconsideration, and, in the
alternative, as a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) for relief
from a judgment or order. See Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006); see also
Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101 (2d Cir. 2010)
(noting that the solicitude afforded to pro se
litigants takes a variety of forms, including liberal
construction of papers, “relaxation of the limitations
on the amendment of pleadings, ” leniency in the
enforcement of other procedural rules, and “deliberate,
continuing efforts to ensure that a pro se litigant
understands what is required of him”) (citations
omitted). After reviewing the arguments in Plaintiff's
submission, the Court denies the motion.
standards governing Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) and Local Civil Rule
6.3 are the same. R.F.M.A.S., Inc. v. Mimi So, 640
F.Supp.2d 506, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). The movant must
demonstrate that the Court overlooked “controlling law
or factual matters” that had been previously put before
it. Id. at 509 (discussing the standard in the
context of both Local Civil Rule 6.3 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e));
see Padilla v. Maersk Line, Ltd., 636 F.Supp.2d 256,
258-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). “Such motions must be narrowly
construed and strictly applied in order to discourage
litigants from making repetitive arguments on issues that
have been thoroughly considered by the court.”
Range Road Music, Inc. v. Music Sales Corp., 90
F.Supp.2d 390, 391-92 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see also Simplex
Grinnell LP v. Integrated Sys. & Power, Inc., 642
F.Supp.2d 206, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[A] motion for
reconsideration is not an invitation to parties to treat the
court's initial decision as the opening of a dialogue in
which that party may then use such a motion to advance new
theories or adduce new evidence in response to the
court's ruling.”) (internal quotation and citations
has failed to demonstrate in his motion that the Court
overlooked any controlling decisions or factual matters with
respect to the dismissed action. Plaintiff's motion under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) and Local Civil Rule 6.3 is therefore
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), a party may seek relief from a district
court's order or judgment for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable
diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for
a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously
called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other
misconduct of an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged;
it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or
vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable;
or (6) any other reason justifying relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
Court has considered Plaintiff's arguments, and even
under a liberal interpretation of his motion, Plaintiff has
failed to allege facts demonstrating that any of the grounds
listed in the first five clauses of Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) apply.
Therefore, the motion under Rule 60(b)(1)-(5) is denied.
extent that Plaintiff seeks relief under Fed.R.Civ.P.
60(b)(6), the motion is also denied. “[A] Rule 60(b)(6)
motion must be based upon some reason other than those stated
in clauses (1)-(5).” United Airlines, Inc. v.
Brien, 588 F.3d 158, 175 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting
Smith v. Sec'y of HHS, 776 F.2d 1330, 1333 (6th
Cir. 1985)). A party moving under Rule 60(b)(6) cannot
circumvent the one-year limitation applicable to claims under
clauses (1)-(3) by invoking the residual clause (6) of Rule
60(b). Id. A Rule 60(b)(6) motion must show both
that the motion was filed within a “reasonable
time” and that “‘extraordinary
circumstances' [exist] to warrant relief.” Old
Republic Ins. Co. v. Pac. Fin. Servs. of America, Inc.,
301 F.3d 54, 59 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam) ...